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One year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, on September 11, 1990, then-U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced the dawn of a »New World Order« in a speech before the U.S. Congress. In his speech, he articulated a vision of »a world different from the one we have known until now. A world in which the rule of law replaces the law of the jungle. A world in which peoples recognize their shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world in which the strong respect the rights of the weak [...].« Just two months later, on this side of the Atlantic, the signing of the Charter of Paris in November 1990 sealed the end of the East-West conflict and heralded a »new era of democracy, peace, and unity« in Europe. Contemporary observers such as the U.S. political scientist Francis Fukuyama interpreted this development as the »end of history« and assumed that liberal principles such as democracy and the market economy would soon prevail worldwide as the dominant model of social order.
We find ourselves in a period of upheaval characterized by increasing uncertainty and an erosion of shared rules.
More than three decades later, the world is still far from having achieved a stable, just, and peaceful order while the »end of history« remains a distant dream. Instead, we are again hearing talk of a »new world order.« The so-called »Pax Americana,« which had long defined the world order, is increasingly disintegrating. Above all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the political shifts in the U.S. mark pivotal turning points whose significance is reminiscent of the upheavals of 1945 or 1989. At this point no one can say with certainty what a future world order will look like. It may take years or even decades before a new order emerges. One thing is certain, however: We are currently in a highly volatile and dangerous phase of upheaval, characterized above all by growing competition among the major powers, increasing uncertainty, and an erosion of shared rules.
In fact, the danger of a global conflagration is probably greater today than it has been since 1945. The disintegration of the global system into power blocs, trade wars, and arms races certainly does little to promote peace. The fact is that there is currently no power willing or able to enforce peace and stability. On the contrary: the major powers are currently doing more to spread regional and global conflicts than to resolve them. Relations between China and the U.S., in particular, are increasingly marked by strategic rivalry and mutual distrust. Reliable mechanisms for reducing tensions and the will to de-escalate are virtually nonexistent. New technologies and weapons systems further increase the risk of both reckless and unintended escalation.
The peace policy approaches of the past are increasingly reaching their limits.
The use of AI and autonomous systems will at last call into question the idea of nuclear deterrence, which was already on shaky ground. At the same time, the dominant approaches to peace policy of the past decades—which relied primarily on multilateral institutions, international law, democratization, and economic interdependence—are increasingly reaching their limits in their current form. This does not mean that these approaches are now basically outmoded, but they clearly no longer go far enough under today’s conditions to ensure lasting peace and stability.
The use of AI and autonomous systems will finally call into question the already fragile concept of nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the dominant approaches to peace policy of recent decades—which have relied primarily on multilateral institutions, international law, democratization, and economic interdependence—are increasingly reaching their limits in their current form. This does not mean that these approaches are now fundamentally obsolete, but they clearly no longer go far enough under today’s conditions to ensure lasting peace and stability.
Peaceful coexistence isn’t a new idea
The crucial question, however, is: What follows from this? How do we deal with this unpredictable, inscrutable global situation? I am convinced that precisely because the situation is so dramatic and increasingly dangerous, we have every reason to reflect on how tensions can be reduced and pathways opened to peaceful coexistence and resilient relationships in a multipolar world. Peaceful coexistence is not a new idea. As far back as the Cold War, it was already invoked and variously interpreted by a quite diverse roster of actors including both Nikita Khrushchev and the the American diplomat George F. Kennan, as well as (within the framework of Ostpolitik) by Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr. At the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations, the Chinese and Indian interpretations of »peaceful coexistence« also played especially important roles.
Nevertheless, peaceful coexistence evidently means something different today than it did 70 years ago—or even just five years ago. There will be no return to the status quo ante. Today, Europe is confronted not only by a Russia ready to resort to military force, but also by an increasingly assertive China and a dollar-driven United States under Trump. At the same time, a multipolar world demands new approaches to policy that take into account the changed global balance of power and forces.
From a European perspective, a policy of peaceful coexistence must be based on several pillars. The first pillar is European self-assertion. The EU can survive in the competition among major powers only if it evolves into a sovereign actor. To do so, it must, on the one hand, strengthen its capacity to act through institutional reforms and, on the other hand, effectively reduce existing dependencies in critical areas to lower the potential for conflict in these fields. Nevertheless, the goal should be consistent de-risking, not decoupling. Complete decoupling and the associated economic costs could dissolve the stabilizing elements of mutual interdependence that still exist, thereby actually increasing the risk of escalation in the medium and long term.
Moreover, due to economic, technological, and political interdependencies, no state can respond to global challenges on its own today. We simply have to depend on a certain degree of regional and global cooperation. Verbose statements of intent, such as the »China Strategy« published in 2023, do little to help in managing international crises. Ultimately, they are quietly shelved, as was the case during the Chancellor’s last visit to Beijing and Shanghai.
At the same time, when it comes to international issues, Europe should consistently back adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence and international law as it has evolved over the past decades. Justifying policies ambiguously or not justifying them at all—e.g., regarding the laws of war or international criminal prosecution—will weaken the core values of the common foreign and security policy. This applies equally to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the U.S.’s actions in Iran and Venezuela that violate international law, and China’s expansive territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.
»Smart diplomacy cannot wait until democracies exist everywhere; rather, it proves its worth precisely in dealing with those who think differently.«
This, of course, also raises the question of how to deal with actors who themselves have no interest in peaceful coexistence. There are no simple answers to this. For instance, I have no illusions about Vladimir Putin’s willingness to negotiate or his predictability. Nevertheless, that must not deter us from continuing to seek diplomatic avenues to end this war. Furthermore, those who oppose the diplomatic alternative must answer the question: Would it be better if Europe continued to be absent from the negotiating table?
Whether we like it or not, diplomacy also involves talking to »bad guys« with whom we have little or no common ground. Smart diplomacy cannot wait until democracies exist everywhere; rather, it proves its worth precisely in dealing with those who hold different views. Ultimately, peaceful coexistence requires a policy based on acceptance and a sober analysis of the status quo while seeking to move beyond it through a pragmatic policy of small steps. I am convinced that, especially in times of such great tension, we need a policy like this once again to restore lost trust and a minimum of strategic stability in international relations. Nothing is permanent, but containing and managing conflicts is preferable to a policy of absolute deterrence relying on power politics alone. We must not resign ourselves to these realities, but to change them, we must confront them.
Role of the EU
From this gray area a process can then gradually emerge that will furnish the basis for a reformed, rules-based, and cooperative order. Together with like-minded partners, the EU should actively advance this process by backing the preservation and reform of the institutions of the rules-based order. Simultaneously, it should be developing new, flexible forms of cooperation. This also includes expanding partnerships with the countries of the Global South, which likewise have an interest in a multilateral and cooperative order.
This is the case because one thing is clear: peace is only possible in the medium and long term if states and societies cooperate. The challenges facing humanity cannot be overcome through isolationism and going it alone, but only through trust and cooperation—whether in climate protection, economic and technological change, the fight against poverty, or the goal of a peaceful and nuclear-weapon-free world.