NG|FH – Quarterly 1|2019

Editorial

In record time the idea of »identity politics« has become an ultra-hot topic among the broader public in both Europe and the USA. On both sides of the Atlantic, and increasingly in Latin America too, identitarian political movements challenge liberal democracy and, in some places, are making successful bids for power. A few of these movements even pride themselves on using the new term »identitarian« to describe their programs. Although they try to mask their real intentions, make no mistake about it: The substantive core of their doctrines constitutes a direct existential assault on the spirit and form of pluralist democracy. In effect, they are fighting a two-front war. Their first attack is aimed at pluralism itself, essential to any kind of democracy worthy of the name, which recognizes the equal rights of all citizens to defend their interests and ensures that all cultural, religious, and ethnic identities are given due respect. Their critique of pluralism undermines the very foundations of modern democracy: the commitment to uphold human and civic rights. The second assault calls upon the »people« to take back control of their own destiny, but defines the people such that only members of the relevant religious or ethnic identity group can be considered as its members. The challenge that this far-right current of thought issues to democracy is deeply at odds with democracy's public-image and with the values and institutions embedded in democratic constitutions. Consequently, rightist identity politics loves to put on democratic airs. That is the reason why it nearly always refashions the idea of »the people« to suit its own purposes before launching campaigns to expand popular sovereignty. Articles in this issue should help us to distinguish such right-wing versions of identity politics from their »leftist« counterparts which seek to defend an inclusive politics and fight for the equal rights of disadvantaged identity groups, whether defined by gender or ethnicity. But we may ask: is there any connection between the recent upsurge of »right-wing« identity politics and the achievements of their »left-wing« opponents? In Europe, ethnically-based parties have actually taken power in a few countries like Hungary and Poland. And their success has already begun to shake the foundations of the European Union. Not only do they question the Union's basic values; they also rely on their joint veto power in crucial decision-making bodies to block some of the EU's more promising counter-strategies. This entire issue thus demands our close attention. Other questions discussed in this number, especially those related to migration and integration, likewise are linked to the question of identity politics.

Thomas Meyer
Editor-in-Chief and Co-Publisher

Meike Büscher
A look back at Sweden's parliamentary elections

This year's elections to the Swedish parliament turned out to be very close. The center-left bloc made up of the Social Democrats, Greens, and the Party of the Left won just one more seat than a second bloc, the bourgeois alliance, that includes the Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and the Center Party. But because the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats grew even stronger, a new third bloc was established. No doubt a lurch to the right did take place, even though it proved to be smaller than many had feared on the basis of opinion polls taken in the weeks before the election. Even though Sweden is used to having minority governments, forming any kind of government will be complicated in the wake of such a close electoral outcome and the hardening of lines between the blocs. The Sweden Democrats are overrepresented primarily in rural areas and among poorly educated voters, men, and those who evince a low level of trust in politicians. On a left-right axis, they would be classified as on the right when it comes to issues concerning the welfare state and taxation. On the GAL-TAN scale – which depicts a different line of conflict (where GAL = green, alternative, liberal and TAN = traditional, authoritarian, nationalistic) – they would be classified as TAN. Among other positions, they take a critical stance on immigration and demand limits on the right to an abortion. The other end of the same scale (GAL) is represented by the Party of the Left, the Social Democrats, the Greens, as well as the Liberals and the Center Party. In the election this libertarian versus authoritarian dimension played a major role and moved into the foreground, particularly during debates over migration and integration. It also divides the bourgeois bloc, with the Liberals and Center Party on the libertarian side, and the Conservatives and Christian Democrats on the authoritarian side.

Even though the Social Democrats remained the strongest party in parliament with 28 % of the vote, this was still their worst electoral showing in over 100 years. Moreover, one should not downplay the fact that the Conservatives were also big losers, in fact more so than any other party. Their poor performance suggests that there is a crisis brewing in the »big-tent« parties too.

Classic social democratic issues

Furthermore, we might well wonder whether we are witnessing the birth of a new big-tent party. That, at least, is the ambition of the Sweden Democrats. They are attempting to move away from being a one-issue party (migration) and hoping to make their mark in other areas as well, such as health care or education, although they usually lump those issues together with migration, since they portray the latter as the root cause of problems in these other fields. That strategy enabled the Sweden Democrats to attract many voters who ordinarily would have voted for the Conservatives or Social Democrats. In addition, their anti-establishment attitudes may have won them some new support. Finally, a study of voter transition shows that those who vote for the Sweden Democrats are very loyal; in fact, 86 % of them had already voted for that party in 2014. The Social Democrats' strategy of trying to win

back lost voters by moving closer to the policies of the Sweden Democrats did not work. On the contrary, their calls for harsher punishments for criminals and a stricter migration policy made their poll numbers sink even lower. Not until the final weeks before the election, when they waged a campaign replete with classic social democratic issues, did their poll numbers begin to rise again. Evidently, their promises to improve working conditions, invest more money in education and health, and introduce an extra week of vacation for families did manage to lure some previous supporters back into the fold. According to some studies, many voters considered those issues to be the most important ones in the election.

Shifting the debate away from migration issues and back toward social democratic issues and questions of distribution seemed to usher in a positive trend for the party. A glance at the regions in which the Social Democrats suffered their biggest losses also illustrates this point. These were mainly electoral districts in which the infrastructure of the welfare state had been dismantled, such as in the region of Västernorrland, where entire wings of hospitals had been closed. There are many structurally weak rural areas in Sweden. Furthermore, as a general rule, the level of social inequality has been increasing rapidly since the 1990s. Social segregation is proceeding apace, while there is now such a huge gap between the working conditions and salaries of different individuals and classes that one can now say of Sweden that living conditions and opportunities in the country are no longer the same for all. At the same time, classical working-class careers are declining in status, while professions requiring education in academic settings are more highly valued. When individuals experience such depreciation of their social positions and identity, they may attempt to restore their lost sense of personal worth by denigrating other (weaker) groups in society such as migrants and by clinging more tenaciously to notions of identity associated with their Swedish nationality. The latter may bestow on them a sense of belonging and recognition, at least within those groups. Such battles over status are waged on several fronts. For example, members of the new college-educated middle class in cities draw sharp lines of distinction between themselves and their erstwhile working-class identity. So in addition to the actual increases in the inequality of wealth, there is also a climate of social devaluation. Both factors lead to processes of sociocultural closure that in turn can become the seedbeds for intensified social conflicts. Here too, social democratic policies of distribution and investment in the welfare state could offer an opportunity to counter such trends.

An additional factor that surely helps account for the Social Democrats' better-than-expected performance were the over 1.5 million conversations that their campaign supporters conducted with citizens during the campaign. Considering that Sweden has only ten million inhabitants, that is a remarkable number.

Finally, there was the support given by the umbrella organization of organized labor in Sweden, the LO. The unambiguous positions it took and its clear rejection of any cooperation with the Sweden Democrats insured that the Social Democrats would be perceived as a safe alternative that would act as a direct check on the ambitions of that far-right party. In sum, it can be ascertained that a combination of

classical social democratic policies, a clear stance against right-wing populists, and the mobilization of the base in the election gave the Social Democrats the lift they needed in the last election. It remains to be seen whether that will be enough for the necessary work of coalition-building.

Meike Büscher

is a sociologist who works as a research associate and project manager in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's Stockholm Office for the Nordic Countries.

meike.buscher@fesnord.se

Thomas Meyer
The Politics of Identity

What is it really about?

The trajectory of the concept »identity politics« has been short and steep, as it has come virtually out of nowhere to reach the top of the political agenda. The concept has three sources that continue to nourish the three main meanings that attach to it today. All three issue in a brand of politics that insists upon the primacy of cultural membership in specific groups and represents exclusively their interests. The concept of identity politics exhibits a pervasive ambiguity that is never resolved until the context is revealed in which it is to be applied. This is so because the concept embraces both the politics of groups sharing a cultural identity that seek preeminence vis-á-vis other groups, and efforts to achieve equality for minority cultural groups (e.g. homosexuals). But the concept has achieved its high profile in all contexts by putting the accent on cultural rather than economic or political interests. Therefore, conflicts in the politics of identity show up primarily as fights for recognition rather than quarrels over distribution, although at a deeper level those dimensions frequently merge. Because identities are indivisible (albeit amenable to being combined), the politics of identity in all of its versions tends toward polarization and unwillingness to compromise.

One of the three sources of the concept of identity politics can be traced back to the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989. This sudden event provoked an intense debate about what the major axis of conflict would be now that previously dominant global ideologies had been superseded. Almost immediately, it turned out that the famous interpretation of the world situation offered by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama (we are now at the »end of history« and liberal capitalism has proven to be the solution to the riddle of history) would not endure. Instead, his colleague Samuel Huntington quickly swept the field with a hypothesis that even today continues to attract adherents and users: We are witnessing the dawn of the age of identity politics or the »clash of civilizations,« in which the irreconcilable, religiously saturated identity claims of the latter will become the principal causes of

all great political conflicts. The latter will manifest themselves primarily in struggles between specific countries or, by extension, among their diaspora groups living in many other countries.

According to Huntington, the politics of the 21st century will play out in an age of unavoidable cultural clashes among the world's cultures because as a matter of principle they will not be able to move past the limits of their divergent interpretations of the world to reach any final consensus about the crucial issues that must always be resolved if human beings are to coexist. But for the individuals who dwell within such civilizations, the latter represent the ultimate opportunity to find a deeply felt source of meaning with which they can identify. According to this interpretation (proposed by Huntington as early as 1983), the true bleakness of their situation did not become apparent to the people of the world until the end of the 20th century, for only then did they confront one another in their nakedness without the filter of culture-transcending ideologies. That, at least, was Huntington's diagnosis in 1993. To a great extent since then, his theories have provoked mood swings, irritation, fears, and hopes that his prophecies might be used to serve partisan ends.

The arena of cultural conflict

In this view, the 21st century will become the arena of cultural conflicts that quite possibly might culminate in a great world war: the decisive battle among various claims to cultural supremacy in light of which all opportunities for consensus and mutual understanding will forever remain essentially blocked (Huntington 1996). The world will fall victim to various forms of fundamentalism that will seize power in every culture, since they will be the most powerful paradigms of the new politics of identity. From this point of view cultures will be less and less able to understand one another and reach a consensus the more they recognize how much they differ from one another, now that they have been freed from the remaining ideological blinkers and the protection afforded by geographic distance. Thus, the war of ideologies will be succeeded by wars between civilizations. Though the latter might be cold wars in the beginning, they could develop into hot ones much more quickly than the unsuspecting world imagines.

Huntington's model thus reveals a modern world doomed to perpetual conflict, a new age of global identity politics. Such a dark vision seems very likely to shape the reality it purports merely to describe, even if its factual core is empirically untenable. Religious, cultural, and political entrepreneurs of identity are only too happy to appropriate it as a way of justifying their own practice. And many other people begin to act as though the model were in fact accurate, thinking they would be well-advised to do so on the assumption that the others certainly will. Thus, from the very outset this model was destined to become a self-fulfilling prophecy all over the world. It had the potential to superimpose self-generated conflicts over recognition upon socioeconomic class conflicts and other quarrels over distribution, or simply to suppress the latter entirely. That point is well illustrated by every shade of fundamentalism, most conspicuously in the case of Islamic fundamentalism but even in its Protestant form in the USA, where it has become the country's strongest pressure

group. In all these cases, where we confront a movement of identity politics built on religious and cultural foundations, we find that the religious tradition has been hijacked to serve the ends of power politics. That is, religious practices are transformed into a political ideology. Comparative global research has shown that every familiar religion has been instrumentalized in this manner, yet not one of them, in and of itself, is ineluctably fundamentalist.

The second continuously influential source of the concept of identity politics is the new right and its intellectual tone-setter, the French scholar and activist Alain de Benoist. He originated the idea of an identitarian movement and politics, although the latter has roots in the folk-romantic goal of an ethnically pure political community with no intermingling of races. Ethnopluralism is a right-wing populist ideology widespread throughout Europe that has helped to resurrect the commandment that races should be kept pure, albeit now in the slightly modernized form of ethnically defined cultures. The »mingling« of ethnic groups or peoples allegedly causes the decline of their culture and social cohesion. The admission of migrants from other cultures into the countries of Europe supposedly violates not only the Europeans' natural right to ethnic-cultural self-preservation, but also the same right enjoyed by the immigrants themselves to their own ethno-cultural identity.

At first glance it appears striking how close Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations comes to the concept of »ethnopluralism« which the new right has chosen as its political lodestar in Europe, in the form of an »identitarian movement.« The political convictions and intentions may differ completely in the two cases. Yet the convergence of the results and thereby the consonance of their political effects are therefore not coincidental. They are the outcome of an essentialist or naturalistic conception of culture that both Huntington and the new right take as foundational, and for similar reasons. Their approaches also have the same consequences for the use of their concepts in practical-political matters, no matter what the respective authors may have considered politically desirable in this regard.

As a first step, the various cultures seemingly are liberated from the hierarchies of superiority/inferiority characteristic of old-fashioned right-wing intellectual traditions. This is an act of ostentatious modernization imposed upon the stock of far-right thinking. Cultures as such are now portrayed as inherently of equal worth, whatever their content might be. But then the concept of culture is naturalized such that the diversity of human cultures is seen in the light of naturally given and firmly delineated identities and differences, much like the diversity of genuses and species in nature itself. As a result of this operation, human culture itself is seen as exhibiting traits akin to those studied by biology. Thus, there is no longer any need to have recourse to the kind of biologism that has been tabooed in the post-fascist era, nor is there any reason to bother about denying its premises, intentions, and effects. By treating culture and ethnicity as quasi-natural phenomena, ethnopluralism achieves its desired result: the differences between cultures almost inevitably begin to seem absolute. Hence, any attempt to mingle them or change them in any substantial way seems to represent a potentially fatal departure from the conditions that sustain cultural life in human communities.

Thus, it is precisely the equality of cultures (assuming that they have already been subjected to ethnic-naturalistic reification) that justifies the radical demand that »alien« cultures should not settle and continue developing in the West. That, of course, is really the »bottom line« for the new right. The representatives of non-Western cultures should go back to where they came from, not only in the interest of the »people here« to keep everything alien at arm's length, but also to exercise their right to and interest in preserving their own kind of civilization back home. And so, we have an apparently consistent egalitarian justification for a form of segregation that, seen in the right light, quickly turns out to be the same old racist chauvinism.

Ethnopluralism as one finds it expressed in the thought of the European new right occupies exactly the same position that openly biological racism held in the traditional forms of right-wing extremism. However, the neo-racist doctrine of ethnopluralism wishes to create the impression that it is compatible with human and democratic rights by calling for a separation of ethno-cultures from each other rather than insisting upon the domination or even the extinction of one by another. Consequently, the fundamental principle of this right-wing version of the politics of identity is apartheid. The rise of a brand of identity politics with ethno-cultural overtones in a number of eastern European countries, especially Poland and Hungary, follows exactly this pattern with only slight variations.

Inclusion, not exclusion

In contrast to the other two, the third source of the concept of identity politics has emerged most strongly in the left-wing regions of the political landscape. Initially, it issued forth most bountifully in the United States, but in the meantime it has become virtually a global phenomenon. Here, the point is to include cultures, not exclude them. The beacon of this version of identity politics is to be found in the African-American civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr. which gained momentum in the 50s and 60s. That movement's objective was to integrate this large »ethnic« group, one that had suffered so much discrimination, into the mainstream of American society. The American philosopher Judith Butler also deserves to be commended for her highly effective international engagement on behalf of a form of identity politics based on self-consciousness and recognition of the equal rights of a growing number of marginalized cultural minorities all over the world as full members of the social and political mainstream.

The cultural minorities whose recognition and rights have been championed by the left and/or liberal identity movement are quite diverse, yet they form part of groups that are always defined primarily in cultural rather than social terms. At present, and depending on the level of development and social situation in a given country, they may include (among others) Native Americans, African Americans and Hispanics in the United States, women, gays and lesbians, transgender and intersex people, the elderly, the homeless, former psychiatric patients, and the disabled.

One noteworthy feature of this left-wing identity politics, the aim of which clearly is to achieve equal rights and emancipation for disadvantaged groups, is its inherent open-endedness. Every successful push for greater equality inevitably

brings to light residual claims to equal recognition that still have not been honored. After capitalism appeared to have been tamed in the Western world in the course of the first few postwar decades, it seemed as though the issues and motive forces of left-wing identity politics *qua* struggle for recognition might overshadow the classic left-wing socioeconomic conflicts over distribution, at least in the USA and a few European countries. Gay marriage and, shortly thereafter, a right of adoption for homosexuals seemed more significant in public debates than social inequality and control of economic power. Right now rancorous debates are raging in leftist and liberal circles on the question of whether and to what degree the left's fixation on ever-new issues in identity politics may be the cause of its own debility and, at the same time, of the strengthening of the populist right.

Thomas Meyer

is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Dortmund and Editor-in-Chief of the journal *Neue Gesellschaft|Frankfurter Hefte* (the parent publication of the *International Quarterly*). His most recent book, entitled *Die Unbelangbaren: Wie politische Journalisten mitregieren*, was published by Suhrkamp in 2015.

thomas.meyer@fes.de

A Conversation with Wolfgang Merkel and Gesine Schwan
Europe's Borders

What is the best way to counter right-wing populism in Europe? Does Europe have to close its borders and, if so, to what extent? And can we make progress in gaining acceptance for refugees by involving local government and civil society? These were some of the topics addressed by the political scientist Gesine Schwan, chair of the SPD's Committee on Basic Values and president of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform (which she co-founded) and Wolfgang Merkel, director of the department »Democracy and Democratization« at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Professor of Political Science at Berlin's Humboldt University, and member of the SPD's Committee on Basic Values. Thomas Meyer conducted the interview.

NG|FH: Considering the many debates on the evolution of migration policy, the rise of right-wing populism, and the recent futile attempts to reach agreement about it, many people are beginning to think that Europe cannot survive unless it turns itself into a fortress. Does that opinion have any merit?

Wolfgang Merkel: I think that idea is disastrous, because we describe European societies as open, and rightly so. Retreating into a fortress would flatly contradict that openness. To be sure, we really are on the way toward doing so, and the explanation for that is not always xenophobia. Behind the fortress mentality there often lurks a thoroughly practical view of politics. Many citizens insist that the European Union should control its borders. That gives them a certain security. We need to have an unprejudiced debate about the extent to which we want to open or close the

borders. I want to stay away from the concept of a »fortress,« but stricter controls can be legitimate from both a democratic and an ethical standpoint.

Gesine Schwan: That is the way I see it too. But the central issue is whether it is even possible for us to control the borders by closing them. If it is to be successful, control implies that people will respect the borders voluntarily whether from the inside or the outside. When the rush to the borders of Europe came in 2015, we could not control them. The idea that external borders can be controlled by closing them completely and not allowing refugees any legal ways and procedures to enter, is unrealistic, since then it would not make sense for them to cross only at official crossing points. Refugees will find a way to get around closures. Many people do not understand that controls and voluntary respect for them go hand in hand.

NG|FH: But it is at least conceivable that borders could be controlled rigidly.

Schwan: One can reduce the numbers for a while, assuming one is willing to reckon with a lot of fatalities in the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa. But then people will find other, more expensive ways, which will imply still greater selection, since only those with the money will be able to cross the borders.

In my view, it is an illusion to think that we can seal off the borders hermetically. Above all, doing that would imply a degree of cynicism about our values that would have redounded upon our own social structure. One just cannot advocate values toward the outside world while simultaneously trampling them underfoot. So we have to act in accord with our values and international law, and find a way to persuade even refugees that they have an interest in respecting our borders.

Merkel: It is a lovely utopia to imagine that the refugees will respect borders. It is also an illusion to believe that we will have a situation in the countries of origin anytime soon that will no longer induce refugees to come here. But I think we should do a lot more in these countries than we have done up to now. The first step would be to open up European markets to agricultural products from outside. And if, in addition, we ramp up significantly our development efforts in the countries from which refugees come, we will have greater legitimacy to control our borders better, thereby taking the wind out of the sails of the right-wing populists.

The one argument reflects an ethic of responsibility; it asks us to look at what the consequences are for our open societies. The second is an argument of legitimacy, according to which effective aid must be offered in the countries of origin rather than in the countries of destination for those who have fled.

Schwan: I would argue just the opposite. To the extent that we manage through a variety of channels to prohibit the privileging of European agricultural products and the closure of borders in Africa and to the extent that we advance genuine development via political steps, financing, and the exchange of know-how, the pressure on our borders will ease and then we can control them.

There are strong reasons to push back against right-wing radicalism. Nevertheless, we will accept large numbers of refugees in the future as well. Thus, from my perspective it is important for us to maintain a decentralized intake of refugees in Europe and, in addition, find ways to enable citizens to participate in the relevant decisions. For me, this would be the proper way to de-legitimize the right.

NG|FH: It is hard to deny that there is a close connection between the previous way of making refugee policy in Europe and the rise of right-wing populism. After the elections scheduled for next year, there presumably will be far more right-wing populists in the European Parliament than ever before. Is it even still possible for Europe to manage the issue of migration politically and institutionally?

And to add another question: Are the broad-gauged European trends toward neo-authoritarian systems and identity politics mainly caused by domestic policy, or are they given legitimacy by the migration and refugee situations?

Merkel: The three major themes around which right-wing populists mobilize today are, first, migration, second, anti-Islamic attitudes, and third, the EU. Usually, they are linked to one another, for example through the claim that the EU does not prevent migration and that, in addition, the latter is still coming mainly from Muslim countries. Of course, I don't accept that argument, but I do think that the German government, at least, probably has made mistakes. Consider the famous statement: »Asylum knows no upper limit,« which came up in almost every debate here in 2015/2016. By 2016 it was already obvious that only about 3 % of the new arrivals really qualified as asylum seekers under the relevant sections of the law. So the discussion was definitely on the wrong track. Germany, especially, which acted without any sort of vote, should have felt compelled to say: »We do control the borders and naturally there are upper limits.« Even positivists in international law would not deny that. Nevertheless, we do want to be generous in accepting refugees, but not the ones who have come to us via the migration routes, but rather the ones from camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, and then in conformity with criteria of social responsibility. I say that deliberately, because by this time – even in the SPD – we are having a debate about a predominantly utilitarian immigration law geared to the needs of the labor market.

We have completely forgotten the discussions of the 70s and encouraged a brain drain from developing countries, which is actually just what we wanted to prevent, since it retards their development. We have to establish different criteria: We need generous policies on the admission of refugees, but we should also get to decide who is admitted. We would then have the moral legitimacy required to enforce our border controls and a better chance that migration would be perceived here at home as socially responsible.

NG|FH: Ms. Schwan, do you have the impression that a common European policy on migration is possible, one that would be accepted and desired by everybody and that would work both qualitatively and quantitatively?

Schwan: From my perspective, I would consider it to be possible if the EU (or, more concretely, the European Council, the assembly of nation-state governments) were smart and far-sighted enough to do something like that. There are proposals along those lines. I don't deny that migration and refugee policies are quite crucial instruments of mobilization for right-wing politics. However, I do think that – especially in Western Europe – they are a form of scapegoating which distracts from problems that have evoked feelings of insecurity elsewhere. As I see it, those problems include great social inequalities reflected, for example, in the undermining of social security systems. And, of course, it is easy to instrumentalize something like that.

In east-central Europe, not all governments have come to power due to the migration controversy. For example, issues such as insecurity and injustice played a major role in the success of the Polish party PiS. The migration issue, of course, was added later. The situation is also different in the Czech Republic. And in East Germany the decisive factors were broken promises made by the reunification treaty – for example, concerning pensions and safeguards for divorced women. There, insecurity and anger did set the political tone, although at first those sentiments drew on other sources besides the migration issue.

So now the question is: How do we reach a point of convergence? In my opinion, that can happen only on a voluntary basis. And the political runup will be important. For years now, the German Federal Government has left Italy, Spain, and Greece to deal with the refugees by themselves. Our former federal interior minister described the problem as an Italian matter. So when the right wing takes power, as in Italy, and the interior minister there, Matteo Salvini, closes the ports, that is obviously unacceptable. However, the fact that the Italians are outraged that the Germans and/or the Europeans didn't want to take those newly arrived refugees off their hands is understandable, and by now has been understood by the German public. Anger builds up when communication breaks down.

I believe that it might work if a kind of »coalition of the willing« could be cobbled together: e.g., consisting of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Germany, Sweden, and probably also Belgium and the Netherlands. They would have to operate several European asylum control centers in which things would move very quickly following the Dutch method, where those who have been recognized as refugees voluntarily register on a contact exchange that enables them to be settled on a decentralized basis. The states guarantee that they will accept a contingent of refugees, but they allow their local governments to submit applications indicating how many refugees they want to accept and what incentives they expect to receive in the way of additional development funding.

All the parts will not mesh perfectly even under that system, but whenever such a heightened scheme of cooperation exists, national governments would be freed from the pressure of sending refugees somewhere just because they have is an empty barracks available, thereby antagonizing the local residents.

NG|FH: Would governments in countries like Poland and Hungary allow local governments to apply and accept refugees in any significant numbers?

Schwan: At first, they might allow it if the refugees were coming only from south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Chechnya. They probably would permit it on a regional level, which might give rise to a movement in which mayors – and I can confirm this for Danzig and Warsaw – would say: We would like to move ahead with certain developments, and for that we need certain kinds of workers. That won't happen overnight, but there will be a change of heart. Attitudes will change at the grass roots, and there will be new synergies, in Poland especially within the Catholic Church.

Merkel: Wouldn't that have to be financed from the center, with EU funds?

Schwan: I am for that.

Merkel: And wouldn't it have to involve a simultaneous equalization of living conditions for all refugees, whether they found shelter in Germany or Greece?

Schwan: Yes, but on a voluntary basis in each case.

Merkel: In this context we have the ugly word »asylum tourism.« It suggests that people go to the countries that will give them the best deal, including in an economic sense. At the end of the day, why should they bother staying in Greece or even Italy, when Sweden, Germany, and Austria offer better accommodations? Couldn't the EU declare this to be a responsibility of the entire community? Of course, then they would need new tax revenues from the member countries. But it would be possible to equalize conditions, thus discouraging migrants from moving on to the best destination countries.

NG|FH: But doesn't that assume that greater social and economic equalization would first have to take place inside of Europe?

Schwan: No. Of course, living conditions will differ. But it also means that, if someone decided, say, to go to Portugal, local governments there likewise would declare what their costs would be, just as if they were in Germany. So you would have different levels of funding corresponding to cost differences. Then the question becomes: Will the refugees remain in those local jurisdictions? I believe that there is a great difference between freely choosing a place to live, and having it assigned to you.

Local governments would have to indicate on their websites what kind of people they need and what terms they are willing to offer. Refugees who arrive in centers of this kind would have the opportunity to decide to go where their relatives are already living and where the cultural setting suits them, and where lodging, good educational opportunities, and jobs are waiting. But then it's not just material incentives that play a role in their decisions.

NG|FH: And they would have to pledge to stay there for a specific period of time?

Schwan: That is the next question: When is it appropriate to impose obligations and when do you rely on voluntary choices? I think that residence in a specific place for a certain period of time ought to be obligatory. But in this case, of course, we must call upon the support of local governments. In the social sciences all this is sub-sumed under the heading of »factors affecting residence,« such as when we enable refugees to acquire property in their new abodes. Thus, if they make the voluntary choice of a new home and from the very outset can take a look at what is being offered there, and if they are provided with a holistic integration orientation, includ-ing sports, culture, shared cuisine, etc., the likelihood of their remaining there – even for the next few years – is considerably greater.

NG|FH: Mr. Merkel, if the migration problem were to be solved in a European sense, much as Ms. Schwan has just sketched out for us, would that have repercussions in those countries? Would it pull the rug out from under those far-right populist regimes?

Merkel: I don't think so. This is all a bit speculative, but I don't assume that, in Hun-gary or the other Visegrád countries for example, there would be a larger-scale intake of refugees. I don't believe that shifting the level of decision-making from the central government to local governments plus the citizenry would change anything essential on this point. I suspect that the progressive, liberal societies in the West would admit many more, with a single exception: France. Here my opinion differs from yours. You won't be able to solve the problem of right-wing authoritarianism in a few countries by this approach. The issue of migration is by no means the deci-sive one there. In eastern Europe, newly-acquired national sovereignty also plays a role. They defend it tenaciously against Brussels, and that is understandable. In my opinion, the idea that sanctions will turn those countries into liberal democratic systems again misses the point. It is more likely that they just will just be grist for the mill of the right wing.

NG|FH: Where do you think this trend is heading?

Merkel: There is a conflict between two distinct types of democracy in Europe. On one hand, you have open, liberal democracy tinged with cosmopolitanism, in which individual and group rights figure prominently. The Scandinavian countries as well as France and Germany illustrate this type. On the other hand, you have forms of democracy that regard the full articulation of these liberal elements and individual and groups rights as elitist and wish to strengthen popular sovereignty, the other dimension of democracy, against those liberal elites.

NG|FH: Of course, a modern understanding of democracy that fuses the rule of law with popular sovereignty underlies the European Union. So if this other »type of democracy« maintains itself over the long term, perhaps in the Visegrád countries, can the EU deal with that or will it be torn apart?

Merkel: Well, at any rate one sees the limits of the »deepening« of the EU in this case. Presumably, the EU is going to have to deal with that. There are certain boundaries and red lines. By studying the treaties on which the EU is based, one can determine whether those limits and lines already have been crossed in Poland and Hungary. There is no question whatsoever that »illiberalization« is proceeding apace in those countries, and that we need to criticize it sternly. But to what extent may the EU or a group of member states dictate to the societies of the Visegrád countries what form of government they should have? We are talking about democratically-elected governments here. In these matters the EU has a mandate based on the treaties, but it does not have a democratic mandate.

Schwan: I see matters a little differently. In Poland the current governing party, the PiS, was elected by about 38 % of the voters. But that certainly does not mean that society as a whole, even those 38 %, wanted to change their system. In fact, the PiS did not campaign on a promise to make such a change. Instead, it promised higher child care subsidies for families and better social security. So when the EU criticizes the current Polish government, one cannot say that they are imposing a model of politics on that government. After all, a lot of people are fighting against the government in Poland and against the fact that the rule of law is being set aside. Relying on the advice of experts, the EU is backing up those regime critics by pointing out that the conditions that Poland had to meet in order to join the EU are still in effect. Thus, there is no question here of a surprise coup by the European Commission. There are deficiencies in states where the rule of law prevails too. But in this instance principles are being undermined and it is by no means the case that the entire Polish society approves of that.

NG|FH: Are things coming to a head on this question in Polish society?

Schwan: Yes, they are. A number of distinct currents of opinion may be observed. There is opposition, but also resignation. For example, the Catholic church in Poland is putting some distance between itself and the very primitive way in which refugees and migrants generally are being treated, and it is expressing its disappointment in no uncertain terms. For instance, a well-known Polish priest wrote in the important Polish weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* that the Polish government is basically de-Christianizing the country by trampling underfoot all Christian values.

So there is much more opposition in Poland than we imagine here. We have to stake our hopes on civil society. An »out« homosexual who had started a new political party suddenly found himself the mayor of the small Polish town of Słupsk. Also, much is happening in the environmental field, where there is major opposition to the truly irrational coal policy in Silesia that is being pushed by the coal companies in cahoots with the present government and will prove disastrous in the long run. Poland, like many other countries, is a dynamic place. The EU should make this known. That would lend support to the people in those societies who are fighting against the erosion of the rule of law from the inside. But the European Union will never succeed in depriving Poland of its voting rights. For that to happen, the decision would have to be unanimous, and Hungary would never go along with it.

Anna-Lena Kirch

Minilateralism on the March

The present state of the EU calls for new models of cooperation

The current legislative period of the European Union under the Juncker Commission is rapidly approaching an end. In anticipation of the upcoming European elections in May, 2019, accomplishments and deficiencies are being weighed and prognoses risked about how the EU might evolve in the next few months and years. Throughout this process, all matters of detail are overshadowed by the realization that the state of the Union, in respect to its stability, resilience, and European cohesion, is considerably worse now than it was five years ago. Whereas the last European elections were dominated by the consequences of the economic and sovereign debt crises, today the list of crises and negative scenarios is far longer and more confusing.

A related point is that the future prospects of the EU are now quite different than they were then. Back In 2014, EU discourse was dominated by discussions about comprehensive reform, how European integration could be pushed ahead more resolutely, and how the EU could »do great things on a grand scale, while doing little things on a small scale.« Today, with several crises and one Brexit referendum in the rear-view mirror, the discourse has become conspicuously more fatalistic and considerably more reactive. For the foreseeable future, no one wants to »roll the dice« for the EU in the form of proposing far-reaching steps toward integration that would involve many member states. Instead, the individual countries remain preoccupied with efforts at pragmatic damage control. Some see a far-reaching disintegration of Europe as a real danger.

Notions such as »differentiated integration,« »a Europe moving at different speeds,« or »core Europe« are by no means novelties in this debate. Still, it is striking how much current models of the future are preoccupied with schemes for flexible cooperation and minilateral »coalitions of the willing.« This is true not only of initiatives emanating from the European Commission – for example in the context of the White Book on Europe's Future, presented in March of 2017 by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker – but even for those coming from the member states.

Thus, it should not be surprising that current, potentially sustainable initiatives are frequently of a voluntary nature and rely on flexible structures. In the field of security and defense, one example is provided by the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) scheme, located structurally within the legal framework of the EU, which at present has 28 members. Other initiatives are of an intergovernmental nature and deliberately situated outside the EU's formal institutions in order to encourage faster and more efficient results. This category includes, for example, the Intervention Initiative to Promote Autonomous European Defense Capabilities advocated by French President Emmanuel Macron, one goal of which was to bind Great Britain tightly to European cooperation arrangements even after Brexit.

Insecurity and low trust

These examples from the field of security and defense policy fit into a European discourse that, seeking to design practicable future scenarios for the EU, highlights flexibility and minilateralism as the least among numerous possible evils. The reasons for this move are to be sought in a network of self-generating and self-reinforcing factors within the Union: namely, insecurity and low levels of trust. In addition, many European capitals are haunted by the fear that excessively drastic steps – such as far-reaching reforms of the economic and monetary union – would require changes in the EU's underlying treaties and thus would trigger referenda in some of the member states. Those, in turn, might open a Pandora's box of troubles. In light of recent survey results, the risk of failure in such a case is judged to be too high. The negative outcome of the 2016 referendum in which the Netherlands voted down a treaty of association with Ukraine is still fresh in the minds of decision-makers.

One critical source of danger for the survival of the EU-27 derives from the progressive erosion of multilateral structures and the gradual weakening of the international global order that grew up alongside them. This trend, which is affecting policy areas such as climate, trade, health, security, and defense, is aided and abetted by the policies of the current government in the United States as well as by the influence exerted by illiberal third countries such as China and Russia.

But at the same time when European countries pursue policies such as these, they contribute to the weakening of multilateral structures. The latter then lag behind in meeting agreed-upon targets (e.g., goals to halt climate change and defense spending targets) or else violate fundamental European principles or the secondary agreements derived from them. In each case, developments of this kind harm the EU in a quite specific way, since the Union relies, both internally and externally, on functioning supranational and/or multilateral structures as well as on the validity of norms anchored in the rule of law. When this order is hollowed out, the EU loses influence and credibility.

The more the impression spreads that the EU is slow to fulfill its promises and cannot solve crucial problems, the more serious becomes the danger that individual EU member states and actors will announce that they are looking for new partners or that they »must take their destiny into their own hands.« In practice this choice might mean that they will search for their own solutions to guaranteeing energy independence, that they want their own security guarantees in defense policy, or that they want to find their own partners to check irregular immigration. The nightmare scenario of pro-European actors is of a further fragmentation of the EU, accompanied by an accelerating loss of its international heft. Jean-Claude Juncker repeatedly addressed the potential dangers of this scenario in his speech on the state of the Union delivered on September 12, 2018. His most urgent appeal was expressed as follows: »When the chips are down, Europe must stand together.«

Germany in the crosshairs of criticism

Up until now, the Brexit referendum has been the most far-reaching precedent for a European country's attempt to go it alone. Yet, similar discourses are taking on new

significance in other EU countries as well, where they have been given vivid expression and impetus by the so-called refugee crisis, which has encouraged mistrust and unilateralism and promoted dissenting interpretations of European solidarity. In particular the role of Germany has been a major cause of friction in the politics and discourses in other – frequently smaller – EU states. Migration and asylum policies in the Visegrád countries furnish just one example of challenges to the claim, so often heard in Germany, that there is no alternative to its own approach to those issues. From the central European point of view, resistance to the introduction of a redistribution quota for refugees was regarded as pushback against German attempts to claim interpretative sovereignty over the concept of European solidarity. In some EU member states the German Federal Government was criticized for adopting a double standard on matters involving solidarity and not taking sufficient account of its partners' misgivings. When presenting the agenda of the European Council Presidency under Austrian leadership at the beginning of July 2018, the Austrian Federal Chancellor Sebastian Kurz pointed out that it was essential for the large and small states of the EU to deal with each other on a level playing field. In this context Kurz continually made negative references directed at Germany.

The increasing visibility of vocal resistance against German policies – from the refugee crises to the Nord Stream II gas pipeline deal, to defense issues – can be interpreted as one indication of a major structural realignment going on within the EU. Due to Brexit, Germany and France, but also especially the numerous middle-sized and small EU countries (particularly those in northern and east-central Europe), will be losing one of their most important partners in many areas of European policy. For one thing, Great Britain was perceived as an important counterweight to the German-French tandem, e.g., in respect to proposed reforms of the economic and currency union, or, more generally, on institutional questions. For another, Britain was valued as a provider of significant diplomatic and military resource guarantees, especially in the area of foreign and security policy.

In the European context, the likelihood of Brexit, together with a more pervasive instability in international relations, thus have led to a noticeable upgrading of issue-specific minilateral coalitions and especially sub-regional associations built to last for the long term. Besides the Visegrád countries, this second category also includes Nordic, Baltic, and Benelux cooperative arrangements. The agenda of these associations ranges across a variety of issues from infrastructure projects and transborder cooperation on health care, energy policy, and internal security to resource-pooling in security and defense matters all the way to common initiatives in support of countries in Europe's neighborhood. Thus, we would not do justice to such groupings if we thought of them as mere veto coalitions, as was frequently the case in the context of the great migratory movements of 2015.

Avoid the impression of double standards

Many EU countries are beginning to go their separate ways, even while the German-French tandem is losing its power to bind the rest together. Consequently, the EU will face a crucial yet very difficult task in the months and years ahead: restoring

confidence in Europe's ability to compromise and in its political clout. Hence, it will be of paramount importance to counteract or at least tone down the impression that double standards are being applied in relations between the larger and smaller states of the EU, and – in the context of increasing cooperation among governments – to make sure that the smaller countries have a voice. This challenge especially affects Germany, whose self-image in foreign policy as well as its political and economic power depend disproportionately on functioning EU structures. At the same time, ongoing internal quarrels in the Federal Republic are stoking mistrust and undermining the consistency and predictability of German policy toward Europe. Thus, inclusive approaches and highly ramified channels of communication are of vital importance. Increasing openness to sub-regional cooperation arrangements represents a step in the right direction.

Anna-Lena Kirch
is an associate researcher at the Hertie School of Governance. Her principal research focus is on issues concerning Europe's future and the Visegrád countries. Previously, she was active in the German Society for Foreign Policy and the European Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Gesine Schwan/Mario Telò
Ideas for a »European Spring«

The elections to the European Parliament in May, 2019 will crucial to the future of the European Union because at this moment Europe's cohesiveness is being jeopardized as never before by the forces of populism and nationalism. Some of the threats are internal, such as those posed by Matteo Salvini, Viktor Orbán, and Marine Le Pen, while others emanate from outside, including from Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Stephen Bannon, and many others. All of these populists pursue the goal of weakening and ultimately destroying the European Union. Thus, not only are the values of 1968 at stake, but even the ideals and accomplishments of the period from 1945 to 1950, when peace was sealed among former foes through economic integration and the construction of European democracy between and within states.

The elections to the European Parliament (EP) will be decisive, since the EP has a say in European affairs and would be able to block important decisions should the populists gain a majority or even a large enough minority to veto legislation. Rhetorical discourses about the »United States of Europe« belong to a bygone era. Only under certain conditions will it be possible to defend the Europe of cooperation and peace against the nationalists, and those conditions will have to be satisfied concretely during the next ten years.

But, as in the past, the Europe that successfully resists the extreme right and nationalism still exists. That is the point at which we should begin. A number of developments raise hopes for the onset of a »European Spring.« These include the

performance of the Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party (SAP) in the last Swedish election; the return of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) to government; the successes of António Costa's government in Portugal and that of Alexis Tsipras in Greece; and finally the dynamics of the German-French duopoly.

At the European level the extreme right has nothing to offer. In the domestic context, the legitimacy of nationalist parties depends on rhetoric directed against their neighbors – Italy against France and Germany, Austria against Italy, northern Europe against southern Europe, and so forth. Thus, while it is true that there is as yet no neo-fascist, populist, protectionist model for Europe, there are still millions of Europeans who are dismayed by the course change in the European Union since 2007 and who have been expressing open displeasure about its elites, Europe, globalization, and the »others.« How can we manage to regain their consent and trust?

Before the 2019 parliamentary elections take place, progressive forces in European countries should focus attention on developing a new programmatic foundation and a new narrative about Europe. The key question that must be answered is: How can we create a balance between internal unity and diversity?

Is Emmanuel Macron on the right track when he declares that the election will be a referendum to decide between nationalism and Europe? To his credit, Macron emphasizes the need for anti-populist unity, a democratic front, and an open Europe and attributes the defeats of some progressive leaders to their attempts to beat the populists by offering a more moderate version of populism to the voters. But Macron is mistaken when he overlooks the necessary internal pluralism of the EU. The latter absolutely has to be strengthened by clearly acknowledging diversity and making possible an open dialectic between differing approaches. If all this is forgotten, defeat will be inevitable. Every member of the progressive front must clearly express his or her political identity and goals. That applies not only to the group around Macron, but also to the liberals who have put some distance between themselves and Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ); those in the parliamentary delegation of the European People's Party within the European Parliament who have turned away from Viktor Orbán; the leftist and green parties, such as the one led by Tsipras in Greece, that have abjured populism; and all of the socialist or social-democratic parties and democratic movements.

Common goals for a political union

It is also a matter of working out common goals that essentially turn on three crucial issues: migration, economic and employment policies, and the quest for a common European foreign policy. Pro-EU allies need goals around which to mobilize, in the mode of »Horizon 1992«, successfully advanced by Jacques Delors back in 1986, which provided for the elimination of tax borders within the EU. What we need right now is a »Horizon 2025.« 75 years after the Schuman Declaration, the time has come for political union. The number of goals with a common foundation must be kept within reasonable limits, clearly formulated, and made acceptable to millions of voters. Finally, every EU country should be able to implement them.

As far as the European economy, democracy, and identity are concerned, it is of paramount importance to know how to get control of even moderately-sized migra-

tion movements. One proposal – certainly among the most innovative ideas on this subject – involves crafting a common European migration policy that would be decisive in the struggle against populism. This new scheme calls for the establishment of a European fund that would enable local governments and authorities to finance not only projects to integrate immigrants but also local investments. Rather than relying exclusively on the idealism of solidarity, it is also makes sense to appeal to the market mechanism and the interests of local communities, especially since we need public infrastructure investments anyway.

For local governments, decisions about the admission of refugees can become opportunities to push forward development plans if they first lay the groundwork by encouraging business and organized civil society to participate in the decision-making process and thus anchor the eventual outcome firmly in local-level society. By enabling citizens to participate in decisions about taking in refugees, one deprives the populists of the issue around which they mobilize support.

When it comes to social affairs, the top priority goal for a participatory politics must be to bestow renewed credibility on Europe's social and employment policies, in the hope of mobilizing the chief victims of recessions and policies of austerity. This is especially true for the younger generation which has bleak prospects in the job market and thus is considered to be a target group for populist anti-immigrant propaganda.

At the same time, it is vitally important to counteract the right-wing populist threat to gender equality. This might be accomplished, for example, by mobilizing opposition to the widespread increase in violence against women.

In regard to economic, trade, and employment policies, Sweden has shown the third way between untrammeled liberalism and economic protectionism. Therefore, a clear signal must be sent that the Scandinavian model should be applied more generally, since it combines openness toward regulated globalization with dynamic efforts to protect the achievements of social welfare policy and the environment. This implies an active employment policy in the framework of liberalized trade at the international level, but in accord with the European approach, i.e., including social and – very important! – environmental standards. In addition, we must insist upon a policy of non-stop investment at both the national and European levels while at the same time bidding adieu to the old-left policy of public indebtedness.

Third, a common European foreign policy must be designed that will serve as a complement to domestic policies – especially that of consolidating the eurozone. An important component of this effort would be a common migration policy with the focus on Africa (Libya, Nigeria, Mali, and Eritrea). But any European foreign policy will need a high dose of internal legitimation by the EU and its citizens, who rightly worry about the negative consequences of globalization, political instability, and external threats such as unplanned immigration as well as economic and trade crises. Macron's speech to French diplomats, the interview with Heiko Mass, the German foreign minister, in the *Handelsblatt*, and Federica Mogherini's position on Donald Trump all point toward a new multilateralism. But that multilateralism absolutely has to include and mobilize national and European civil societies, which will push for a stronger, more independent Europe in the world.

Given this background how can multilateral cooperation be made to work? On one hand, the trans-Atlantic alliance can be reformed and reshaped into an equal partnership; on the other, the unilateral approach preferred by the current administration in the United States should be countered by targeted isolation and condemnation, especially in respect to its trade war against China and the EU. It is up to the EU to cobble together a broad front of countries to defend multilateral cooperation and its benefits. Rather than weakening the global organizations devoted to cooperation such as the World Trade Organization, the UN, or regional forms of cooperation, it would be better to reform them, perhaps by mobilizing non-governmental organizations and carrying on »antagonistic cooperation« with business enterprises.

Progressive forces are way behind schedule in carrying out this agenda. It is indeed a paradox: While during the Barack Obama era hundreds of thousands of people protested against a trans-Atlantic free trade agreement, there has been no mobilization against Trump's economic and political unilateralism. And yet it is still possible – as it has been in the past – to assemble a broad social, ecological, and political front symbolizing that Europe is still open, peaceful, and cooperative.

However, let us be cautious: two conditions must be met before a »European spring« can begin. Public opinion must be won over to the cause of Europe, and the nationalist menace must then be halted.

But first of all, an idea aired by the French president must be enacted: to strengthen the political will of the core of countries with many committed Europeanists (to be specific, they include Spain, France, and Germany, supported of course by the Benelux countries, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, and other member states), from which a progressive, anti-nationalist avant-garde could be formed. Jürgen Habermas and others have stressed the urgency of a political and strategic leadership role. In the past, this kind of »differentiated integration« has proven to be effective for Europe, since in this way pro-European forces in initially euro-skeptical countries can be given reinforcement.

Second, this core Europe would be the basis for a restructuring of European leadership, and/or for further initiatives to bring about »tighter cooperation.« The first steps in this direction were already underway in 2017/2018. In December, 2017, a European defense union (to include countermeasures against cyber-attacks) was launched under the rubric of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation). But reforms at the eurozone level also will have to be undertaken in line with the German-French Declaration of Meseberg issued last June. We would want to mention an autonomous budget, a banking union, and a cooperative scheme of unemployment insurance as broad categories for such reforms.

Major challenges require a new architecture for the EU

It is up to the leadership group of the EU to hammer out an agreement with the United Kingdom on the terms of Brexit, but within the framework of a yet-to-be-created new architecture of the Continent that will benefit both sides. Negotiations with the western Balkans, neighborhood policies, the status of Ukraine, controversial ties to Turkey, as well as the revival of the European Council and the Organiza-

tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe all should play vital roles in this plan for a restructuring of the European architecture for peaceful cooperation.

However, the key word uttered by Jean-Claude Juncker in his speech of September 12, 2019 was »Africa.« To prevent his words from remaining mere rhetoric, he first must refuse unequivocally to go along with the Italian anti-immigration policy initiated by Salvini. Second, he should explain why all trade deals with African countries have been blocked. Third, he should launch a strategic partnership for Africa as soon as possible – not one that simply treats trade with that continent as a tool for keeping out refugees, but one that includes China, a country that, in objective terms, helps us a great deal with its investments at the level of 60 billion U.S. dollars.

Clear and comprehensible communications contribute a great deal to the success of this differentiated strategy to bring about a political union. For example, even the internal opposition movements within euro-skeptical countries (such as Hungary, Austria, and Poland) can benefit from this strategy. Accordingly, the Italian population ought to acquire the right to have some say in the obvious change of course set by the current government in relation to the EU. Once a pioneer of European integration, Italy has been transformed into an ally of the Visegrád group and the nationalists against Europe, immigrants, and international cooperation. But Italian citizens did not vote for such a policy switch when they went to the polls on March 4, 2019 in the country's parliamentary election.

Furthermore, clarity and good communications are the sine qua non for a debate on the »European spring« that will enable proponents to go on the offensive. Awareness of the seriousness of the situation and of looming internal and external menaces may also evoke something else besides Hamlet-like doubts about the »EU's existential crisis.« After all, there is certainly still enough energy and dynamism left to launch a counterattack and renew and democratize EU institutions. But that will only be possible when new narratives about the global role of the European Union have been devised.

(We would like to thank the Spanish foreign minister, Josep Borrell, Ruth Rubio Marin, Professor of constitutional law at the University of Seville, and other participants in Summer School 2018 in Santander at the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo for their constructive suggestions.)

Gesine Schwan

is president of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform and chairs the SPD's Committee on Basic Values.

drschwan@zedat.fu-berlin.org

Mario Telò

is Professor of International Relations at the Université libre de Bruxelles and the LUISS University in Rome.

mtelo@ulb.ac.be

Paul Scheffer
Migration and integration – towards a »new we«

I will try to present my thoughts on our topic in four hopefully straightforward ideas. I consider the much-discussed polarization in our societies as real, but not as foreordained. I think it also represents the failure of the classical parties to come up with new ideas concerning migration and integration that can build bridges in order to overcome this polarization. The divide between those who are mobile and those who are less mobile in our societies is important in a sociological as well as a psychological sense. To better understand the societies we live in, we should start with a brief article from the French newspapers *Le Monde*, where I read the other day that seven out of ten people in France still live in the same region in which they were born. In David Goodhart's book, *The Road to Somewhere. The New Tribes Shaping British Politics* (2017), one can read that 60 % of the people in Britain live within 30 kilometers of the place where they were living already when they were 14 years old. So our societies are not that mobile. The horizon of many citizens is far more locally defined than we used to think, and that is something we need to be aware of.

A clearly defined immigration policy

The most important task for social democrats, but also for Christian democrats and liberals, consists in bridging the gap overcoming the social and political divide between the mobile and the rather more settled inhabitants of our society that continues to shape it today.

In the following I will develop four arguments concerning the topics of immigration, integration, and bridge-building. The first is that we cannot have a relevant discussion about integration if we lack a clearly defined immigration policy. We have spent 20 years discussing integration, in the Netherlands, in Sweden, France, Germany, Britain – everywhere I go, years and years have been spent discussing integration, but not immigration within a long-term perspective. So if immigration is seen as something that descends upon a society like a force of nature that cannot be controlled or regulated in a reasonable way, then for the majority immigration becomes a symbol for a world – a globalization – that is out of control.

If liberals – in the widest sense of the word, including social democrats and Christian democrats, those who believe and adhere to the idea of an open society and a social contract – do not have a plan for a long-term regulation of migration, society's need for control will find an authoritarian voice. And that is exactly what is happening at the moment. Brexit was about immigration control. According to research, for 80 % of Brexiteers the defining issue was: »Take back control.« If we do not take that statement seriously, every relevant discussion about the future of our societies will slip away from us.

So what is a liberal regulation of immigration? It is alarming that in an immigrant society such as the USA a person was elected President whose main project it is to build a wall in order to seal his country off from migrants (»I'm going to build a wall. Believe me, this will be a great wall. I'm good at this«). What other

evidence do we need to realize what is going on. So what could a reasonable long-term immigration regulation look like? Currently – and that is a great failure of the progressive imagination – entrepreneurs' individual interests are defining our labor migration policy. The trade unions are absent and the social democrats have not got a clue what labor migration with a long-term perspective could and should look like. It is thus defined only by the short-term interests of entrepreneurs. It is a given that these interests are relevant in an open society. But we do not tell people that our environmental policies should be defined by farmers only or that we should put the legislation's future solely in the hands of lawyers. But that is exactly what we do when it comes to immigration. We allow for the future of immigration in our society to be defined essentially by the interests of entrepreneurs.

That is completely wrong, because we have seen it in the past and we see it again today: short-term interests related to the maximization of profits prevail. If I had the choice between employing somebody from the Netherlands or a Polish guest worker, I would, of course, always choose the latter. After six or seven days of work, he goes home with 400 or 500 euros without fulfilling any social contract. This kind of migration is oftentimes undermining the social contract. And we look at it and do nothing because we do not have a long-term plan for labor migration.

And the same logic applies to our refugee policy. I am sure that there are clear majorities in our society for helping people in need, but within a defined limit. An open-borders policy will destroy the middle class, the social center in our societies. It polarizes our society between those who say »open borders« and those who say »closed borders.« People want change, but first and foremost they want predictability and orientation. It is true that we have a humanitarian obligation towards the migrants – but not only for one year as in 2015. In Germany I heard statements like: »We had to make this great humanitarian gesture, but we are not going to do it again next year. We cannot afford it.« If a society has an actual moral obligation, it should be able to live up to that obligation year in, year out, for decades.

It is obvious that, given the world we live in, the refugee problem will be a humanitarian challenge for decades to come. And we can only do this humanitarian obligation justice in the long term if it is well-planned and organized, and if the people have the feeling that the development is under control, and state and society do not lose their way.

Let us have a look at Canada. Some people say to me, »Canada is far away from the actual conflicts.« But we could learn something from Canada. Instead we always come up with answers to the question of what cannot be done, when we should, like the Canadians, be asking this question first: What do we want? And then we can ask: How can we reach what we want? That is the democratic way.

The Canadians say: »We have an organized immigration policy, 300,000 people in 2017, 58 % labor migration with this and this qualification that we need, not short term, but long term, 28 % family reunification and 14 % refugees. That is the limit this year«, a clearly defined humanitarian obligation. Public opinion in Canada is more or less the same as in Germany or the Netherlands. The big difference is that immigration is not a politically contentious issue. Why? Because the Canadians

have predictability, transparency, and democratic agency. And we have lost all that. So what do we want? This is what we should ask first.

Integration has always been accompanied by a history of conflict

My second argument is very similar, and yet different. We should be aware that integration has always been accompanied by a history of conflict. I did not find one example in US-American or European history showing that integration did not provoke conflicts on all sides. We have to learn to understand the rational core of those conflicts and not to immediately label people clinging to traditional views of religion or family life as refusing integration or as xenophobic. Such terms miss the core of the conflict that accompanies integration. And nonviolent conflicts are a sign of successful integration rather than a sign of its failure.

What are the sources of these conflicts? There are three understandable sources of conflict. The first one is of a socio-economic nature. Low-skilled migrants, the predominant group in the history of migration, are, of course, a good deal from an entrepreneurial point of view, but not necessarily from the point of view of society as a whole. If one looks at the history of low-skilled migration, it is apparent that it makes societies more unequal. Therefore, the American trade unions were vehemently supporting immigration restrictions at the end of the 19th century. The consequences of low-skilled immigration are fatal for the welfare state. It is not a coincidence that classical immigration countries such as America, Canada, and Australia have weak welfare states. This calls into question the connection between access to the welfare state and citizenship. Long-term immigration policy should define one issue especially: How can the substantial conflict of interest between securing a generous welfare state, on the one hand, and opting for a generous migration policy on the other be managed?

The second source of conflict that can be observed throughout the history of migration is normative. There was a time when Catholic immigrants from Italy, Ireland, and Poland were strongly rejected in the United States, because they conflicted with the Protestant self-image of America. They were not at all welcome. Fast forward to our time. I would say it is completely understandable that there is a deep normative conflict in our society, which has become much more liberal over the past 50 years, when migrants come in great numbers from illiberal societies who have been socialized in a correspondingly authoritarian ways, in everything from family life (notably the relationship between the elders and the young) to their role in society and state. This is a conflict between social norms that is completely understandable and that we have observed throughout the history of migration and which rekindles in the present. It has got nothing to do with guilt that someone has to acknowledge.

The third source of conflict, which has little to do with xenophobia or a refusal to integrate, consists of international conflicts becoming domestic conflicts in an immigration society. This shows up, for example, in the story of the Germans in America: During World War I, a lot of pressure was put on the German-American community, the largest migrant community in America around 1900, to choose either to support America – then involved in a war against Germany – or to remain neutral. Of course, people wanted the latter. It was a huge conflict of loyalties.

Hence, it is not surprising that an undeclared civil war in Turkey should have enormous consequences for our schools, our streets, our Turkish community, and much more. So if we do not understand that through immigration international conflicts become domestic conflicts, with all the consequences they entail for social peace, then we do not understand what integration is about.

How do we handle these conflicts?

My third argument: When we look at the conflict-laden history of migration and integration, naturally the question arises: How do we handle these conflicts? Abstract terms do not help us here. Diversity is an empty word, because it embraces everything and means nothing in the end. Everything is diverse, but there are forms of diversity, forms of extremism that are in direct conflict with the idea of an open society. Illiteracy is also a form of diversity, but we do not encourage it. So if we are not clear about our values and hide behind words of embarrassment like diversity, we become lost.

We now have a database with information about the entire population of the Netherlands, more than 17 million people. New research we have done in the Netherlands and beyond shows two things. The first is that, empirically speaking, we are far more diverse than we thought we were, because we used to look only at the classical immigration communities. People from 180 different nations are living in the city I come from. There is a classical diversity index that goes from zero to one and simply asks the question: If you meet two people randomly on the streets of a city, do they have a different background or the same background as you do? On this scale, a city like Amsterdam is at 0.75, so three out of four people you would meet on the street have a different background. This is a very high level of diversity.

Second observation: There is a clear correlation between the degree of diversity and the loss of social cohesion in neighborhoods. The extensive research done by Robert Putnam in the USA has reached the same conclusion. There must be no mistaking that there is a negative correlation between the level of diversity, the level of trust, and the level of social cohesion in a society. However, no correlation has been found between economic growth and the level of diversity. On the contrary, in our most densely populated parts of the county, including cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, or Utrecht, there was a negative correlation between the degree of diversity and economic growth.

These are the hard facts. If we do not want to talk about these facts and shy away from them, hiding behind words of embarrassment like diversity, which not only obscure the actual empirical questions, but also do not give us a clue about where we have to go in the normative sense, then we cannot talk seriously about migration and integration.

We need words, ideas and a political style that tell us what we have in common

My last, more positive argument would be that the divide in our societies, the ruptures we can see around these questions are, of course, not inevitable, but can be overcome. This requires that we reach beyond words like multiculturalism or diver-

sity, because they do not tell us what we have in common. We need words, ideas and a political style that tell us what we have in common so that we are able to argue peacefully about the things we disagree about. But if we only have words that describe what divides us, and we lack a language that tells us what we should or could have in common, then we cannot achieve what we actually want. I would like to give four answers to the question of what we have in common. First of all, there is the idea of shared citizenship, not as an abstraction, but as a lived reality. First and foremost, this requires speaking the same language. In the Netherlands, we told migrants year after year: »No, you don't have to learn Dutch. It's not that important. It's a small language anyway.« What we actually told migrants was: »You will never be a proper citizen in this society because you won't be able to communicate in a meaningful way with your fellow citizen; you will stay marginalized.« That was the actual meaning behind the idea of not emphasizing language too much. Then we found out that many migrants in the Dutch population had a very low level of education. This discussion about integration resulted in a far more consequential one about the interconnection between education and citizenship.

The second example concerns knowledge: What do you need to know to be a proper citizen? This led to a discussion about integration and what a curriculum reform would mean – not only with regard to children from migrant communities, but with regard to everybody. What do you need to know about your history, and then about all those difficult questions concerning colonialism and slavery? I myself have participated in building a monument commemorating slavery in a central park in Amsterdam, because, when you discuss history seriously, you cannot avoid its painful aspects. In Germany, some people say: »But you're not going to talk with children from migrant communities about those years 1933–45. It's not their history.« But what if everyone born after the war would have said that coming to terms with the past is only for those who lived during that period? Every one of us who was born after 1945 is a newcomer to this society. And we are all part of a moral community that tries to form a relationship to those years with all the lessons and all the moral ambiguities they entail. A curriculum reform that asks what we need to know about our history and our constitutional state is a shared responsibility that enriches the entire society.

The third example is about participation: Citizenship always means participation. In our welfare state, migrants are the most risk-prone, the most dependent people in our population. That leads to asking for a welfare state reform. But it cannot be about reducing benefits, because we cannot ask if we can afford it. The question of citizenship needs to be the predominant one here. How does a welfare state need to be construed such that it does not create dependency but instead enables social mobility?

The last and most difficult question concerns the normative aspect of citizenship, which oftentimes creates a very unnecessary embarrassment. We can find a language that creates a community. But it needs to be noted that conforming to the laws is not enough in an open society, because one can very well abide by the law in a formal sense while maintaining a deviating position. It is entirely possible to

live in an open society while holding a very orthodox idea of one's own religion or ideology. There is nothing in the legislation preventing one from saying »I have a monopoly of truth, and I despise everybody who does not share my beliefs« – whether religious or secular. We have to look for institutions beyond legislation to see what makes an open society worth living in for the many. The idea behind it is very simple: reciprocity. From the 60s onwards, we told everybody: »You have rights.« But we forgot to tell people that those rights will erode very quickly if we do not develop a sense of responsibility to defend the same rights for others with whom we deeply disagree.

If I am invited to a mosque, I tell the people there: »Yes, you have a right to religious freedom, but if you don't accept the responsibility to defend the freedom of those who criticize your religion, you will erode your own freedom in the long term.« The political parties at the center need to confront the members of our societies that do not respect the religious freedom of others with the fact that in an open society, they can only enjoy their religious freedom if they concede the same right to everybody else. When I am talking to teenagers with a Moroccan or Turkish background, I ask them: »Why are you so angry?« They say: »We're being discriminated against.« »What is the problem with discrimination?« »We want to be treated equally.« »Okay. That is important. Do you think that in your own community, believers and nonbelievers, women and men, homosexuals and heterosexuals should also be treated equally?« And then they see the fairness of the argument.

We need such a common language to confront positions that are legally within the confines of our legislation, but that will eventually destroy the institutions sustaining an open society. That is why reciprocity is the key. And if we do not find the language and the civil courage to confront people everywhere who dismiss this position, we will not be able to build the bridges that we need.

I conclude with a small anecdote. I talked to people from the Surinamese community in Amsterdam, migrants from a former Dutch colony who immigrated 40 years ago. At the time they were considered to be not includable – quite a big problem that could never be solved. One person stood up and said: »Nobody talks about us anymore. It's all about the Turkish community, the Moroccan community.« One might have said to them: »Well, count your blessings.« Of course, in the Netherlands, you also only receive money and subsidies from the state if you are considered a problem. So that was the problem. And I thought: »This is what I've been trying to describe in a book of 500 pages, a sentence like »Nobody talks about us anymore.« I am very confident that, 10 years from now, when I speak to people from the Moroccan community, somebody will stand up and say: »Nobody talks about us anymore.«

Paul Scheffer

is Professor of European Studies at the Universities of Tilburg and Amsterdam and writes regularly for European dailies and weeklies. In 2016 Hanser Press issued a revised and enlarged edition of his *The Immigrants: Tolerance in a borderless world.*

p.j.scheffer@tilburguniversity.edu

Lewis Hinchman
The 2018 Midterm Elections in the USA

Portrait of a defective democracy

In the midterm elections of 2018, held on November 6, the Democratic Party picked up at least 40 seats in the House of Representatives, as expected, and lost two in the Senate, which was a disappointing outcome for them. The election revealed some important trends in American politics that were foreseen, but exceeded many observers' expectations. First, voter turnout was very high, approaching 50 %, an extraordinary number for midterm elections. The high rate of voter participation was driven both by the Democrats' loathing for Donald Trump and their zealous organizing efforts, and by the President's massive rallies in support of Republican candidates for the Senate, most of whom won. Second, the gap in party allegiance between men and women yawned wider than ever. For example, post-elections polls showed that white, college-educated women favored Democratic candidates by 18 percentage points, whereas white men without a college degree favored Republicans by 33 points – a 51 point gap without precedent in American politics. In races for the House of Representatives, the Democrats won many new seats in suburban districts with high levels of education. In Senate races, where rural, less-educated voters played a key role, Republicans managed to eke out victories in states like Florida and Texas.

However, the gains and losses for each party are not the most important story of 2018. To understand what really happened in this election, we must take a look at certain background circumstances of this year's balloting, many of which were created long ago, before people went to the polls this year. The argument to be made here is as follows: the Republican Party has found ways to »stack the deck« against Democrats at both the state and national levels with the result that the latter are put at a perpetual disadvantage in every election cycle. They must combat efforts to disqualify citizens who usually support them and then win far more than simple majorities in order to control state and national legislatures and even get their candidates for executive offices elected (including the presidency). By one estimate, Democrats needed to beat the GOP by 8 percentage points in order to win a bare majority of seats there (in fact, they won by over 9 %). In short, as Donald Trump has often said, the »system is rigged,« but it is rigged in favor of the Republicans, not the Democrats. The hallmark of defective democracy is that the popular will is not translated into electoral majorities and thus into pro-majority policies. This is exactly what has happened in the United States during the past few decades. Thus, although the outcome of this year's election is far from meaningless, it should not lull anyone into believing that this was a free and fair election, or that the »will of the people« has triumphed. At most, this election was merely one minor skirmish in a long battle to recover American democracy.

Demographic trends in the United States have long been running against the Grand Old Party (GOP) as the Republicans are known here. Their voter base, especially since Trump's victory in 2016, has become older, whiter, less well-educated,

and more male than that of the Democrats, who tend to attract more African-Americans, Latinos, women, younger people and (increasingly) the college-educated. Yet as immigration proceeds apace, the percentage of Democratic-leaning voters keeps growing, especially in large »sunbelt« states. Republicans can read the handwriting on the wall: Unless they respond somehow to those trends, eventually they will become a permanent minority party. So they have opted instead to disenfranchise as many Democratic voters as possible; draw the boundaries of electoral districts so as to favor their own candidates (gerrymandering), weaken pro-Democratic political forces such as labor unions; and change the laws to enable wealthy individuals and groups that support the GOP's agenda to funnel money into elections and policy battles while keeping secret the sources of those funds. We will examine each of those schemes.

Disenfranchisement: Unlike most European countries, the United States puts the onus of voter registration on the individual citizen. No one is entitled to vote unless s/he registers first. That citizen's name and address is then recorded by the local county board of elections. In most states, when someone goes to the polling place to cast a vote, elections officials must match the person's identification (almost always a state driver's license) to the name and address shown in the voter registration lists. If they don't match, it can be difficult or impossible for that person to cast a ballot. For most of us, this is not a burdensome procedure, since we normally have driver's licenses. But getting a driver's license is not always easy. The applicant must present several pieces of identification, typically including a birth certificate. Many Democratic-leaning voters may not have a birth certificate, especially African Americans from southern states. And lower income people may not even bother to apply for a driver's license since they don't own a car. Finally, poor people often move (or become homeless), and so the addresses shown on their form of ID may not correspond to those on voter registration lists. Thus »strict« ID laws can disqualify many thousands of potential voters.

But pro-Democratic voters can be disenfranchised in another way: via so-called »purges« of voting records. In Ohio, for example, the current secretary of state (the official responsible for maintaining voter registration lists) has purged about two million voters since 2011, the majority because they did not vote in any elections over a two-year period and did not respond to mailings asking them to reconfirm their registration. One study showed that African-Americans, the Democrats' most loyal voting bloc, are twice as likely to be purged as whites. In Georgia, the current secretary of state, Brian Kemp, was also the candidate for governor. He was able to use his office to block (at least temporarily) the registration of 53,000 people, 70 % of them African-American or Hispanic who likely would have voted for his Democratic opponent, Stacey Abrams, who lost by a slim margin.

Gerrymandering: This involves manipulating the boundaries of electoral districts so as to gain an advantage for the party that draws them. For decades the GOP has worked hard to gain control of this. Every ten years, after the national census, seats in the House of Representatives are reapportioned to match the relative population gains and losses of each state. The party in power in the states can manipulate congressional district boundaries by a tactic called »cracking and packing.« The GOP, for example, has tried to »pack« reliably Democratic voters into as small a

number of districts as possible. Alternatively, they may »crack« strongly Democratic areas, distributing their voters into more reliably Republican districts that the GOP will win anyway even with more Democratic votes there. The state of North Carolina used both strategies after the 2010 census to insure, as one GOP state legislator bragged, that the GOP would get at least ten House seats (about 75 % of them) while the Democrats would win only three despite the fact that each party typically wins about 50 % of the votes in all the House races across North Carolina.

Making it more difficult for citizens to vote: There are many ways to do this, but reducing the number of polling places in neighborhoods where minority voters live usually works well. In Kansas, local officials moved the only polling place for Dodge City (60 % Hispanic) out of town to a location more than a mile from any public transportation. Over the long term, the reduction in the number of polling places puts an almost intolerable burden on poorer voters who may work several jobs and don't have time to stand in line for three hours to vote, as happened in this midterm election. Another approach, preferred by Florida Republicans, is to deny to all felons the right to vote for the rest of their lives. That law has deprived 1.4 million Florida citizens of the right to vote, predominantly African-Americans. A ballot initiative in the midterm election to repeal this law passed, but too late to save Democratic candidates for the governorship and Senate there. Furthermore, in seven states, criminals who have completed jail sentences cannot get their voting rights restored until they pay all accumulated fines and fees, which most will never be able to do because they rarely find steady employment and then only at poverty-level wages. Right now, 6 million people (3 % of the U.S. population) are debarred from voting because they have unpaid debts to the state, including for »room and board« in jail! Finally, some states like North Carolina have cut back on early voting, because they know that many lower-income voters will be unable leave their jobs to vote on election Tuesday.

Seizing control of the courts: Until 2013, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required states and localities with a history of voter discrimination against African Americans to submit any proposed changes in voting procedures to the U.S. Justice Department for »pre-clearance.« But in 2013, in *Shelby County vs. Holder*, the Supreme Court, dominated by GOP appointees, ruled that section of the law unconstitutional, leaving those states to set their own rules. They did so by adopting the vote suppression measures described here; thus, by 2016, there were 868 fewer polling places than there were in 2012. A later court decision, in 2016, found that Ohio acted properly in continuing to purge voters. Finally, the Supreme Court recently refused to order states to stop gerrymandering their electoral districts, even though boundaries are drawn in such grotesque shapes that they clearly are intended to deny to some citizens the »equal protection of the laws« promised to all Americans by the U.S. Constitution.

Pouring large sums of money into the electoral process and concealing its origins: The United States has long had laws limiting the amount of money that individuals and groups may donate to candidates and political parties. But Republican-led efforts to weaken and circumvent those regulations have succeeded so well that now shadowy »dark money« donors can spend hundreds of millions influencing politics

without the public ever finding out how much they spend or who the beneficiaries are. To cite one example, the notorious right-wing billionaires Charles and David Koch have set up a vast and complex network of interest groups and think tanks to promote their favorite causes: blocking legislation to protect the environment and undermining labor unions, which usually support Democrats. For example, they succeeded in having the Wisconsin state legislature pass a bill designed to weaken the public employees' union. Since then, membership in the union has fallen by over 50 % as have union dues, leaving less money and manpower to promote union – and Democratic Party – goals in politics.

Thus, starting next January the Democrats will hold one chamber of Congress, but the GOP will still dominate the Senate, the presidency, the Supreme Court, and most state governments. That means the Democrats cannot effect drastic changes; in fact, their role will be mainly to play defense and block some of the worst bills and policies pursued by the GOP. But they will be able to set the agenda for the House of Representatives, showing the country what they would do if they won back the other branches in 2020 and beyond. For example, they may push for a minimum wage of $15 an hour, universal health insurance, and expanded tuition aid for university students, all policies that numerous Democratic candidates have advocated. None of this would pass, but at least Republicans would have to explain why they were blocking such popular measures. Moreover, the Democrats will be able to launch investigations (with subpoena power) of the many corrupt and illegal actions of the Trump Administration. House Committees could ferret out the real story behind the Russia connection, Trump's tax avoidance, and the connections between former lobbyists for the energy industry and the Administration's reversal of pro-environment policies on energy and climate change.

But most important, the Democrats should do everything they can to level the political playing field and insure that the outrageous tactics described above to suppress the vote and gerrymander electoral districts come to an end. Congress can fix some of these problems, perhaps by launching a constitutional amendment to guarantee the right to vote to every citizen, but until that happens, much work will have to be done in and by the states. Fortunately, the Democratic Party managed to recapture governorships in seven states previously held by the GOP which will help in preventing the most extreme forms of gerrymandering. But eventually the Democrats must try to rewrite the »rules of the game« to make elections fair again and see to it that all citizens are granted the equal protection of the laws. This is especially vital after 2020, when the next census will happen and GOP attempts at gerrymandering will begin anew. This is no time for Democrats to pop the corks on their champagne bottles. The hard work of recovering real democracy in America has just begun.

Lewis Hinchman
is Professor of Political Science (emeritus) at Clarkson University in Potsdam, New York and the English-language editor for *The International Quarterly*.

lhinchma@clarkson.edu

Recent publications

from the International Departments of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

The Reconstruction of Syria

Socially just re-integration and peace building or regime re-consolidation?
SALAM SAID AND JIHAD YAZIGI

International Policy Analysis, December 2018
www.fes.de/lnk/3dp

The Rights-based Welfare State

Public budgets and economic and social rights
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER

Study, November 2018
www.fes.de/lnk/3dq

Power Dynamics around Corporate Social Responsibility within the EU

LAURA GROEBEL

Study, November 2018
www.fes.de/lnk/3dn

Making »Never Again« a Reality

What Germany can contribute during its next term in the Security Council toward preventing mass atrocities
TIBI GALIS AND JACK MAYERHOFER

Perspective FES New York, November 2018
www.fes.de/lnk/3d9

The 2030 Agenda

An unprecedented statistical challenge
STEVE MACFEELY

International Policy Analysis, November 2018
www.fes.de/lnk/3ch

Strategy, Jointness, Capacity

Institutional requirements for supporting security sector reform
KONSTANTIN BÄRWALDT (Ed.)

Study, November 2018
www.fes.de/lnk/3cf

These and further publications are available at: www.fes.de/international.

Stay up to date with new developments in international affairs with the weekly publications newsletter »Neuerscheinungen«, bringing to you the latest and most important analyses, reports and opinions from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's international departments.

Subscribe today by sending an email with the subject »Newsletter NEUERSCHEINUNGEN abonnieren« to international@fes.de.