

Neue Gesellschaft Frankfurter Hefte

Journal of Social Democracy

3

2019

€ 3,80

Dominika Biegoń

**Let's have a more Diverse Europe –
even in a Monetary Union: The labor union
perspective on reform schemes**

Elisabeth Braune/Florian Koch

**Mental Postcolonialism is Out of Fashion:
The EU is passing up a chance to reset its
relations with Africa**

Julian Nida-Rümelin

Republican Cosmopolitanism

Thomas Meyer

**The Battle over Borders and Social
Democracy: Theories versus realities**

INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY EDITION

-
- 1** Editorial
-
- 2** *Yellow Forever?*
Georg Blume
-
- 7** *Let's have a more Diverse Europe – even in a Monetary Union: The labor union perspective on reform schemes*
Dominika Biegoń
-
- 12** *Mental Postcolonialism is Out of Fashion: The EU is passing up a chance to reset its relations with Africa*
Elisabeth Braune/Florian Koch
-
- 17** *Social Democratic Parties in Europe: Typology and performance*
André Krouwel/Yordan Kutiyski
-
- 22** *Republican Cosmopolitanism*
Julian Nida-Rümelin
-
- 27** *The Battle over Borders and Social Democracy: Theories versus realities*
Thomas Meyer

Editorial

Recently, some innovative social scientific research has helped shed light on the consequences of economic and social globalization, both clearly under-regulated fields. These studies have been conducted mainly in the USA, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In Germany, the key figures are the two directors of the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Wolfgang Merkel and Michael Zürn, who directed the research in question and edited a book that grew out of it. Their findings possess considerable explanatory power when applied to some of the most conspicuous political changes going on now in the Western democracies. Moreover, they offer practical suggestions for how democracies might deal with some of these daunting challenges.



The facts in this case are clear enough: great imbalances in international trade, the enormous advantages enjoyed by those in professions favored by globalization, the maldistribution of its benefits, and the increasingly rapid tempo of migration all have had obvious repercussions. A new cleavage has emerged between the winners and losers of globalization. The winners, concentrated in prestigious, well-paid fields such as finance, exports, culture, and digital technology, tend to display a »cosmopolitan« mentality and to prefer softer border controls or their complete elimination. The losers often come from the old middle class (skilled workers, small, independent businesspeople) and/or from the new underclass (low-wage workers with few skills). In contrast to the winners, they tend to hold a »communitarian« outlook. They prefer closed borders and are willing to rely on an authoritarian leader to protect the community (the nation) against all forms of »external threat.«

The political consequences of this emergent pattern are troubling: the weakening of liberal democracy and the upsurge of right-wing populism. Both center-left and center-right parties in contemporary democracies have been victimized by these trends and are starting to lose their stabilizing role in the democratic process. Closer inspection reveals that the extreme fringe of right-wing populism is not very numerous. With some reservations, one could conclude that this political phenomenon will pose dangers to democracy only if the number of its »fellow-travelers« increases. The latter do not favor complete closure of borders, but only more responsible border regulation. Also, they would like to have a bigger share of the benefits from globalization and want their traditional culture to be respected. That is the reason the German political philosopher Julian Nida-Rümelin advocates bridge-building that would defuse the new contradictions through compromises acceptable to both sides. He dubs this political program »republican cosmopolitanism.«

Thomas Meyer

Thomas Meyer
Editor-in-Chief and Co-Publisher

Georg Blume

Yellow Forever?

The yellow vests in France could lay the foundations for a new and historic protest movement among the Western middle classes. At the heart of the movement is a woman named Ingrid Levavasseur.

She will always remain the persuasive, charming, original French face of the yellow vests: Ingrid Levavasseur, 32 years old, red hair, two children, 8 and 13, a single mother who works as a nurse in a small town south of Rouen in Normandy. Today, nearly everyone in France knows who she is, just as, after May, 1968, virtually every French person knew Daniel Cohn-Bendit.

On March 16, Ingrid (we have been using the familiar pronoun »tu« since the yellow vest protests entered their fourth week) is standing in front of the big old Garnier Opera in Paris, demonstrating for the 18th week in a row since the movement began calling for demonstrations. Supporters of the movement show up every Saturday. For several weeks now Saturdays have been yellow vest days for the French. The protests have become commonplace, even for Ingrid and her kids, who are sent to their grandmother on those days.

But this Saturday is different. Ingrid, wearing her yellow vest in front of the Opera House, says: »Here, two movements are coming together. Today, the yellow vests are demonstrating together with the March for the Climate.« The yellow vest leader with the brightly colored scarf over her vest is obviously right: From the Opera to the Place de la République, an impressive crowd is moving along, carrying rainbow-hued signs demanding that we save the climate, but there are many more yellow vests in the shadow of the signs. For Ingrid, this represents the fulfillment of a fantasy: Ingrid has been calling herself an »ecologist« from the very day when the yellow vest protests started on November 17, 2018, when many different voices on social media originally called for protests against higher gasoline prices. In that sense she seemed to be bucking a trend. After all, the yellow vest protests were kindled by outrage against an eco-tax. How could anyone who thinks of herself as an environmentalist be against that?

Yet two days before the climate demonstration in Paris, Ingrid posted a picture of herself on her Facebook page with a sign around her neck saying »Sorry, kids. I was more worried about the end of every month than I was about the end of the world.«

This is how she saw things from the very beginning. She was a single mother and nurse with a monthly salary of 1,250 euros. By the end of the month, she never had enough money to buy her children better clothes, let alone to be able to take them out to eat. Nor could her small family afford to eat organic foods. How would Ingrid ever be able to afford a higher gasoline tax when she had a daily commute of 30 kilometers in her little Opel? No, she said to herself, she could never live in an ecologically correct way, but she would fight so that she could afford to do so later on.

After 18 weeks of demonstrations, that happy day is not yet in sight. But still: on this March day, for her, there is no longer any contradiction between wearing yellow

and being green. There are a lot of people marching toward the Place de la République alongside Ingrid – some 36,000 according to official estimates, some 100,000 according to the organizers – many on bikes or with children, many wearing yellow vests. The French call this sort of public mood »bon enfant« (among good children), referring to a feeling that everyone seems to be dreaming of a better world together. This was the mood in which the yellow vests began last fall: A jubilant, celebratory atmosphere prevailed at the many roundabouts, super market entrances, and expressway toll booths in the country, where the yellow vests gathered and disrupted traffic in a friendly manner, inviting passers-by to have a cup of coffee around their camp fires. By contrast, alcohol was strictly prohibited. That was one indication that the movement was exercising remarkable discipline in many places, at least by French standards. Ingrid, too, embodies that discipline. She is always on time for her stressful job transporting ill patients, and reliably shows up right at 10 a.m. for the Saturday demonstration, always making sure that her children are well cared for. In each of these ways, she is very different from the demonstrators of 1968!

Many of the yellow vests are just as competent, socially engaged, and fundamentally decent as Ingrid, without being noticeably political. That quality has marked the movement for success from the outset. On the very first day of the protests in November, 300,000 Frenchmen and Frenchwomen heeded the various calls to turn out. They all behaved properly. There were no breakdowns of order, no riots. The only exceptions were a few unintentional accidents that, lamentably, caused one fatality on November 17. But the echo of these events was easy to hear: Initial opinion polls showed that 80 % of the French supported the movement.

But the yellow vests are not always so nice

On that same day in March when Ingrid was standing in front of the Opera House, a second march of yellow vests was taking place in Paris, in addition to the climate demonstration. That morning, a hard, militant core of the movement assembled on the Champs-Élysées, the »world's most beautiful street,« as the French call this magnificent boulevard that runs beneath the Arc de Triomphe. But on this day the street's beauty is barely noticeable. Instead, it is the scene of violent street clashes. The militants begin by setting the little round newspaper kiosks on fire, then the ground floor of a bank branch office, from the second story of which, in short order, the fire department rescues a mother and her children who had been hemmed in by the blaze. France's Minister of the Interior, Christophe Castaner, once a solid socialist and today President Emmanuel Macron's right-hand man, cannot contain himself: »Those are not demonstrators or even rioters; they are murderers.« This was the accusation he leveled against the yellow vests.

But they did not stop there. Twice, they attacked the famed gourmet restaurant Le Fouquet's. At this symbol of the republic, the revered socialist former president François Mitterrand had a reserved table. And here, one of his conservative successors, Nicolas Sarkozy, celebrated his election victory back in 2007. But now the yellow vests hurl rocks at the high-end eatery, breaking the windows, and then loot it. Holding aloft an embroidered napkin with a silver ring around it bearing the name

Le Fouquet's as if it were a trophy, one of the yellow vests tells TV station TF1 that he is taking it with him as a souvenir. His accomplice, a woman from Toulouse standing in front of shattered window panes, comments: »In Toulouse, where we come from, small businesspeople suffer from the demonstrations, but not here.«

Her reaction is quite typical, as though everyone on the Champs-Élysées were rich. The people who run the kiosks, who complain next day about the fires set by the yellow vests, are certainly not among the wealthy. Nevertheless, many French people even today feel that there is a right of revolution, a right to take violent action against a state when it appears to them to be too authoritarian and unjust. And in France the Arc de Triomphe and Champs-Élysées are perceived as symbols of the state's power. In this context many Frenchmen and -women believe they have a sixth sense for when the state has exceeded its sphere of legitimate responsibilities and for when ordinary citizens have to defend themselves against it. Since the fall of 2018, many French people have gotten this feeling again. It also accompanied the events of May, 1968 and stems from the country's proud revolutionary history. But it had been dormant for quite some time. And it explains why, after the yellow vests' many highs and lows, opinion polls show 49 % of the French still supporting the movement in spite of all the violence such as that which took place in March.

In fact, it is not only the well-known black blocs or other well-organized groups of left- and right-wing radicals that commit violent acts on the fringes of the yellow vest demonstrations. Nor is it just that the police, who have learned to keep the demonstrations in check at any time through so-called mobile units, like to get in a beating every now and then. It is the yellow vests themselves who have become violent: ordinary people from the provinces who have had enough of Paris, its elites, and their supreme representatives. Ingrid is among them, although she is not a rioter.

When I first visited her in the small town of Pont-de-l'Arche south of Rouen in Normandy, all of France was seized by an insurrectionary mood, such as had not been seen for many a decade. In the town of Louviers, not far from Ingrid's village, a citizens' meeting is scheduled for the evening of Friday, during the third week of Advent, with the local parliamentary deputy for the governing party, La République en Marche! (LREM), Bruno Questel. The room is full. Ingrid is sitting with other yellow vests in the last row. Children's drawings hang on the walls, because during the day the room is used for pre-school education. So the scene looks benign at first glance. Nevertheless, in the course of the evening it is easy to see that the deputy, along with his pro-system discourse, has forfeited his authority. Yet Questel is an experienced man, vice-chief of the LREM parliamentary delegation in Paris, a lawyer, for years a mayor in the district, and a former member of long standing in the Socialist Party. However, all the reforms initiated by his president, Emmanuel Macron, that he cites to offset criticism, all the good social-liberal arguments he makes, fail to persuade the audience that evening. The people of Louviers feel hoodwinked by Questel's government and its young president, and they will not budge. Ingrid is leading them. She doesn't have to say it again: life is too expensive, wages are too low, there seems to be no way out. As Ingrid finally stands up and contradicts Questel, there is a profound tension in the room, as if the upstanding citizens

present at the meeting were about to morph into a mob and attack their deputy. Although everyone remains polite and well-behaved, the rift between government and electorate, between Paris and the provinces, between the elite and »ordinary« people is plain to see that evening in the very ordinary small town of Louviers.

I am allowed to sleep that night on Ingrid's sofa. She lives in a small, three-room rental house. There, later on in the evening, she serves whiskey, cola, and chips for the handful of yellow vests of whom she has grown fond during the demonstrations. No one in the group had ever attended college. Nobody had ever been to Germany. One was an assistant gravedigger before he was certified as disabled due to a crippling injury. Another works as a janitor in a town hall and previously had voted for the right-wing extremist, Marine Le Pen. Two are nurses. One of them does not always take part in the demonstrations, while the other, who works with Ingrid, also supported Le Pen. All of them are extremely proud of their new movement. For four Saturdays in a row they have blocked a nearby expressway. Reporters have filmed them. One of them, from a national TV network, selected Ingrid for an interview, during which she came across better than anyone else from the yellow vests. Before long, Ingrid could be seen everywhere, even for a special report aired by public television on Sunday night, prime viewing time. A few weeks before that, she and her friends never would have dreamed that they could attract so much attention by staging protests. This evening, they are a really happy circle of friends. The city hall employee and one of the nurses regret that they previously had supported Le Pen. Back then, they just felt neglected and powerless. Now, they believed, things were different. And on this night Ingrid tells them for the first time that she might want to be on a list of yellow vest candidates in the European elections. Everybody is enthusiastic and wants to support her.

I spend that night alone in Ingrid's house, because she is sleeping with her children at the house of some friends. I am a journalist, so I begin a ruthless search for cheeses in the fridge and find three kinds: Camembert, grated Emmental, and goat cheese, in each case the cheapest brands from the supermarket. Anyone who knows the French even a little realizes what a sacrifice it is for them to eat the cheapest kind of cheese. In Ingrid's cupboard I find children's drinking glasses with Asterix figures etched on them that allow you to read off Asterix's character traits: »clever, brave, intelligent, reliable, strong, nice,« all the qualities the yellow-vested Ingrid needs for her new political struggle. In her sparsely furnished living room, she has hung a photo of an old man in a boat on the Ganges in India. Ingrid later explains to me that »it's hanging there because I still want to travel sometime in my life.« In the bookcase in the hall, I find a few good English children's books. The utterly normal austerity of Ingrid's house wordlessly explains the yellow vest movement: Here lives a woman who knows what it's all about, wants to do everything right, but can't. And the simplest explanation for the sparseness of the house is her salary of 1,250 euros a month. And that is what she has written on her yellow vest: »nurse, who earns 1,250 euros a month, while investors stuff their pockets full of money.«

But Ingrid is not a left-winger. This is the first time she has become politically active. Judging by her bookshelves, she has never read a political book. Two years

ago, she voted for Macron based on a gut feeling and is now demonstrating against him. Is that enough for her to get involved in politics herself? By mid-January Ingrid graces the front-page columns of the French media. A group of yellow vests has just announced a list of candidates for the European elections. Polls indicate that the list would win 12–14 % of the vote across the country. Of course, their top candidate is Ingrid. During that period, I accompany her to a secret preparatory meeting in Paris to organize the candidate lists. It takes place in the traditional café La Régence opposite the Louvre, where in 1844 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels met to hold talks that would be crucial for the workers' movement. Political pros offer instruction on electoral campaigns for the newly minted labor leader Ingrid in 2019, 175 years after the famous meeting between Marx and Engels. But her yellow vest friends from Rouen have to stay home. Could this already signal the beginning of the end of the yellow vests?

When Ingrid stands in front of the old Opera House two months later in the demonstration, an old man comes up to her, doffs his hat, and says »How are you? We all feel very sorry for you.« Ingrid laughs and says »That wasn't the point.«

In fact, between mid-January and mid-March, things did get worse for the yellow vests. During the holidays around the New Year, the number of participants in the Saturday demonstrations shot up once more, as if to indicate that this was no joke. But then things went downhill for the movement. Conflicts among the few well-known leaders of the movement did their part to undermine it. Soon enough, Ingrid had disappeared from the headlines. Among those on her candidate list, there were yellow vests on the right and left, environmentalists, and even some who were close to Macron. Ingrid wanted it that way, but soon they began to quarrel. Against her wishes, right-wing yellow vests organized a meeting with the Italian vice-premier Luigi Di Maio. She did not want to make common cause with the populists. It did not take her long to chuck it all. But then the list lacked her high-profile leadership and it fell apart. It is quite possible that, when the European elections take place, there won't be any list of yellow vest candidates. Thus, it is also symptomatic of this ferment that Ingrid marched with the climate activists on March 16, while other yellow vests stirred up trouble on the Champs-Élysées. So now it appears that the yellow vests, in a way reminiscent of the labor movement, have begun to split apart into reformers like Ingrid and anti-system radicals.

But the movement is not dead. Even Ingrid is not giving up. She founded the association *Plus que jamais!*, which means roughly »And now, more than ever.« She may decide to run in the local elections next year. But above all she wants to keep demonstrating.

The Parisian sociologist Bruno Latour remarked of the movement: »The yellow vests are internal migrants who have been abandoned by their own country.« In other words, they are people who no longer feel at ease in their own home places and who are seeking a way back to a normal life by protesting against their own government. They are driven in this endeavor by a revolutionary ardor that is still second nature to the French. It is as though they think that, by forcing their young president to resign, they could make everything change. One of the yellow vests'

favorite slogans is »Macron, resign!« That will not work. But what might work is a new form of local social cohesion that would generate a new class consciousness. It was already present in Ingrid's little rental house during the third week of Advent.



Georg Blume

has reported from Japan, China, and India. He has directed the Paris office of the newspaper *Die Zeit* since 2011 and since 2018 also has been an author for *SpiegelOnline*. His book *Der Frankreich Blues* (*The France Blues*, Edition Körber, 2017) appeared in French in March, 2019, under the title *Lami indésirable* (Editions Saint-Simon).

georg.blume@zeit.de

Dominika Biegón

Let's have a more Diverse Europe – even in a Monetary Union

The labor union perspective on reform schemes

From a labor union perspective, European economic policy over the past several years has been disappointing. To cite just a few of the low points: The adjustment programs adopted by the so-called troika (the cooperative alliance of the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Commission) have had a devastating impact on Greek society, put pressure on the system of collective bargaining, and weakened the unions. In many southern European countries, the austerity policy decreed via the European Semester after 2009/10 has throttled the economic recovery process in its early stages, allowing the unemployment rate to skyrocket. It has become clear since the financial crisis of 2008 that the monetary union has been unable to fulfill its original promise of convergence. If one looks at crucial economic indicators such as unemployment and gross domestic product, it is not hard to discern that northern and southern Europe are drifting apart.

Issues involving political majorities have been one – but not the only – cause of misguided developments in economic policy inside the eurozone. But the truly decisive factor has been the design of the monetary union, or what economist Stephan Schulmeister has fittingly dubbed »the rules of the game.« That term encompasses, among other things, the EU's restrictive fiscal policy which forces member states to run a tight fiscal ship regardless of where they are in the business cycle and no matter what the domestic political situation may be. Moreover, the lack of safety mechanisms such as establishing a lender of last resort has turned out to be a consequential omission. It was speculation on the possible sovereign bankruptcy of several southern European countries that pushed interest rates to levels that could no longer be financed. Also, a few member states have encountered difficulty in refinancing, which has continued to weigh heavily upon the monetary union, jeopardizing its ability to function effectively and keeping the financing of public expenditures within narrow limits.

In short, the monetary union is tilting toward the market-liberal side. How can we reverse that tilt? What reforms are needed to enable the monetary union to fulfill its promise of convergence even this late in the game? How can the eurozone be put back on track toward inclusive growth?

Whereas some think the best solution would be to devise an ambitious reform agenda that would move Europe toward greater integration, with fiscal union as the ultimate goal (option 1), others call for a rollback of the monetary union (option 2). I will review each of these proposals briefly and add to them a third, quite distinct reform option. The latter represents a middle way that would culminate in a radical reform agenda able to take full account of the socio-economic diversity of the member states while simultaneously sticking with the project of a common currency.

My reform plans are inspired by the image of a Europe of diversity, which in turn links up with the theory of an »EU democracy« as elaborated by political scientists like Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Richard Bellamy. As they see it, the nation-state provides a democratic arena that is worth preserving, in which institutions that have emerged over the course of history make sure that various interests are accorded due weight. For that reason, supranational European institutions should not be too quick to dismiss decisions reached by the nation-state. The dominant image of a Europe of diversity in the form I advocate here portrays the nation-state as the form of political organization best suited to realize the ideal of democratic self-determination, while at the same time emphasizing the advantages and necessity of European cooperation.

Option 1: Risking more Europe?

A great many progressive economists reason that the market-liberal tilt could be countered by taking a further step toward integration, especially in fiscal policy. The German Trade Union Confederation (DGB), too, has come out in favor of completing the monetary union by pushing for the creation of an EU fiscal union. We have welcomed, as important initiatives for the reform debate, the visionary proposals of French President Emmanuel Macron for the reform of the eurozone, whether through a European finance minister, an automatic stabilization mechanism or a eurozone budget. As far as the eurozone budget is concerned, regardless of how it might be constituted, it would enable the monetary union to recover its ability to act on macroeconomic issues.

Yet the concrete suggestions that political actors have advanced in this context have been disappointing. It seems as though EU economic policy is trapped in a certain ordo-liberal approach. The EU can't seem to do anything but demand reforms to strengthen competitiveness and fiscal consolidation, both of which have massive impacts on industrial relations, public investment policy, and social security mechanisms in the member states. Against that background, to call for »more Europe« without any further qualifications seems to me a risky venture. Of course, from a labor union perspective it would be desirable if the monetary union were to have an automatic stabilizing mechanism for Europe in the future so we could respond more effectively to recessions. It would also be nice to have a eurozone budget that could

be used to invest in the future viability of national economies and would encourage public investments in the areas of education, infrastructure, and the construction of »social« housing. But that scenario seems to be far from realistic. It is much more likely that EU financial aid of any kind will be linked to rigid reform guidelines that will constrain the autonomy of the member states to make their own economic policy and will have serious consequences for the national labor market and social policy.

Furthermore, theorists of democracy will have many misgivings about an EU fiscal union, because the latter would require deeper coordination of national economic policies. Even as things stand now, the European Commission gives member states annual directives for the reform of their economic policies (via the European Semester). And many of these – especially those involving fiscal policy – are legally binding. In other words, if the member states do not adhere to the reform guidelines, they will be threatened with financial sanctions. So far, this option has never been used; still, the very threat of such sanctions puts a great deal of political pressure on the member states. The problem is that the decision about whether a country has violated the EU's deficit rules is made primarily through technocratic procedures without any parliamentary input. At this point in time, neither national parliaments nor the European Parliament have any say in the recommendations given to specific countries as formulated in the framework of the European Semester. While it is true that social partners are extensively consulted, these informal consultations cannot replace a regular parliamentary process. From my point of view, no further moves toward integration in the form of a fiscal union should be attempted until and unless one basic prerequisite is met: a thoroughgoing democratization of the European Semester. The decision about whether a country has violated the deficit criteria and which structural reforms it should put in place is not a technical matter that ought to be negotiated in isolation from the political process.

Option 2: Less is more

Another position, advocated by a rather small circle of left-wing intellectuals, endorses much of the problem-description noted above and likewise criticizes the market-liberal tilt of the monetary union, but it comes to a diametrically opposed conclusion. If we want to strengthen the social aspect of the EU, the solution cannot be sought in deepened integration but rather in the step-by-step dismantling of the monetary union. Authors such as Martin Höpner and Fritz W. Scharpf would like to see the countries of the eurozone go back to the earlier European Monetary System (EMS), which would allow for common decision-making about currency revaluations when significant disequilibria were present. The starting point for such arguments is the observation that European economies exhibit great structural heterogeneity, which limits the monetary union's effective functioning. It also leads to a state of affairs in which the soft currency countries of southern Europe, which depend more on flourishing domestic demand, are compelled to operate within an economic model suited to the export-oriented hard currency countries of the north.

As I see it, the authors cited above have made a valuable contribution to the eurozone reform debate. They have broken through the »no alternatives« rhetoric

that has dominated politics and, by dint of an impressive analysis of the problem, have developed a concrete political proposal that does not simply call for us to revert to national currencies (as do nationalist and right-wing populist forces such as the AfD) but instead holds out the prospect of a European solution by revisiting the European Monetary System.

Nevertheless, I find their proposal problematic for two reasons. First, the economic consequences of the EMS proposal would have to be spelled out more clearly. The Deutsche Mark or a northern European euro would have to be revalued upward. How would that work? What would be the impact on Germany's export economy? What costs would be incurred by public authorities? The guarantees that Germany has provided in the framework of the European Stability Mechanism and the demands of the German Bundesbank upon the European Central Bank in the TARGET-2 system would lose much of their value. How would that be managed?

Second, it would be hard to predict what the political consequences of a dismantling of the monetary union might be, especially given the current political situation. Lobbying for a proposal such as this one might only strengthen the centrifugal forces in the political sphere. The risk of a domino effect is too great. Once the project of a monetary union had been called into question, the next to follow might be the project of European integration as such.

A diverse Europe

At first glance it seems hopeless to try to apply the attractive image of a Europe of diversity to the monetary union: Other policy areas offer broader scope for taking into account the cultural and socio-economic heterogeneity of the member states by providing more nuanced forms of integration. But in a monetary union? Once monetary policy has been made uniform, a depth of integration has been achieved that seems to point the way down a development path that leads toward fiscal union and eventually political union.

And, as a matter of fact, the goal of preserving the socio-economic heterogeneity of the member states conflicts with the objective of insuring that the monetary union functions effectively. In the reform agenda sketched out here, that conflict is not entirely resolved. The proposals advanced here represent at least the pragmatic attempt to do justice to both goals. There is a reform agenda that would follow a middle course, adhering to the common currency while revising the market-liberal rules of the EMU game and paying greater attention to the socio-economic heterogeneity of the member states. Without raising any claims to completeness, I would like to conclude this inquiry by adumbrating at least three building blocks of such a reform agenda. All three of these building blocks represent key demands articulated by the DGB for reform of the eurozone.

Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: For years the DGB has been calling for the abolition of the Fiscal Pact and a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. A global rule for public investments would allow net public investments to be financed by the extension of credits. Spending on net public investments would be exempted from the EU's deficit rules. In this way, investments in the areas of social housing

construction, infrastructure, and the rebuilding of our schools could be ramped up. A golden rule for public investment along these lines would be to sustain public investments at a permanently higher level, thus strengthening the future viability of European economies. It would also have the effect of stabilizing the business cycle by preventing public investment from declining too much during recessions. Overall, the member states would regain some leeway to act in matters of fiscal policy.

Minimum standards for basic social security: If the EU were to set minimum standards governing unemployment insurance and basic welfare provision, national social security systems also could be fortified. Minimum standards of this kind would go some way toward checking the EU states' propensity to drift farther apart in respect to living standards and socio-economic inequality. In addition, a political measure such as this could prevent future misguided anti-crisis policies and matching demands for spending cuts from eroding the member states' own guidelines. But even if we look at matters from a purely economic policy perspective, much can be said in favor of minimum social standards. Backstopping national social security systems would have the effect of stabilizing the business cycle and would permit member states to react more nimbly to economic downturns. Strong social security systems in the member states function as automatic stabilizers. Countries that have strong social security systems and high levels of social spending fared demonstrably better in the last crisis. Finally, a new study by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (*More just. More social. Less unequal: What Germans expect from Europe*) shows that a project such as this one would be welcomed by the citizenry.

The ECB as a lender of last resort: Finally, public policies must be adopted that prevent financial markets from speculating on the sovereign bankruptcy of individual member states, since such speculation drives up interest costs to levels that cannot be financed. The debt crises that plagued some eurozone countries after 2008 could have been avoided if the European Central Bank, like the U.S. Fed or other big central banks, had been authorized to buy up sovereign debt of the member countries unconditionally on the secondary market. In other words, under this scenario the Central Bank would have functioned as a lender of last resort. Alternatively, the ECB could have been empowered to issue common European loans (eurobonds). For this to happen, politicians would have to pluck up their courage and send out strong signals. Greater discipline on the market for sovereign debt will weaken the euro and heighten still more the uncertainty that afflicts the eurozone. An effort to stabilize the finances of member states via common European loans is long overdue.



Dominika Biegon

is Head of Unit for European and International Economic Policy at the Federal Executive of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB).

dominika.biegon@dgb.de

Elisabeth Braune/Florian Koch

Mental Postcolonialism is Out of Fashion

The EU is passing up a chance to reset its relations with Africa

There is no question that many years have passed since Africa enjoyed as much attention in Europe as it is now receiving. Fortunately, in many cases the neighboring continent's higher profile stems from honest efforts to promote economic development and social consolidation, albeit not always for the proper reasons. Nevertheless, these efforts tend to neglect coordination with their respective African counterparts when it comes to strategy and overall design, not to mention failing to consult with the latter or even consider their interests. Those oversights speak volumes about what the Europeans think both about their own priorities and those of Africans. Moreover, in a reverse conclusion they show how deeply Europe is still committed to the post-colonial donor mentality in respect to the African continent.

Especially in the context of the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, Europe acted primarily to defuse its own domestic political crisis and, in so doing, it engaged in »action for action's sake« aimed at achieving short-term results. It failed to acknowledge that the goals of its own actions conflicted with the long-term peaceful and sustainable development of its neighboring continent. By this time, the side effects have become clearly discernible, particularly in Niger, among other things by hampering regional economic integration and further weakening institutions intended to foster the rule of law. Corruption and incentives for the criminalizing of entire branches of the economy (e.g., in the transportation sector in the context of supposed migration controls) are among these regrettable side effects.

At least since the »Joint Africa-EU Strategy« (JAES) of 2007, the goal always has been to forge a partnership of equals. Indeed, that aim has been a mantra constantly reiterated in EU speeches and policy position papers. Yet the real Africa policy of the Union has been talking a different language – and not just since 2015. Thus, at this point we should hesitate to blame African decision-makers for dismissing the Europeans' words as little more than lip service.

At the same time, the so-called Post-Cotonou Accord is being renegotiated, a process that the mainstream media pretty much have ignored even though it entails a fundamental institutional policy shift that will have considerable bearing on future relations between Africa and the EU. To express this momentous step the chair of the African Union (AU) Commission, Moussa Faki, chose the following words at the last EU-AU summit: »It is high time for us and our European friends to evaluate this 42-year-old partnership between the EU and the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries. I believe that this kind of relationship is outdated.«

The Post-Cotonou Accord – a pact with the ACP countries, a group of 79 former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (mainly of France and Great Britain) – is scheduled to terminate at the end of 2020. Its expiration should have given Europe the chance to re-establish its partnership with Africa while adapting it to the changed global political landscape. But a glance at the current state of the

negotiations concerning future EU-ACP relations makes it seem far more likely that a system will be perpetuated that continues post-colonial dependencies and solidifies inconsistent approaches on the EU's part in respect to Africa. The EU's behavior here reveals not only a frightening path-dependency, but also the lack of any political strategy for and with Africa.

The treaty relationship with the ACP, which even today remains the legally binding agreement for development aid, economic development, and political dialogue, has been overtaken by other trends. For example, since 2004 we have had the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), mainly relevant for the countries of North Africa; the JAES (since 2007), which the AU is responsible for implementing, and a separate strategic agreement between the EU and South Africa, signed in 2007. To address this complicated and multi-layered situation, in 2015 the EU launched a consultation process to prepare for a sequel to the Cotonou Accord. It quickly became evident that there were strong inertial forces in favor of continuing the ACP-EU relations. Meanwhile, the political map for rearranging the relationship between Africa and Europe had changed, becoming far more complex. In particular, the founding of the AU in 2002 introduced an actor that called into question the legitimacy of the ACP, regarding it as a post-colonial construct, and that sees itself now as the sole »voice of Africa« and its interests. Those aspirations are doubtless reinforced by the fact that representatives of the AU and EU meet regularly at the highest level, even apart from common summit conferences. It is no accident that, since the last summit in Abidjan in 2017, these meetings are no longer called EU-Africa summits but instead EU-AU summits. This change was made at the behest of the AU, reflecting its increasing recognition as an international actor as well as its own self-image and ambitions. By contrast, since the turn of the century the ACP has lost a great deal of its political relevance, yet it continues to see itself as representing the interests of its members vis-à-vis the European Union and would prefer not to have the AU present at the table during negotiations. The fact that 49 African countries, with the exceptions of the North African states and South Sudan, belong to both the ACP and the AU just makes matters that much more complicated.

The network of relationships is changing

Meanwhile, the EU is staking its hopes on a three-pillar model that retains the overarching framework when it comes to concrete cooperation and implementation but concentrates on the relevant region in each case. Thus, the new regional EU-Africa Agreement is supposed to supplant the existing intercontinental strategy (JAES), replacing it with a uniform approach to Africa (»One Africa«). The logic of this approach seems to favor the merger of the ACP and the AU, however it might be done. It is hard to imagine that such an undertaking might succeed, since these organizations do not represent the same countries; besides, their mandates are quite different. For instance, the AU, the sole organization speaking for Africa as a whole, pursues continental projects, which the ACP has no mandate to initiate or carry out. In this context it is worthwhile to single out the Development Agenda 2063, the continental free trade zone, and the African peace and security architecture. In addi-

tion, the EU supports these projects politically and financially, because, as the EU sees them, they are also important for the peaceful and sustainable development of the continent. Regardless of how any future accord might look, the AU will not turn these projects over to the ACP.

Even though the AU took a long time to prepare a proposal to revamp relations between Africa and Europe, in March of 2018 it did manage to approve a Common African Position (CAP). That came as a surprise to everyone involved, especially the EU. Previously, no one had considered it realistic to expect that the North African countries would agree to a common negotiating position set forth in a continent-wide agreement. Those nations always had made it clear that they did not want to give up their preferential relations with the EU. The latter have been governed by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which applies exclusively to the countries of North Africa. Moreover, even South Africa voted for the CAP. The North African countries got on board only when they were promised that every effort would be made to maintain existing agreements between them and the EU. Still, no one should be deceived about how difficult the negotiations were that led to the CAP, given that some AU members registered their concerns about whether there was any mandate to come up with a common negotiating position for all of Africa. For example, reservations were expressed about the inclusion of the North African countries, which were perceived as too influential, the supranational ambitions of the AU, and whether development money from the European Development Fund should be shared with North Africa. As a result, the negotiating mandate of the AU exists only on paper. Thus, it is not at the table for negotiations. By contrast, the ACP agreed on a negotiating mandate on May 30, 2018 and is already parlaying with the EU. Meanwhile, the North African countries are biding their time and remain open to both options. On one hand they are intensifying economic contacts with sub-Saharan Africa; on the other they are using the Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to safeguard their relations with the EU. At this point it appears that the AU is assuming that the new ACP accord will not last long anyway, since a common African approach (including North Africa) might not be possible and because important issues such as trade, sustainable development, peace and security, or migration cannot be discussed unless they are included.

In this situation the EU has neglected to forge a clear position and to answer the question of how (political) cooperation might look that went beyond the traditional donor-recipient logic inherent in the ACP-EU relationship. For that to happen, the EU would have to have a clearly formulated goal and, based on that, negotiate an agreement that would include all the African countries. Instead, here in Europe we are passing up a golden opportunity to work out an approach to cooperation with Africa that is both unified and political. In the long run that may prove deleterious to both sides, since negative influences on African development sooner or later always recoil onto Europe.

The AU has a basic interest in putting a democratic stamp on Africa's development, which gives it a unique position in contrast to actors such as China, Russia, Turkey, or the countries of the Arab world. When it comes to building partnerships,

the EU should take advantage of that democratic commitment. Although the AU may have many shortcomings, its greater self-confidence and growing ambition to shape continental affairs are unmistakable and would offer a starting point for expanded mutual – and more political – cooperation. Considering that it includes 55 member states of the UN, all entitled to a vote, it could become a valued ally of the EU in coming to grips with global challenges. Considering the global crisis that afflicts multilateralism today, the EU has good reasons for trying to close ranks with the AU rather than antagonizing it.

Europe lacks a plan

By virtue of its inconsistent behavior, the EU is not only wasting political capital; it is also frittering away economic advantages. The EU is still Africa's largest trading partner; however, actors such as China and India have been catching up quickly and by now have become solidly entrenched in the economies of various African countries. Furthermore, states such as Russia, Turkey, and Indonesia, among others, are getting more deeply involved there and make no secret of their economic interests. These countries have an easier time because they are not wedded to democratic principles. Their approach therefore may pay dividends in the short run, yet it remains to be seen whether it has staying power in longer-term competition with an approach that is committed to certain values. And for that very reason the EU and its member states should finally, honestly lay their cards on the table, reveal what their interests are, think strategically, and coordinate their actions toward Africa.

It would be of prime importance to think about how to make the political and economic development of Africa benefit Africans themselves rather than treating cooperation and development approaches mainly as means to keep migration in check. Why doesn't the EU deliberately seek out the African nations and look over their plans for national development jointly with the AU, examining them in respect both to their needs and their compatibility with Agenda 2063. By sticking to its present course, the EU is abandoning the field to undemocratic countries like China. That trend poses the danger that African countries might indeed develop economically, but fail to develop politically to the extent that would be desirable and sustainable for their stable development. There are good reasons why the EU recently named China a »systemic rival« with which it would compete in this area as well.

Brexit likewise will introduce enduring changes into African-European relations regardless of its timing or the form which it eventually might take. It is noteworthy that Great Britain now is preparing to expand its diplomatic representation in western, francophone parts of Africa, while France is taking analogous steps to bolster its political presence in East Africa, traditionally more attuned to its former colonial power, Great Britain, and is doing so in pursuit of clear economic interests. In this context even Germany is thinking in non-European terms; it is undermining European political initiatives through its own bilateral partnerships.

German Social Democracy has provided little concrete illumination about any of these matters. True, the program it issued for the recent European elections does call for a new north-south strategy, but the specifics remain vague. Africa is indeed

referred to as the sole international partner from the global south, and we certainly should welcome the SPD's rejection of »disembarkation platforms« in Africa. Still, there are no clear proposals that would add up to a strategy. It would undoubtedly be desirable to enter into a partnership with Africa oriented to principles of human rights, peace-keeping, sustainable development, and the elimination of structural inequalities. But time and again these have proved to be little more than slogans that European politicians have been repeating for years while real opportunities are seized by other actors. Nor is it likely that such slogans will change very much in the future conduct of the EU toward Africa.

But let's return to the subject of Post-Cotonou and the prolongation of post-colonial institutions: The persistent juxtaposition of uncoordinated political initiatives toward Africa is something for which the EU itself is culpable. It actually makes the Gordian knot of varying funding sources and political guidelines that much denser rather than cutting right through it. Instead, a kind of politics that aspires to overcome post-colonial legacies (and in this sense would be post-post-colonial) would have to fulfill the following three criteria before all else. First, it would have to take seriously and thereby reinforce the AU's claim to representation in the sense of the latter's »One Africa« motto. Second, it would have to articulate its own legitimate interests clearly without presenting them in a roundabout way as the supposedly convergent interests of its unconsulted counterparts. Third, on this basis it would be possible to develop a values-oriented partnership as a multilateral counterpoint. Could this be the beginning of a beautiful friendship?

France, of all European nations the one most West Africans would likely see as the quintessential colonial power stuck in the past, is now making a remarkable new beginning at the level of symbolic politics. President Emmanuel Macron asked for and received a restitution report in November of 2018 from the Senegalese intellectual Felwine Sarr and the French art historian Bénédicte Savoy. At this point it has ignited a far-reaching public debate in France and in many (mainly Francophone) African countries about how the artistic and cultural treasures in the hands of the state should be handled. Certainly, this is just the start of a process and many questions remain open. Nevertheless, Macron indeed has recognized the full scope of the transformative potential of this issue for French-African relations. Whether on the spur of the moment or following sound advice, he has made himself the leader of this movement.



Elisabeth Braune

is a consultant for the Africa desk of the FES and is responsible for EU-AU relations, among other assignments.

elisabeth.braune@fes.de



Florian Koch

was director of the AU office of the FES from 2015–2018. He is now a consultant for Europe in Berlin.

florian.koch@fes.de

Social Democratic Parties in Europe: Typology and performance

In many European countries of late, social democratic parties have had to absorb huge losses at the polls. In the Netherlands, Austria, and Italy they were driven from government. In France the Parti Socialiste (PS) endured the worst showing in its history during the parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2017. The PvdA in the Netherlands likewise has fallen to a similar historical nadir. Even the German and Swedish Social Democratic Parties were badly weakened, although once again they were able to return to government. By contrast, the Labour Party in Great Britain gained almost ten percentage points in the parliamentary elections of 2017 as compared to those of 2015.

Electoral results of social democratic parties (in %)

Name/country	Best election result	Worst election result	Last election	Votes gained or lost versus the next-to-last election
Labour (Great Britain)	48.8 (1951)	29.0 (2010)	40.0 (2017)	+9.6
SPÖ (Austria)	51.0 (1979)	26.8 (1950)	26.9 (2017)	+0.1
SAP (Sweden)	50.1 (1964)	28.3 (2018)	28.3 (2018)	-2.7
PD (Italy)	33.2 (2008)	18.7 (2018)	18.7 (2018)	-6.7
PvdA (Netherlands)	33.8 (1977)	5.7 (2018)	5.7 (2018)	-19.0
PS (France)*	37.5 (1981)	7.4 (2017)	7.4 (2017)	-22.0

(*Share of the vote in the first round and after the PS was re-founded around François Mitterrand)

The recent losses suffered by social democratic parties fit a pattern of long-term decline in voter support levels that has bedeviled the traditional center-left parties. Over the past ten years, social democratic parties in Europe have been exposed to increasing competition from various points on the political spectrum. Studies show that the traditional social democratic voter base in many countries is particularly susceptible to the political blandishments of radical socialist parties on the left, green environmental parties, and radical right-wing populist parties. Moreover, libertarian parties from the right-wing political camp likewise contribute to the ero-

sion of the social democratic electorate, for example in France, where the party of President Emmanuel Macron, La République en Marche (LREM) has persuaded many former voters of the Parti Socialiste to switch their allegiances. In the Netherlands, too, the social-liberal Democraten 66 (D66) won over many previous supporters of that country's social democratic party. Traditionally, the social democrats lay claim to a strong electoral base in the political center, which is one reason that their erstwhile voters tend to defect to center-right parties. Are these losses harbingers of permanent decline? Or might the pendulum swing back to the benefit of center-left parties, as was the case in the 2017 elections in Great Britain? How will the various social democratic parties respond to this political pressure, and in what ways will they try to stop the loss of votes to parties that have totally opposed ideological orientations?

In this study we will categorize four different strategies of social democratic parties by comparing their positions on relevant issues with those of two groups of voters: core voters who express the intention to support the respective social democratic party and potential voters who are very inclined to vote for the respective social democratic party but who nevertheless indicate in polls that they want to cast their ballots for a different party.

Great Britain: Corbynism and economic polarization

The British Labour Party finds itself to the left of its voters and potential voters – a strategy that we have characterized as »economic polarization.« In the runup to the 2017 parliamentary elections, Labour, led by Jeremy Corbyn, opted for a much more radical agenda in economic policy. On the economic axis the party clearly shifted leftward – more to the left than are the party's core voters and sympathizers. At the same time, on the cultural axis Labour largely agreed with both groups of voters. Under Corbyn the party succeeded in polarizing public opinion on economic issues, thus attracting numerous new groups of voters. As a result of the unrelenting austerity measures and deregulation policies pursued by two Conservative governments in a row, many Britons had been made worse off economically or else they felt a sense of economic insecurity. Those factors contributed to Labour's triumphs in the 2017 elections. On economic issues Jeremy Corbyn succeeded in polarizing the broad public on questions of economic policy and moved Labour to the left. Many experts and observers criticized him for those developments. According to their arguments, a strategy such as his risks alienating voters in the political center, either today or in the future. Yet so far this prophecy has not been fulfilled. Under Jeremy Corbyn in 2017, the Labour Party won back numerous seats it had lost before and, since January of 2019, leads the Tories in some polls. Meanwhile, the Labour Party pretty much agrees with its voters and sympathizers on cultural issues.

France and Italy: Macronism and market-oriented progressivism

While it is true that the focus of this study is on social democratic parties, it is still worthwhile to include the centrist party known as La République en Marche! (LREM) due to its unprecedented electoral success. In addition, its founder and

leading light on substantive issues, Emmanuel Macron, used to belong to the Parti Socialiste. Besides, a few social democratic parties such as the Italian Partito Democratico have adopted a very similar strategy: On the right-left axis they have moved toward the political center, whereas on the cultural axis they have taken clearly progressive positions. Part of this strategy involves positioning their own party in the center or toward the right of center on economic questions while simultaneously adopting a more explicitly progressive and pro-European stance on cultural issues. These parties' programs advocate pro-market, liberal economic reforms, and they stand for a tolerant immigration policy while supporting multiculturalism as well as European integration. At first, the strategy of pro-market progressivism was highly successful, yet market-oriented economic reforms have not proven to be popular among the broader public in either the French or the Italian case. Citizens of those countries feel that the government is assigning a higher priority to the interests of large corporations and the affluent than to those of »hard-working people.« In France, Macron's approval ratings have now sunk to an all-time low. This has been especially so since the yellow vest protests erupted all around the country in late 2018 and early 2019. The social democratic PD in Italy has suffered a similar fate.

The Netherlands and France: The parties drift away from their voters

Many observers think that shifts along the economic policy axis are the most troublesome ones for social democratic parties. Yet our analyses show clearly that parties that put too much distance between themselves and their core voters on the cultural axis are taking a much greater risk of moving the entire party away from its core base of support. For example, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) in the Netherlands and the French Parti Socialiste (PS) took a more progressive line on cultural issues than their voters and sympathizers did, although the gap between party and voters was far wider in the Netherlands. At the same time, in respect to economic issues, both parties maintained a moderate, centrist position. This combination of economic moderation and cultural progressivism cost the PvdA and the PS dearly in the 2017 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands and France.

One important implication is that economic moderation does not seem to work if a polarization on cultural issues is happening at the same time: According to our findings, the voters and sympathizers of the PS are situated slightly left of the party on the economic axis, whereas the voters and especially the sympathizers of the PvdA stood to the right of the party on that same axis. The collapse of the PvdA and the PS in their respective national elections could have been caused either by the fact that the party did not move far enough to the left to show a clear profile to its core constituency or that it moved too far in the direction of the progressive-libertarian pole, where other progressive challengers already had positioned themselves.

In contrast to the Labour Party in Great Britain, the French and Dutch social democrats pursued a strategy of economic moderation while pushing polarization on cultural issues. Against the background of increasing competition from anti-immigrant parties and burgeoning anti-immigrant sentiments, this strategy proved unsuccessful for both parties. Both the Dutch PvdA and the French PS were consid-

erably more progressive than their voters, which may have induced many of their former voters to defect. Apparently, the PvdA and the PS drifted too far away from their core voters; therefore, they were in no position to appeal to their own base or to attract new supporters. This attempt also turned out to be hopeless, because the sympathizer groups stood farther away from the parties on the positions it took than the core voter group.

Austria and Sweden: Traditional catch-all social democracy

In Austria and Sweden, social democratic parties mostly have pursued a catch-all strategy of moderation and centrism on both the cultural and the economic axes. Apparently, voters who prefer the SPÖ (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) and the SAP (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti) are more culturally conservative than the sympathizers of the two parties. On the economic axis, both the actual voters and the group of sympathizers stand slightly to the right of their respective parties. In the past, Austrian and Swedish social democrats usually have advocated rather moderate, less radical political positions in order to continue attracting voters from both the (somewhat authoritarian/conservative) working class and the lower middle class. By positioning themselves between their core voters and their rather more progress-oriented sympathizers, they potentially can appeal to a broad swathe of the population. Moreover, faced with the rise of anti-immigrant parties the social democratic parties in Austria and Sweden took a soft line on migrants. Pragmatic positions both in respect to economic governance as well as cultural issues make it easy for social democrats to initiate coalition talks even with centrist parties that hold different ideological outlooks.

In these countries, the sympathizers of the social democratic parties are disposed to be more culturally progressive than their respective parties, although they also are slightly to the right of their parties on the economic axis. This shows that social democratic parties with a traditional catch-all strategy can appeal both to the conservative segments of the working class and to progressive intellectuals, professionals, and the middle class.

Social democratic strategies in detail

The previous evaluation of the relative positioning of social democratic parties vis-à-vis their most important voter groups permits us to conclude that two strategies hold out the greatest promise of success: a traditional social democratic catch-all strategy, in which the parties take moderate positions in both the economic and cultural areas (as the SPÖ and the SAP both did) and a strategy of polarization along the economic axis, defined here as Corbynism, in which the party opts for an unequivocally leftist position (as the British Labour Party did). The catch-all strategy is more defensive and has produced stable electoral outcomes, although the social democratic share of the vote in Sweden actually has declined somewhat even while it was rising slightly in Austria. The economic polarization strategy seems best suited to start winning more voters over to the social democratic side. In regard to electoral outcomes the most dangerous strategy seems to be one in which moderate

economic positions are combined with cultural polarization, i.e. pushing the party toward the progressive/libertarian pole as the Dutch PvdA did in the 2017 elections. Its share of the vote sank from 24.7 % in 2012 to a mere 5.7 % in 2017.

Corbynism was successful in the sense that it helped increase the share of the vote won by the Labour Party in the 2017 elections, but this strategy has not yet enabled the party to win a national election. Thus, the economic polarization strategy has the potential to succeed, but only if a country has been governed by the center-right for a long time and austerity policies have been so far-reaching that their repercussions eventually came to be felt by the broader public. In the United Kingdom the health care and public transportation systems, for that matter also even the police and numerous other institutions, were subjected to budget cutting for many years. In a situation like this – confronted by the negative impacts of austerity policy – the broad public, including government employees and civil servants, frequently turns against right-wing parties. Nevertheless, social democrats should be cautious and not move too far to the left so as not to appear incompetent to more moderate, centrist voters. In the case of Labour, the presumed incompetence of the party leadership is regarded as a major obstacle that prevents the party from achieving a decisive lead in the polls. Still, these conclusions are purely speculative: it is quite possible that if Labour had a more moderate set of leaders, it would be in a still more disadvantageous situation.

At first, »Macronism« likewise seemed to be a successful strategy. For instance, the Partito Democratico in Italy moved toward the ideological center, committed itself to follow an orthodox economic approach and still announced that it intended to reform the Italian economy. By doing all these things it attracted a broad spectrum of voters and in 2013 won the election. And by founding *La République en Marche!* prior to the French elections in 2017, Macron won not only the race for the presidency but also a majority in the *Assemblée Nationale*. Still, the Macronism strategy could turn out to be counterproductive in the long run. After managing to boost their vote total in the 2013 elections, the Italian social democrats saw their share of the vote fall from 25.4 % to just 18.7 % in 2018, even though the party clung to its pro-market economic policy position. A similar dynamic can be observed in France. After Macron's stunning victory in 2017 his approval ratings went into free fall, ending at record lows not even a year after he took office. The outcome of his political project could again be in jeopardy in the next elections. One of the major critical points made by (left-wing) voters against the president is that he is instituting policies that benefit the affluent economic elite at the expense of the working population. Increasingly, Macron is perceived as the »president of the rich.« For that reason, social democrats should beware of pursuing a Macronism strategy. Although it might pay short-term dividends in elections, it basically implies the renunciation of fundamental social democratic values and center-left policies.

By contrast, a moderate economic orientation coupled with a strategy of polarization on the cultural axis (as adopted by the PvdA and the PS) seems to be a fatal mixture. In the eyes of the voters, when social democratic parties drift away from their base toward a progressive-libertarian position, their profile becomes

almost indistinguishable from that of their progressive rivals, since their political approaches are nearly identical. In terms of the economic axis, a moderate economic orientation only works when the social democratic party in question also remains moderate when it comes to cultural issues. The combination of centrist economic policies and cultural drift toward the progressive pole, however, leads to a situation in which the social democrats are hard to distinguish from the center-right on economic issues. By the same token, their differences from green parties and other progressive competitors are blurred. So it seems that social democracy has considerable latitude on the economic axis (primarily toward the left), whereas movement along the cultural axis – especially in the direction of the progressive pole – weakens ties to the core voter group without winning over many additional new voters.

What seems to work best, at least where electoral success is concerned, is a catch-all strategy designed to appeal to the broadest possible stratum of voters. When this strategy is adopted, the key is to maintain the party's image of competence in governing, since catch-all parties frequently end up in government (as is still the case in Sweden and was in Austria until 2018). Traditionally, catch-all parties have behaved with moderation on both economic and ideological matters. With their vision of stability and prosperity they have appealed to a growing middle class. Instead of committing themselves to radical economic change, those parties have advocated the status quo in regard to the distribution of social welfare benefits. They oppose the dismantling of social safety nets and any further pro-business liberalization of the economy. Where identity politics is concerned, catch-all parties maintain a progressive stance without jumping on board the train of identity politics by, say, emphasizing too much the rights of ethnic and sexual minorities.

(Further information on the project »Strategic debates among social democratic parties in Europe 2017,« including numerous graphics, can be found at www.fes.de.)



André Krouwel

is a professor at the University of Amsterdam and the founder of Kieskompas (Election compass).

andre.krouwel@vu.nl



Yordan Kutiyiski

works for Kieskompas and conducts research on voting behavior as well as European and Latin American politics.

yordan@kieskompas.nl

Julian Nida-Rümelin

Republican Cosmopolitanism

In the United States since the beginning of the 1980s, a communitarian critique of liberalism has been evolving, most impressively exemplified by Michael Sandel's book, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* which to a certain extent represents the prelude to a debate that is still going on today. That critique emphasized dependence on communities, however constituted, and took issue with the inappropriate conception of the person that implicitly or explicitly underlies liberal theories, especially John Rawls' theory of justice. This juxtaposition of liberalism and communi-

tarianism was quickly imported into Europe and today continues to inform debates in political philosophy and democratic theory to a great extent. Political developments in recent years, particularly the emergence of right-wing populist movements in Western democracies, have sparked a renaissance in political philosophy (which had seemed to be past its prime) due mostly to this polarity of liberalism vs. communitarianism. Indeed, that dichotomy is now exerting a stronger influence upon the empirical disciplines of sociology and political science.

The communitarian critique, though ignited by John Rawls' *Theory of Justice*, also had in mind the defects of American society, especially the way Americans understood their own brand of individualism and market rationality. By contrast, European societies since the Second World War, reacting to the Great Depression of 1929 and the rise of fascism and national socialism in Europe, sought a balance between the social welfare state and market economics. Although they differ markedly on how they combine those forms, as evidenced by Gøsta Esping-Andersen's *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, the European democracies have reckoned with a basic consensus on the role of the social welfare state – one that persists even today – that unites the Christian Democratic and conservative catch-all parties on one hand and the social democratic and socialist catch-all parties on the other. The communitarian critique of excessive individualism and the market economy encounters societies in Europe that to varying degrees have been shaped by a historical compromise between economic and social interests.

In Europe, communitarianism *avant la lettre* has a long anti-enlightenment, culturalist and nationalist tradition. It stoked the conflict of world-views between supposedly superficial »civilization« and supposedly more profound »culture,« shaped the ideological superstructure of the conflict between France and Germany prior to the First World War, and continues to pervade the conservative critique of democracy up to the present day. In Europe today, the ideologies of the identitarians hark back to these conceptual skirmishes again. In his book *The Road to Somewhere*, the British sociologist David Goodhart distinguishes between the *somewheres* and the *anywheres*, i.e., between those who, like the majority of the British populace, live in the same place they were born and feel solidly rooted there, and those who have long since lost touch with their origins and now are just about anywhere, here for a while, there for a while. The latter category is often seen as shorthand for the »cosmopolitan elite.« It is against them that the presumed or actual anger of the »left behind« among the rural population is directed – those who never graduated from high school, those who feel that they are not the intended audience of public discourses. Thus, according to this analysis, communitarian vs. cosmopolitan attitudes overlap the traditional right-left polarity.

There is a lot to be said for this interpretation. Empirical research supports it as the book *The Struggle over Borders* by Pieter de Wilde, Ruud Koopmans, Wolfgang Merkel, Oliver Strijbis, and Michael Zürn shows. Yet at the same time it formats political discourse and political science analysis in a problematic way. This leads to systematic distortions of political reality and normative judgments, while leaving out of account a significant alternative to both liberalism and communitarianism: republicanism.

Both right- and left-wing populism struggle against the nation-state's declining significance. In Italy, which is currently governed by a coalition of the right-wing Lega and the civic association known as the Five Star Movement founded by comedian Beppe Grillo, a new term for those political forces has entered the language: *sovranisti*, meaning those who insist upon the sovereignty of individual states and do not wish to subordinate national interests to international obligations. South American left-wing populism, too, long has been nationalistic. It defends national interests against interventions and manipulations on the part of the United States and trans-national corporations. Still, it is misleading to interpret such nationalism, whether on the left or the right, as a form of communitarianism. Historically – and even today – one of the most important functions of allegiance to the nation-state has been to weaken local ties and rally the citizenry to embrace an overarching loyalty that transcends particular interests.

What distinguishes the communal ties that communitarians analyze is the fact that they subsist outside of any formal institutional framework, whereas ties to the nation-state did not come into being until a collective actor got established in institutional form and decision-making processes were given legitimacy by being embedded in institutionalized procedures. Historically, virtually all nation-states had to be superimposed on pre-state communities. In cases where resistance was particularly fierce, that could be achieved only through the establishment of a federation. The late-arriving nation-states of Germany and Italy provide an especially illuminating illustration of that observation.

On the role of social solidarity organized by the state

Schoolbooks in Germany today teach young people there that the German nation-state was established in 1871. In fact, outside of Prussia the »small-German« Empire (excluding Austria) at first was perceived as a Prussian imposition resulting from a series of military defeats, the last of which was the Bavarian loss at Königgrätz in 1866. Thus, there were strict limits to the degree of loyalty felt by the citizens of the Empire toward this state apparatus. That indifference began to change only gradually, as a rudimentary social welfare state was put in place (the Imperial Insurance System). But external threats, whether real or successfully conjured up, and the ideologically charged competition with the Empire's western neighbor, France (culture vs. civilization), also played a role in cementing loyalty, while offering a dismal prelude to the First World War.

That brings us to the second key term of this analysis: the social welfare state. Present-day left-wing populists laments the loss of national control precipitated by economic globalization, the growing importance of international law, and the Europeanization of legislation. They claim that all these trends jeopardize social equalization and the edifice of the social welfare state institutions guaranteeing citizens' social rights that – as Wolfgang Streeck explains – until now have been possible only within the national framework.

However, it would be a dramatic misrepresentation of the role of state-organized solidarity to interpret it as a form of communal ties. The willingness to pay taxes

and premiums to insure against old age, illness, unemployment, parental responsibilities, and elder care – and/or to support those who at the moment cannot be gainfully employed due to one or more of those reasons – certainly doesn't require that one should be a member of a community of whatever kind (religious, ethnic, regional, etc.). It presupposes no more than a cooperative relationship: Everyone, within the scope of his or her capabilities, contributes to realizing these individual rights, all the while fully expecting that he or she eventually might be the beneficiary of such cooperation.

This is also the obvious explanation for the resistance of European populations against accepting large numbers of newcomers (refugees and migrant workers) into the social welfare state system. In that case, the symmetry between willingness to make contributions in the form of taxes and premiums, on one hand, and receiving social-welfare state benefits, on the other – the condition for willingness to cooperate on a broad scale – would be lacking. At least initially, the newcomers appear as beneficiaries rather than as contributors to the system. Thus, what is at stake here is not at all a relationship of cultural affinity such as the communitarian interpretation suggests; rather it is a matter of whether cooperative relationships exist or not. Conflating those two categories leads to seriously mistaken interpretations.

This is also the case for empirical analysis. Opinion surveys taken after the fall of 2015, when hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Germany, indicated to the surprise of many people that the portion of the German population with a »migration background« took a more critical view of this influx than did the majority of the population without an immigration background. Such attitudes should surprise only those who adopt the flawed communitarian interpretation, according to which it is affinity relationships that determine a person's attitudes. But if we interpret the social welfare state essentially as a cooperative relationship, the riddle immediately solves itself (allowing of course for great differences among countries such as Esping-Andersen describes in his book). In Germany the portion of the population with a migration background depends more heavily on social welfare services, but most of them, especially the so-called guest workers who came here from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, also contributed to the provision of those services. Furthermore, the resistance of employed persons in the lower and middle classes without a migration background can be explained with reference to the same pattern. It is the worry that relations of social cooperation will be perceptibly disturbed when the symmetry between having services provided and the reception of those services breaks down to the detriment of those who are socially and economically weaker.

In short, it would be a mistake to analyze the nature of the nation-state and the social welfare state through the lens of communitarianism. To the contrary, the nature of both the nation-state and the social welfare state, as well as the connections between them, weaken communitarian ties because they foster a new status (citizen of a nation and/or social citizen) that is independent of such bonds. This is the core of the republican critique of multiculturalism which links a person's status to the respect for and role of cultural identity, an idea advocated for example by Tariq Modood in his *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea* (2007).

The promise of liberalism to liberate individuals from relations of dependency and make them the authors of their own lives could not be fully realized until the social welfare state had been created. In this respect, American liberalism has enjoyed a cognitive head start as compared to its European counterparts. Regarded in this light, the linkage between multiculturalism and liberalism which shaped more recent developments in the USA and contributed to the defeat of Hillary Clinton by Donald Trump, is an aberration from the social-liberal heritage of American Democrats.

The political conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is obvious and two-fold. Beyond the duel between communitarianism and liberalism there is a third pole: republicanism. It counts on membership in a democratically constituted state, sustained by social cooperation, in order both to keep in check the individualizing tendencies of untrammelled economic liberalism and to rein in the particularizing tendencies of multiculturalism. When people have a say in their democracy and the opportunity to shape their living arrangements both politically and socially, that experience fosters a collective and thus republican, genuinely political identity that keeps the collectivism of particular identities as well as the atomism of capitalist market economies within civilized bounds.

The second – cosmopolitan – critique states that, given the global challenges we face, the principle of statehood or the existing nation-states must be extended outward to ensure that politics retains its power to shape events and to instill in people a cosmopolitan sense of responsibility. The frightened withdrawal of left- and right-wing populism into the national framework, coupled with a renaissance of national selfishness, would inevitably fail when confronted with the enormous challenges to humanity such as climate change, resource conservation, species diversity, and the battle against poverty, etc. In the end it would culminate in a Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*, a war of all against all.



Julian Nida-Rümelin

teaches philosophy and political theory at the University of Munich. He leads the interdisciplinary research group »International Justice and Institutional Responsibility« sponsored by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

sekretariat.nida-ruemelin@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Thomas Meyer

The Battle over Borders and Social Democracy

Theories versus realities

According to one influential theory, the persistent weakness of European social democracy is due primarily to the excessive focus of the entire center-left on issues of liberal identity politics, such as marriage for all. In addition – so goes the theory – its troubles have been exacerbated by the lack of clarity in its positions on open borders and migration. As a result, the true core commitments of the left, especially equality, good work, social security, and sustainability, presumably have been almost completely overshadowed. In the last analysis, say critics, the disastrous upsurge of right-wing populism in many countries must be understood as the response of déclassé elements to the neglect of their existential interests in favor of the more highbrow needs of a new middle class that profits economically and culturally from globalization.

Advocates of this interpretation claim that the real working class no longer recognizes social democracy as its appointed advocate; instead, it is attracted increasingly to the politics of ethnic identity peddled by the populist right with its call for border closure, seeing in the latter the only satisfactory answer to its neglected demands for security, orientation, and esteem. Reflecting on public discussions, it is not hard to observe a constant tendency for influential actors in the media and politics to blur the highly sensitive line of demarcation between radical right-wing populism and the legitimate questioning of current migration policy. Those who are skeptical of that policy easily can be pushed out of the center, where they feel most at home, toward the fringes of society where right-wing populism lies in wait. Thus, they find themselves marginalized even though all they really were looking for was greater clarity and consistency in policy and thus the chance to contribute to a public debate that even today never has been exhaustively explored. Criteria are blurred and conceptual confusion reigns; the radical populists, along with their core principle of identity politics, are the main beneficiaries here, even though they are actually a very small group.

This argument may be partially correct, but if so, that is because it encompasses broader changes, above all profound upheavals in the structure of society and politics as a whole, in which the battle over borders is imbedded. First let us note that the great estrangement between social democracy and the »new working class« consisting of the precariously employed as well as segments of the »old middle class« (self-employed small businesspeople, skilled workers) has deeper causes than just the former's unclear policy on migration. Rather, it is the expression of more fundamental processes of change in society, mainly owing to untrammelled globalization, that are reshaping the political landscape in almost every democracy around the world. In any case, these observations are confirmed by the most up-to-date social-scientific research. Its findings suggest that all these phenomena – social polarization and emergent insecurity, migration on a grand scale, and widespread discon-

tent about it – are merely facets of a bigger picture. Yet no one should overlook a related point: that by this time the issue of migration has become the symbolic focus and emotional lightning-rod for these new political contradictions.

Up until now, two circumstances have made it considerably more difficult to understand the entire picture completely. In fact, they always have played a confusing role in the history of political debates on the left. The first is the unreflective use of dangerously ambivalent terms, today including (besides the very fuzzy concept of »right-wing populism«) especially »cosmopolitanism« and »communitarianism.« In such cases there is a tendency for the users of the term to smuggle their own political desires as deeply into the analysis of real-world events as they possibly can and then to bend and twist whatever does not fit those concepts.

Modern class society

The social sciences are outlining the contours of a new kind of class society, one that exhibits a peculiar combination of old distributive conflicts and new-style skirmishes over social and cultural recognition. The processes of largely untrammelled economic globalization are generating a fundamentally new form of social conflict the economic, cultural, and political effects of which radiate steadily outward. In this context we refer to the emergence of a new, socio-*economically* defined class society with a strong socio-*cultural* dimension (described especially by Andreas Reckwitz) and – closely linked to it – the articulation of a new kind of basic *political* conflict over the consequences of globalization and its boundaries (as depicted mainly by Wolfgang Merkel and Michael Zürn). These unprecedented conflicts add a dramatically new element to the two previously dominant antitheses between capital and labor and industrialism and ecology, while reshaping both in highly consequential ways and perhaps also aggravating them. Although these new types of conflict do not polarize society completely, they do generate clearly discernible poles, each with far-flung spheres of influence. In this respect they influence the political mind-set of the majority of society, albeit not always in straightforward ways and with the same degree of forcefulness. »Cosmopolitanism« (as it is known in the clumsy terminology of social science) forms one of the poles. Popular primarily among members of the »new middle class,« the winners in globalization, its adherents tend to favor open borders and unregulated migration. »Communitarianism,« the mentality of globalization's losers, forms the other pole and advocates just the opposite policies: closed borders and restrictive immigration controls. The first group wants openness in all respects, because, given its members' professional skills and cultural proclivities, they will be able to benefit from it everywhere. The others want to protect their jobs and enjoy the recognition of their peers in the community. These antitheses are strongest in the vicinity of the extreme ends of the political spectrum (the »poles«) and weaken increasingly as one approaches more closely to the center of society. There, one more often encounters combinations of elements from both mentalities.

A migration study conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and published in April, 2019, under the title (here Anglicized) »The Pragmatic Immigration Coun-

try« supplements the results of previous research. The FES study prefers the terms »open to the world« (WO) and »nationally oriented« (NO) to characterize the two poles noted above. Of the persons included in the study, 7 % of the WO group were located at the margins (i.e., close to the poles), while 11 % of the NOs were (at the other pole). About 25 % of society were more weakly influenced by the mentality embodied in the two poles: 19 % of the WOs and 14 % of the NOs. In respect to most controversial issues, the other half of society falls into what the FES researchers call the »mobile middle.« Given the dwindling electoral support for catch-all parties (when we went to press the figures were around 17 % for the SPD and about 28 % for the CDU), these numbers suggest that the new political-cultural conflicts over the shaping of globalization and its consequences for the social climate, the party system, and the electoral chances of the parties will have a major – and in cases of doubt a decisive – impact. In this country, the Greens and the Left Party rally around the purest form of the cosmopolitan pole, while only the AfD embodies the border-closing mentality of communitarianism. The other parties navigate through this minefield as best they can, with hard-fought compromises and courses that often remain unclear. The true electoral base of the SPD as well as a large portion of its membership appears to be split down the middle, with tendencies to drift over toward one or the other of the two poles. Of course, this conflict too can be managed productively only if it is first examined without prejudice. The preliminary results are as follows: 1. Both »camps« contain fairly small, committed core groups flanked by a wider circle of sympathizers. 2. The moderate center is only weakly influenced by the poles, yet its members are by no means uninterested in the really controversial issues. They are open to more nuanced, »good« compromises. 3. In light of these findings it would be a terrible mistake to classify almost automatically as »right-wing populists« those people who share a few of the positions of »communitarianism« in a moderate form and/or to equate the »moderate WOs« with the hardline border openers. 4. The group of radical right-wing populists is small and the field is wide open for building bridges between the two camps.

New conflicts and imprecise concepts

It is also the case that the oversimplifying yet catchy expressions »cosmopolitanism« and »communitarianism« prove to be unhelpful if we wish to understand the broader picture behind the new conflicts. Those terms are even less useful if we hope to discover workable political compromises acceptable to the moderate majorities on both sides. There is more at stake here than just borders. Economic globalization leads to what Andreas Reckwitz, referring to an old-style, single-chain elevator, calls a »Pater Noster society« in which a third of its members benefit from globalization, mainly those engaged in professional fields such as consulting, finance, cultural creation, and digital technologies. They quickly climb the social and financial ladders and increasingly set vital cultural standards for the entire society. Meanwhile, the other two-thirds, including the »old middle class« comprised of small-scale self-employed people plus skilled workers and the »new working class« of less highly trained service employees not only have experienced financial stagnation or

even downward mobility; they also have come to feel that their lifestyles and quotidian cultures have been belittled, which simply adds insult to injury. As a rule, those who profit from globalization due to their professional training and cultural opportunities tend to exhibit a highly cosmopolitan disposition in all matters of personal lifestyle, from their economic, cultural, social, and private interests to their choices of partners and leisure activities, artistic tastes, in their child-raising practices, and political culture. But when the consequences of globalization are experienced as a real menace – as loss of income, security, and the esteem of others – then a person's whole disposition will be quite different, marked by resistance to change, dogged persistence in accustomed ways of life, and demands for protection.

Those tendencies can only lead to mutual alienation and eventually even to contempt. In this manner, longstanding struggles over the distribution of the economic pie shade over into newer-style conflicts over social and cultural recognition. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the elites, because of their positions of influence in every sphere of society, establish the norms and define the rules of the game. These conflicts are emotionally charged due to the resentments felt on both sides of the great divide, which further stymies efforts at achieving consensus. This new situation began to emerge gradually as early as the 1990s. Subsequently, around 2015, the rising tide of migration was converted by both sides into a symbol of the conflict described above, thus concealing its multiple other dimensions. Now, the great migration, together with its real or anticipated consequences, came to be perceived as the cause of the whole new set of conflicts rather than as a symptom of them.

In this situation, opportunities to reform the »deformed society« and achieve political consensus tend to dwindle when the terms »cosmopolitanism« and »communitarianism« – both desperately in need of clarification – are used to characterize the two camps and are injected into public debate without further commentary. The problem is not only that this binary terminology exaggerates the tensions delimited above, but also that such a dichotomy is a kind of red herring. When allowed to set the agenda of the debate, the concepts of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism boil it down to a question of migration's symbolic significance. At the same time, they present a crudely simplistic version of the real conflict. The term cosmopolitanism as it is currently used suggests a radical aversion to local ties, social communities, and patriotic loyalty to the nation-state, but those connotations are in no way specified either by the term's historical usage or by the mentality of those who are so described today. By the same token, the term communitarianism implies that those intended by it ultimately are all adherents of an ethnic or religious kind of identity politics, i.e., that strictly speaking all of them are right-wing populists. Yet polling data and certainly the history of that concept show that this is not at all the case. The misguided connotations attached to these two terms becloud the political landscape and can lead to the misidentification of people's real attitudes. Sometimes, for example, even slightly un-cosmopolitan attitudes – say, not fully endorsing open borders or not wanting to do away completely with strict scrutiny of asylum seekers – are thrown into the same pot with views of real right-wing populists. That sort of

thing draws smiles of approbation from the most hardline anti-immigrant factions by making it seem as though the moderates actually are in their camp too.

The political concept of cosmopolitanism actually dates back to the early modern era. It was coined and suitably defined by Immanuel Kant, who used it to characterize his vision of a worldwide »federation of free states,« all of which would be nationally organized republics and would stay that way because the regimes that ran them would be expected to carry out punctilious border checks. In this global federation, aliens were to have a »right of visitation,« while citizens of every republic would retain the right to invite them to stay or ask them to leave, except in cases where the latter would mean their »demise.« This is exactly what is meant when we talk about republican cosmopolitanism (as Kant or Julian Nida-Rümelin describe it). The republics have national constitutions and consist of citizens who practice virtues that aim to promote the common good and defend it against all particular interests, thus infusing their commonwealths with a democratic spirit. In this sense the expression »cosmopolitans« is falsely applied when used to designate those who favor open borders unconditionally.

The choice of the concept of communitarianism to describe the other side (those skeptical about migration) is even more unfortunate. In its philosophical application (e.g. by Michael Walzer) it emphasizes the view that the validity claims raised by terms such as »just« and »good« are relative to the community that employs them. To be sure, this claim does not rule out extensive overlaps in the understanding of basic values among very different cultural communities, as evidenced by Walzer's idea of a cultural community of political liberalism. But *political* communitarianism, the kind that is at issue in this context, relates the aspiration toward community exclusively to liberal democratic *political culture* and stresses that the latter obviously can and should (so claims Amitai Etzioni) be shared by citizens who differ considerably from one another in religion and ethnicity. No version of identity politics of whatever kind can rest its case on communitarian assumptions thus understood. Hence, if we examine the history of the two concepts cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, we find them being applied to designate political mentalities, in which both republicanism (i.e. the formation of a *political* community of democrats) and trans-cultural cooperation are fused. Yet in the unfortunate and politically misleading use of these concepts that recently has taken root in political science, political affairs, and journalism, those very principles would be ruled out. It is evident that these two slogans can depict the new reality at best in vague and partially misleading terms, when what we need is a proper and thus more complex depiction of it.

A good compromise is possible

The two concepts – cosmopolitanism and communitarianism – become completely counterproductive when we attempt to forge a compromise between the moderate forces of both camps, one that is urgently needed given the present crisis of globalization and Western democracy. Generally speaking, the problem is to develop a humane policy on migration that would reliably protect asylum seekers and war

refugees for as long as their lives are at risk while at the same time maintaining functioning border controls. As for migrants in search of jobs, the door should remain open, but only if they can be assured of finding employment. Moreover, the political-cultural integrity of the republic in Kant's sense and the autonomous decision-making authority of the community of its citizens must be preserved. Finally, we must be able to guarantee that the economic, social, and cultural costs of integrating large numbers of migrants entitled to remain will be fairly distributed across different social groups (proportional to their ability to bear the burdens) and that additional aid will be provided to the more precariously situated members of the host society as well. Assuming that we need an organizing political concept for a compromise thus envisioned, it can only be the one suggested by Nida-Rümelin: »republican cosmopolitanism« in the sense elucidated here, at least in the absence of any handier expression. Nevertheless, what is still missing are persuasive responses about how to overcome the inequality of material opportunities and offer credible guarantees of social security, and mutual recognition of the divergent cultural forms of life adopted by the new classes. This is not a trivial matter; it is a vital project for social democracy as it faces a new century of globalization.



Thomas Meyer

is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Dortmund and Editor-in-Chief of the journal *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* (the parent publication of the *International Quarterly*). His most recent book, entitled *Die Unbelangbaren: Wie politische Journalisten mitregieren*, was published by Suhrkamp in 2015.

thomas.meyer@fes.de

Publisher's Information

Released for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung by

Kurt Beck, Jürgen Kocka, Thomas Meyer, Bascha Mika,
Andrea Nahles, Angelica Schwall-Düren and Wolfgang Thierse

Editorial Staff

Thomas Meyer (editor-in-chief and responsible),
Lewis Hinchman (English language editor), Jana Heisel, Dirk Kohn,
Klaus-Jürgen Scherer

Editorial Department of NG|FH

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 17, D-10785 Berlin,
Tel: 004930269357151, -52, -53, Fax: 004930269359238,
www.ng-fh.de, ng-fh@fes.de

Publisher

Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH
Dreizehnmorgenweg 24, D-53175 Bonn,
Tel: 0049228184877-0, Fax: 0049228184877-29, www.dietz-verlag.de

Design Planning

tiff.any Ltd., Berlin

Typeset, Lithography, Printing, Production

Limberg Druck GmbH, Kaarst

To order individual copies contact

heidemarie.pankratz@dietz-verlag.de

ISSN 2194-3095



Recent publications

from the International Departments of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Graduating LDCs in an evolving WTO

Options and strategies

MUSTAFIZUR RAHMAN,
DEBAPRIYA BHATTARCHARYA

Geneva, 2019

Who »really« legislates?

The political economy of parliaments
in Sub-Saharan Africa

ANNETTE LOHMANN

Berlin, 2019

The responsibility to act

German UN policy promoting stability
and development in Darfur

PETER SCHUMANN

Berlin, 2019

Between aspiration and reality

Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear
weapons

ANGELA KANE

Berlin, 2019

A global common good

Improving financing for UN
humanitarian aid

DIETER REINHARDT

New York, 2019

Trade unions in Germany

Challenges in a time of transition

HEINER DRIBBUSCH, PETER BIRKE

Berlin, 2019

These and further publications are available at: www.fes.de/international.

Stay up to date with new developments in international affairs with the weekly publications newsletter »Neuerscheinungen«, bringing to you the latest and most important analyses, reports and opinions from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's international departments.

Subscribe today by sending an email with the subject »Newsletter NEUERSCHEINUNGEN abonnieren« to international@fes.de.