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Beginning in 1973, and for the first time since the end of World War II, a total of 35 countries from East and West gathered for an all-European security conference in order to discuss ways to achieve peaceful coexistence. Following 672 days of intensive negotiations, the countries participating in the CSCE finally agreed upon a comprehensive final document that was to regulate future cooperation in three main areas: security and trust-building measures (basket 1); economy, science, technology, and the environment (basket 2); and humanitarian issues (basket 3).

Human rights and civil liberties

In retrospect, the third basket turned out to have especially far-reaching historical consequences. Against the bitter opposition of Moscow at the time, the West managed to have included in the final Helsinki document both human rights and civil liberties. For the Eastern European dissidents and civil rights activists, the unwilling commitment of their governments to universal rights became a lever in the struggle for freedom, justice, and solidarity. Thus, the CSCE not only went a long way toward reducing tensions in the Cold War; it also made a major contribution to the gradual transformation of communist rule and ultimately to the peaceful overcoming of the East-West conflict. 

The OSCE is gradually fading into insignificance

Once the Cold War was over, the CSCE process evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Its charter, drawn up in Paris at the outset of the Nineties, initially stirred great hopes for a »new age of democracy, peace, and unity« in Europe. But as early as the turn of the century the OSCE experienced a creeping loss of significance. There were many reasons for the diminishing relevance of the OSCE: competition from other actors, the resulting shift of priorities on the part of participating countries in favor of NATO and the EU; organizational paralysis due to the split between Russia and the West, not to mention its fuzzy profile and minimal visibility in the outside world.

At the same time, the former backers of the OSCE increasingly lost interest in it, because in their domestic affairs national egoism, isolationism, and multiple symptoms of crisis were on the rise. The OSCE was no longer seen as a robust platform; instead, it came to be viewed as an instrument that could be applied selectively to achieve limited foreign policy goals, mainly in regions in which neither NATO nor the EU could – or wanted to – get involved. More and more, the organization seemed to drop off the radar screens of both the public generally and elected and appointed officeholders.

»Russia abuses the consensus principle to block OSCE decisions.«

It wasn’t until 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, that the OSCE came into sharp political focus once again – albeit only for a short time – due to the establishment of a special monitoring mission and the creation of a trilateral contact group to support it.  Yet the massive Russian attack on Ukraine plunged the OSCE into a new and severe crisis. Since then, Russia has abused OSCE’s consensus rule to block any fundamental decisions. The last time the Organization was able to pass a regular budget was in 2021. Moreover, its special monitoring mission in Ukraine expired on March 31, 2022, because Moscow withheld consent to extend its mandate.

The war in Ukraine and the OSCE’s institutional failures symbolize the profound crisis of the liberal, rules-based order as a whole. Worldwide, international institutions increasingly have come under pressure. The United Nations Security Council is virtually paralyzed by the vetoes of its permanent members on crucial issues. The World Trade Organization (WTO) can barely function due to the absence of reform and the blockade of its dispute resolution system. Finally, doubts have been cast more frequently on the reach of international law and jurisdiction, or else they simply have been ignored.

»The world finds itself caught up in a renewed arms race.«

Global disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation also have been drifting toward an existential crisis for quite a while. The New Start Treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2026. Its final demise would signify an end to the last remaining bilateral arms control treaty between Russia and the USA.

In recent years the world has found itself caught up in a new arms race. According to the SIPRI Report of 2025, global expenditures on weaponry in 2024 increased for the tenth year in a row. That research institute also recorded for the previous year the biggest increase in military spending since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, new technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems, and cyberweapons remain largely unregulated.

Against this backdrop, we must ask whether and how international institutions like the OSCE and other multilateral bodies can still contribute today to easing global tensions and finding joint solutions to global challenges.

The state of the world in 1975 and 2025

As we attempt to answer such questions, it makes sense to describe present-day political realities as matter-of-factly as possible. The state of the world in 2025 differs radically from that which prevailed in 1975. Unlike the Soviet Union of that era, contemporary Russia is not trying to preserve the status quo. Rather, it is using military force to redraw boundaries in Europe and thus restore its sphere of influence as a great power in eastern Europe. Furthermore, the USA is no longer inclined to play its erstwhile roles as benign hegemon and global policeman. On the contrary, under Donald Trump it too is taking an axe to the multilateral, rules-based order.

Moreover, the world today is no longer bipolar, but multipolar, with a variety of power centers. Rising global powers such as China and India and regional actors like Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey are pushing into the power-political vacuum left by the USA and the former Soviet Union, and are attempting to reshape the world order and its institutions according to their own ideas.

What is more, the decline of multilateral institutions goes hand in hand with a global crisis of democracy. In principle, democracies are more receptive to international cooperation, institutions, rules, and values. As democracies everywhere fall on hard times, backing for multilateralism likewise diminishes. Another reason for the fragility of democracy is the transformation of the global economic order. After World War II ended, capitalism and democracy continued to share a strong community of interest. Today, however, the bonds between them increasingly have frayed. Authoritarian forms of rule yoked to capitalist economies have been equally successful if not even more so. At the same time, it has become harder for democracies credibly to make good their claims to justice, participation, and fair distribution.

  »The decline of multilateral institutions goes hand in hand with a global crisis of democracy.«

At this point, we are in a phase marked by geopolitical upheaval. The postwar order that took shape on the heels of World War II and the subsequent East-West conflict is nearing an end, and so far, no new, stable system has arisen to replace it. In fact, it may take decades before a multipolar order emerges. The current situation is thus far more fragile, complex, and inscrutable than it ever was during the Cold War.

Reliable rules for international cooperation

For that very reason, it is all the more urgent nowadays to reinforce democratic structures alongside credible deterrence and defensive capabilities. By the same token, commonly agreed-upon, reliable rules and mechanisms of international cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution must be created. Working to achieve those ends does not require us to reinvent the wheel. Often it would be enough to adhere to already existing rules and, if necessary, reform and strengthen institutions.

Even today, numerous international institutions remain functional and able to take action; moreover, they contribute considerably to rendering the global order more secure. Thus, for instance, the OSCE continues to support Ukraine despite the Russian blockade through voluntary contributions outside of its normal organizational budget. In addition, the OSCE remains the sole body devoted to security policy in which both Russia and Ukraine, as well as Europe and the USA, are represented. If serious talks were held about a potential ceasefire and how to preserve it, the OSCE could be assigned a key role in supervising the armistice and rebuilding Ukraine.

It has become obvious that we desperately need cooperative and multilateral security mechanisms even outside of Europe. The ongoing tensions in the Indo-Pacific and Korean peninsula, the increasingly threatening military gestures directed against Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China and the recent wars in the Near and Middle East make clear that there is a lack of reliable forums and mechanisms for dialogue, transparency, and trust-building in other parts of the world as well. Despite all the reverses it has suffered in recent years, the OSCE or perhaps other regional organizations elsewhere on the globe might continue to serve as models for trust-building and security.

Europe’s special responsibility

Based on its historical experiences with multilateral institutions such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the EU, Europe bears a special responsibility for the defense and renewal of multilateralism. Even in a multipolar world, a rules-based and multilateral order continues to have existential significance, especially for many small and medium-sized countries.

However, many states of the Global South do not feel that they are adequately represented in the current architecture of international institutions. Their interests typically attract little attention in institutions such as the UN, the WTO, or the World Bank. Europe must take these justified concerns seriously and actively cooperate in making the multilateral order fairer and more inclusive. At the same time, we should do our best to engage existing regional organizations like ASEAN and the African Union more vigorously in joint initiatives while developing a relaxed but still critical relationship with institutions like BRICS and the security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

»Many countries of the Global South do not feel that they are adequately represented in international institutions.«

To achieve those aims, the West must initiate conversations with difficult partners like China and other authoritarian countries. Engaging even difficult partners in multilateral initiatives does not mean being unprincipled. Rather, it indicates that we see what is feasible and realize that pressure alone will not induce changes in behavior. Like it or not, the major tasks confronting humanity such as arms control, addressing the climate crisis and pandemics, and regulating new technologies can only be managed through joint action. For those challenges, multilateral formats plus a comprehensive and cooperative understanding of security such as that implicit in the final documents of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris, remain indispensable. Otherwise, we face the threat of a fragmented, confrontational order in which the right of the stronger will be the sole accepted rule.