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According to a survey conducted in 1899, most middle-class readers of a Berlin magazine expressed no doubt about one thing. The establishment of the German nation-state – under Prussian leadership and in the wake of a highly-praised victory over France – was the premier historical event of the outgoing century. We should not forget that, when the German empire was proclaimed in 1871, the still-small Social Democratic Party was relegated to a fringe position, where it was forced to remain for some time to come. Germany’s Catholic community tended to be skeptical as well. Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck still had to win over even the conservatives to his national strategy, since thus far it had been supported mainly by liberals. However, over the next few decades nation-building inside the country made important strides. The new state gained legitimacy, while toxic nationalism also began to surge. In 1914 Germany’s entry into World War I met with broad support, extending even into some elements of the newly ascendent Social Democracy.

During the Weimar Republic vociferous commitment to the nation-state moved somewhat toward the right, as conservatives, nationalists, and populists used it to stake out their propaganda position against the left, which had been the founder and chief support of the democratic constitutional state, but often was vilified as the betrayer of Germany. This despite the fact that the left itself had a nationalist orientation. Widespread nationalism was a crucial prerequisite for Hitler’s seizure of power. Nevertheless, his racist imperialism, which ignored national boundaries, shattered the framework of the nation-state and ended up destroying It, with catastrophic consequences.

Since 1945 the nation-state has been a frequent target of criticism and disdain. Some observers argue that the collapse of civilization that took place during previous years has thoroughly discredited it. They consider the nation-state to be the antithesis of democratization, international understanding, and gradual progress toward European integration. Moreover, during the years in which Germany was divided, the Federal Republic proved that a large country could develop successfully without being a nation-state. The faction that clung to the goal of national reunification, which was after all anchored in the Basic Law, seemed slowly to be losing ground. On the other hand, many observers, especially on the left, thought that the nation-state was historically outmoded, one of history’s discontinued models, or simply that it did not merit much special attention.

A powerful renaissance after 1989

In 1989 and thereafter, that viewpoint turned out to be wrong. Awareness that the two parts of Germany belonged together proved strong enough, especially in the crumbling German Democratic Republic, to transform the demand for reunification into a potent political force. Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic the nation-state idea sufficed to legitimize politically the enormous efforts and expenditures that would be needed to make reunification a reality. In east-central and southern Europe after 1989, both national dynamics and the nation-state itself experienced a powerful renaissance spurred by hostility to the – waning  – imperial rule of the Soviet Union, yet moderated by the fervent wish to »belong to Europe.« Also, ever since the end of the Second World War, decolonization, mainly in Asia and Africa, had accelerated and spread widely. The process assumed its institutional form in the rapid increase of newly independent states trying to adopt the nation-state model in the design of their new polities.

»The nation-state did not belong on the scrap heap of history anywhere.«

Once the Cold War ended, along with the demise of the hostile blocs to which it had given rise, nation-states acquired greater room for maneuver and their relative power vis-à-vis their counterparts took on added significance. The nation-state’s comeback occurred despite – or perhaps also because of – the simultaneous rapid progress of globalization. There is no question that international and transnational integration was proceeding apace around the world, that it was reinforced to some extent by international organizations, and that global NGOs were operating across national borders as well. Yet the conclusion is inescapable that the nation-state does not belong on the scrap heap of history anywhere. Rather, it adapts to transformations and survives with all its advantages and disadvantages.

In addition, since the second decade of the 21^st century, we have witnessed a trans-border wave of right-wing extremist ideas, movements, and actions. Relying on a populist toolkit, the far right has taken aim at the norms and institutions of liberal democracy, and recently has become a highly visible presence in the politics of both the majority of European countries and the USA. We might interpret this wave as a reaction to the experiences of previous decades, in which liberalization, democratization, and globalization took center stage. Those phenomena sparked changes and led the state to make excessive demands on the population that were simply too much for many people to bear. In response, broad segments of the populations in those countries were attracted to right-wing-oriented system-critiques. In modern right-wing extremism, demands expressed in slogans such as »Germany for the Germans« and »Make America great again,« have played a prominent role. Most of them evoke national interests, nationalist myths, and xenophobic resentments. In this menacing environment, the independent nation-state is winning new friends and admirers from the far right of the political spectrum.

Achievements

The nation-state represents a special kind of correspondence between the state and the people it governs. Moreover, it is based on a clearly demarcated territory that both actors – the state and its people – claim as their own. Furthermore, state and nation are linked by a national culture. That is, they function within an intended, practiced, and experiential context in which historical tales, myths, and memories as well as (usually) a common language, shared culture, and norms are central. To some extent, states make an effort to establish this coherent national context, primarily through legislation, the educational system, and the public sphere.

»…peculiar intertwinement of state, national culture, and the national citizen body.«

In this sense, national culture is often, though not necessarily, tinged by ethnicity. It encompasses and partially integrates various social strata, classes, and groups, while it is compatible with a certain degree of – albeit not unlimited – cultural heterogeneity. It gains its identity and integrative power by setting boundaries vis-à-vis other states and peoples. It enables and demands loyalty toward and participation in the state by the members of the nation who are equals in this sense. By the same token, the demarcation of members versus non-members legitimizes the lofty expectations directed by the state at individual subjects, up to and including the risk of their own lives in war for »the fatherland.« This implies that nation-states make demands so far-reaching that neither pre- nor post-national polities could meet them. This peculiar entwinement of state, national culture, and the national citizen body partly explains the superior capability of the nation-state in modern history and its remarkable resilience down to the present day.

The nation-state emerged in the late 18^th century in the wake of the American and French Revolutions as the space in which both feudalism and colonial rule of whites over whites had been overcome, but also as the epoch in which the first declarations of universal human rights were being formulated. Something of this progressive tradition has been preserved over the past two-and-a-half centuries. Again and again, the fervent call for national independence and/or national unity has been allied with the demand for freedom, equality, and emancipation and the struggle against obsolete privileges, foreign rule, or dictatorship. This twofold quest proved fruitless in the European revolutions of 1848-49, productive in the decolonization movements of the 20^th century, and successful in the central European revolutions of 1989-90. The outcome of the Ukrainians‹ struggle against Russian neocolonialism remains undecided.

»The principles of liberal democracy have been realized most consistently in nation-states.

No one should overlook the fact that universal suffrage was obtained only as the result of a long and laborious struggle. Still, it is significant that the promise of participation by all male citizens (and later by all female citizens as well) was embedded in the logic of the nation-state. However imperfectly the principles of liberal democracy have been redeemed, they were most likely to be realized consistently in nation-states rather than in the international, cross-border sphere. And to the extent that we have succeeded in curbing the worst abuses of capitalism and promoting the cause of social justice by political means, those advances were most likely to have happened in nation-states. The social welfare state was achieved within the framework of the nation-state and hardly ever in either transnational or highly local venues. The German Empire’s efforts to promote science, culture and art demonstrates how the ambition, competitiveness, and dynamism of nation-states can generate successes, regardless of the Empire’s shortcomings in other respects. The nation-state as a vehicle of progress? No doubt about it.

Weaknesses and roads to nowhere

Nevertheless, the history of the nation-state has a dark underside. It is true, as numerous examples testify, that nation-states can accommodate and assimilate marked social, ethnic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity. But when they abandon their liberal underpinnings, there is a great danger that the penchant – endemic in such polities – to treat their citizens in a uniform way and regiment every aspect of their lives will intensify, yielding a compulsive striving for homogenization. That can lead to the suppression of minorities and ultimately to their marginalization, as exemplified by the history of the Poles in the Prussian-German cultural sphere both before and after the founding of the nation-state. The history of the Jewish minority there confirms the point. As a rule, nation-states are less immune to dictatorial and totalitarian perversions than traditional empires or old-fashioned principalities, if for no other reason than that nation-states can more easily mobilize »the masses.«

Love of one’s own nation-state often turns into disrespect and contempt for or aggression against other nations, their members and their states. After all, the identity of the nation-state is constituted by boundary-setting vis-à-vis others, which can culminate in the violent ostracism of outsiders. Just as nation-states almost never have arisen without wars, the nationalism that inevitably accompanies their formation has contributed to enmity among peoples and triggered warfare.

That pattern shows up even in the early modern era when the French Revolution’s utopian belief in progress mutated into the bloody Napoleonic wars that devastated nearly all of Europe. The hatred of the French characteristic of emergent German nationalism demonstrates the same point. Here, too, we should recall the link between chauvinistic passions and the outbreak of both World Wars of the twentieth century. Nor should we forget how nationalistic arguments are invoked when there were and are reasons to justify transborder aggression and the acquisition of empires.

»Nation-states‹ quest for independence and their need for competition with others stands in the way of the creation of broader frameworks for decision-making and joint action.«

Finally, we should not overlook the fact that nation-states‹ quest for untrammeled independence and their sacro egoismo, i.e., their need for permanent competition with others, which is implicit in their foreign relations, stands seriously in the way of the creation of broader, overarching frameworks for decision-making and joint action that would transcend national borders. In a political situation in which power is primarily distributed among a few great powers or blocs, most nation-states will find themselves gravely weakened.

Limitations

Moreover, we live in a world in which the greatest challenges are global: control of capitalism, which long since has become transnational, the environmental and climate crises affecting all of humanity, and the preservation or restoration of peace. Because of their self-referential structure it is very difficult for nation-states effectively to advance solutions to such transnational problems. At present, that is their greatest weakness and most severe limitation.

It is not easy to benefit from the strengths and achievements of the nation-state without being confronted by its weaknesses and dangers. Strengths and weaknesses are interwoven. Prudent policymaking can partially disentangle the two elements by linking nation-state and transnational interests. Transnational embedding minimizes the egoism and aggressiveness inherent in the nation-state. On the other hand, attending to the roots and ties of the nation-state protects international alliances and institutions from losing their moorings in the world of everyday life and becoming ruthless or undemocratic. Despite its many disappointments and internal crises, the European Union continues to be one of the very few promising efforts to reconcile national and international interests. It deserves all the support we can give it, not because it is a transitional stage on the way to a European superstate, but more likely because, as a unique and original creation, it balances nation-statehood with transnationality in ways that are always fresh and open to the future.

A conceptual clarification: The concept of the nation first to be widely used in the German language around 1400, derived from the Latin verb nasci (»to be born«). Today, in a nation with high immigration, it would be anachronistic to define »nation« as meaning a »community of birth.« The reduction of nationality to supposedly objective traits, above all language, tradition, ethnic origin, culture, and character, can easily culminate in populistic nationalism. Even using subjective characteristics to define a nation, such as the desire to belong to a community together with others or sharing political values that all citizens feel obligated to accept, hardly does justice to either cultural pluralism or the claims of individual uniqueness (»singularity«). The least controversial definition seems to be the cautious one found in constitutional law: the nation is the people constituting the state, i.e., the totality of citizens of that state regardless of language und ethnic origin, who reside within the given boundaries of the state. On this definition there is no way to justify their displacement by violent means. (Ed.)