» Lesen Sie diesen Artikel auf Deutsch
The EU stands for values like freedom, democracy, and pluralism, all of which presuppose a state that can be counted upon due to the strength of its legal order. It upholds these values not only internally but also champions them externally. That, at least, is the ideal.
A Union on treadmills
Yet as we see every day the European Union in its current form is paralyzed. This paralysis is political in nature, and—yes--some actors even want it that way. There are governments in the EU that reap domestic political capital from rendering the EU incapable of acting in certain areas. Furthermore, a single country can currently torpedo Europe’s common foreign and security policy with its veto. It is precisely in this context that Peter Magyar’s election victory and Hungary’s return to a more constructive role within the European Union represent a first important step toward restoring the EU’s collective capacity to act. But it is only a first step: Hungary’s return to the group of pro-European countries will not resolve the dilemmas facing the European Union.
These are, first, that while the EU is indeed a genuine global economic power—with a single market of 450 million citizens in one of the world’s wealthiest regions—it is politically so fragmented that it cannot leverage its economic strength. The aforementioned principle of unanimity in EU foreign policy means that, on the major issues of our time, the EU is unable to speak with one voice to the outside world and stand up to the autocrats and destroyers of the international order.
»The traditional Western alliance has come to an end.«
Second: Under the U.S. administration of Donald Trump, the traditional Western alliance between most of the European countries and the U.S. and Canada within NATO has come to an end. While NATO still formally exists, its core as an alliance—and thus its non-aggression pact and mutual defense clause—can no longer be considered secure following the military threats made by the U.S. –a NATO partner—against a fellow NATO member, Denmark. And unfortunately, it is true: The European Union has so far failed to establish a security architecture of its own.
»Supporting Ukraine as a shared mission that reinforces the West’s identity.«
This gives rise to a third dilemma: The existing Western alliance to support Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression—an attack that violates international law--is crumbling. Until the start of Trump’s second term, supporting Ukraine against an irredentist, authoritarian, and aggressive Russian state was also seen as a shared mission of the democratic West, one with significant symbolic importance that served to reinforce the West’s identity. This commitment was abandoned by the U.S. government last year. Donald Trump’s administration now aligns U.S. efforts for Ukraine’s defense purely with the immediate geopolitical interests of the United States. At the same time, both ideologically and in terms of rhetoric, he is closer to the Russian president than to any European head of state or government. Furthermore, the Trump administration shares Russia’s secondary goal of using this war to destroy the European Union or at least pry it apart.
The fourth dilemma is that the European Union long ago should have drawn conclusions from these tendencies. Now it is more important than ever to close ranks with those partners around the world who are being harmed by both U.S. and Russian political moves, but who still wish to uphold a multilateral system of values consistent with international law. This is fairly easy to achieve with countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, or most Latin American nations, such as Brazil and the other Mercosur countries. It becomes more difficult in relations with India, very difficult in relations with a number of African states, and in some cases dauntingly complicated in relations with China.
The European Union is not sufficiently prepared for this. It has also not yet recognized that cooperation is not only necessary, but that the nature of that cooperation must also shift toward genuine partnership. That is the only way in which alliances become possible at all. The vote on the Mercosur agreement in the European Parliament—and the arrogance evident in the justifications given by those who voted against it, including parties that are supposedly committed to multilateralism—has shown how necessary global alliances can be undermined even before they are formed.
»China is and remains a systemic competitor.«
The fifth dilemma: The EU is also viewed by China, at least in part, as an adversary. While China is still the most interested in pragmatic cooperation with Europe—because the country needs the European single market, and conversely, the European single market depends on the Chinese market and Chinese raw materials—China is and remains, despite the more pragmatic approach Beijing displays, a systemic competitor. After all, China, with its authoritarian political system, embodies the antithesis of enlightened, modern Western democracies founded on individual rights.
A New Direction for a Strategic Shift
All these dilemmas are paralyzing the European Union at a time when it needs strength, because it is additionally confronted with the war in Ukraine in its immediate neighborhood and, in the Mediterranean region, it’s being drawn ever more deeply into the Middle East conflict.
»Despite this damaging paralysis, the EU remains attractive to the Western Balkans«
And this paralysis is damaging, as it threatens to grind the EU between the interests of China, Russia, and the U.S. Nevertheless, the EU, especially its single market, remains highly attractive, particularly for the countries of the Western Balkans. But in its current state of paralysis, the EU is incapable of enlargement, as unanimity among all EU member states is required even for accessions. Some member states even must hold referendums to grant their approval of new members, and those are unlikely to pass at the moment. Without the prospect of accession or at least an interim solution for the countries of the Western Balkans, anti-democratic actors such as Russia or China will have an easy time establishing intensive trade relations in that region, thereby expanding their sphere of political influence right in the heart of Europe.
All of this raises the question: Can the Union of 27 member states, based on the existing EU treaties and the principle of unanimity in foreign policy, overcome the challenges described? The answer is: No, it cannot.
For this reason, I am advocating a new strategy for the European Union. However, treaty amendments are difficult to achieve because they require unanimity, which, as is the case with enlargement processes, sometimes necessitates referenda.
»The article makes it possible for a country that so far has stood aloof from the process to join the agreed-upon enhanced cooperation scheme whenever it likes.«
Thus, we should try to resolve the dilemmas by taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the existing treaties. Article 20 of the EU Treaty provides that states wishing to move forward together can cooperate more closely if at least nine of them join forces. To do so, they may make use of the existing instruments of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council, without the countries that don’t wish to participate being able to delay the process or vote on it. At the same time, the article makes it possible for a country that so far has stood aloof from the process to join the agreed-upon enhanced cooperation scheme whenever it likes.
Initiatives can thus be taken:
First: In foreign and security policy, particularly in strengthening Europe’s role within NATO.
Second: In tax policy, especially regarding the taxation of large tech companies.
Third: In the fight against crime and in police and judicial cooperation.
Fourth: In all areas for which the EU is already responsible, but in which individual states or groups of states are hindering the EU’s ability to act.
Preventing paralysis
The criticism that this would amount to a »multi-speed Europe« must certainly be taken seriously. Yet, in my view, this is better than paralysis, as we have recently seen in the case of aid to Ukraine.
Of course, this does not address the lack of a realistic prospect of accession for the Balkan states and Turkey. Therefore, on this point, it is urgently necessary to make possible what these states need most urgently: namely, privileged access to the European Union’s single market, the reduction of tariff barriers, and the integration of these countries into an economic process from which they can benefit. In other words, a kind of Southeast European free trade zone, similar to EFTA, through which Switzerland and Iceland previously were integrated into the European economic process. Edi Rama, the Prime Minister of Albania, and Aleksandar Vucic, the President of Serbia, have also recently proposed similar ideas. It should be in our European interest to examine the next steps here.
Injecting momentum into a political process
Certainly, the application of Article 20 and privileged access to the single market for those who currently have no option to join does not constitute a genuine re-founding of the EU, but it is the best realistic option we have: its application injects momentum into a political process that is currently marked by uncertainty and stagnation in the face of global crises. The Europe of enhanced cooperation can help maintain security and prosperity in Europe. Security and prosperity, in turn, are indispensable prerequisites for countering the rise of enemies of democracy and freedom.
»Europe would be well advised to work with reliable partners«
When it comes to global partnerships, Europe would be well advised to work together with reliable partners to form rules-based, effective structures and strategic alliances in order to achieve independence in key areas such as food, energy, critical supply chains, finance, and security in the medium term, while simultaneously striving to remain an attractive location endowed with freedom and prosperity for all to see.
To sum up, I would like to say: With its own security architecture, with new global partnerships, with enhanced cooperation, and with prospects for currently blocked accession candidates, Europe can mitigate these dilemmas and spark a new European dynamic.