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What are the implications of this reversal in American foreign policy, away from the defense of human rights and the encouragement of democracy toward undisguised intervention? Two months after the military strike, the contours of a new American posture toward Latin America as well as its impacts on the region are becoming clearer.
As Latin Americans see it, the military operation in Venezuela represents the latest chapter in a long history of US intervention in the region. Between the 1940s and 1980s, the rules-based, multilateral postwar order coincided with the acme of US interventionism in the region, a (sometimes forcible) policy justified by the goal of containment, i.e., stopping the spread of real or imagined communism. During that era the United States carried out a series of covert or open interventions in Latin America. They included CIA-organized or -supported coups in Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973), the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961), the financing of the Contras‹ war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua (198190), the training of military personnel at the notorious Escuela de las Americas in Panama, and finally the violent overthrow of Panamanian President Manuel Noriega by the invading U.S. military in 1989-90.
Even the decades after the end of the Cold War were anything but free of attempted political meddling by the United States in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. The region’s leftward turn during the early 2000s was tracked suspiciously by Washington, which sometimes responded by demonstrating open support for right-wing opposition forces. Nevertheless, between 1990 and 2026 there were no more open military interventions. In fact, the attention of American policymakers shifted away from Latin America during that period.
The claim of unchallenged U.S. hegemony
Both of those trends have reversed since Donald Trump returned to the White House. In the new national security strategy, published at the beginning of December last year, the Western Hemisphere takes clear priority. And that marks a sharp departure from even the political outlook of the first Trump Administration. The »Trump Corollary« to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine – the so-called »Donroe Doctrine« – lies at the heart of Washington’s current policy toward Latin America. The original declaration of principle formulated by President James Monroe (1817–1825) was directed mainly against imperial meddling in the Western Hemisphere by European monarchies. The aims of the present United States government are far more explicit: gaining unchallenged hegemony over the entire Western Hemisphere, including Latin America, the Caribbean, and even Greenland.
»The struggle against rivals from outside the region is directed primarily against China.«
For one thing, that ambition encompasses control over the politics of the region’s countries to ensure that they align with American priorities such as combating »narco-terrorism,« interdicting migration, or giving the United States access to critical resources. For another, it means not only denying a military presence to rivals from outside the region, but also depriving them of control over strategically important »financial assets.« The last clause of Trump’s doctrine is directed especially against China, which has gained considerable influence in Latin America during the last few decades. China has focused on sectors like raw materials, infrastructure projects, and technological development. Moreover, it has discovered that it can sell many of its products, especially consumer goods, in Latin American markets. Geopolitical competition is playing out in Latin America as well, a fact that became obvious in the case of Panama shortly after the start of Trump’s second term.
By the same token, the means used by the United States to enforce its interests have changed drastically. The shutdown of USAID and the enormous expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean clearly mark a shift away from an economic-development-oriented agenda toward the open exploitation of economic and political power vis-à-vis a region that remains politically divided.
The »Donroe Doctrine« in action
Washington’s intervention in Venezuela is the first case in which the »Donroe Doctrine« has been applied. And in fact, the national defense strategy, published barely three weeks after the military strike, explicitly names Venezuela as an example of how the U.S. government intends to enforce Trump’s amendment to the Monroe Doctrine: »with speed, power, and precision, as the world could see.«
»The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the promotion of human rights and democracy no longer play a role.«
Although previous interventions by the United States in Latin America also were aimed at securing geopolitical dominance and the pursuit of economic interests, under the current regime those interests have been articulated more nakedly. An imperialist policy is now accompanied by imperialist rhetoric. Not even the slightest effort was made to legitimize the military operation against Venezuela in terms of international law. Instead, the U.S. government claimed the right to assume political control in Venezuela for the foreseeable future and to secure access to its petroleum reserves. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries played as little a role in Trump’s statements as did human rights or democracy.
It’s true that Secretary of State Marco Rubio did allude vaguely to a »transitional« phase that would follow »stabilization« and »reconstruction.« However, so far there is no hint that any such transition is in the offing. Instead, the cabal in power in Venezuela rallied around Maduro’s vice-president Delcy Rodriguez, now serving as transitional president. The new government has in fact been sending out certain signals indicating a political opening, e.g., by releasing some political prisoners. Nevertheless, key figures in the authoritarian regime have held onto their offices, and the regime’s structures remain intact. Their role will now be to stabilize the foreign policy reversal that has made Venezuela a junior partner of the USA.
Toward that end, the country’s acting president has been performing a discursive balancing-act. In her January 16 speech before parliament on the state of the nation as well as in posts on Instagram, she has depicted a country that weathered an economic slump but was now on the way to recovery. At the same time, she is combining anti-imperialist rhetoric with appeals for foreign investment in the oil sector. Evidently, she has been willing enough to cooperate to satisfy Trump.
Implications for the region
U.S. intervention in Venezuela has sparked a divided response in Latin America. For the most part, reactions by the region’s governments have followed predictable political and ideological lines. Right-wing governments from Argentina and Ecuador to El Salvador have applauded the incursion, while Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay have condemned it, partly because it represented an obvious violation of international law.
These reactions are more than just everyday politics. They make it clear that the United States' focus on Latin America, combined with the aggressive power politics inherent in the Donroe Doctrine, will limit the region’s political leeway. While Latin American countries had previously attempted to sidestep the collision of rival powers through a policy of balancing and economic diversification, that sort of positioning now seems increasingly risky. In addition, it weakens the still notoriously fragile efforts to advance regional integration und sharpens conflicts over the proper political course.
Already, it’s not hard to foresee that the USA will exert an enormous influence on the political landscape of Latin America in the coming months. Presidential elections are schedule for 2026 in Peru, Colombia, and Brazil. Trump may well make direct political endorsements, but fears of economic or political setbacks also could influence electoral outcomes in the region. At the same time, it’s apparent that the USA has shifted its gaze toward Cuba. There, stricter enforcement of the economic blockade seems intended to compel the country to embark on a change of course. The Caribbean Island is going through a serious crisis; moreover, it is central to the domestic politics of the Republican Party as well as to Marco Rubio, who has ambitions for a more powerful office.
»It is by no means a given that close ties with the Trump Administration will guarantee electoral victories for the political right.«
However, it is by no means a given that close ties with the Trump Administration will guarantee electoral victories for the political right. The U.S. government’s inhumane migration policy is being closely watched throughout the region. Furthermore, its imperialistic policy toward Latin America is far from popular there. In Brazil, for example, the incumbent president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (»Lula«), so far seems likely to have benefitted from it. In any case it is clear that the Trump regime is confronting Latin American policymakers with new challenges.
Reactions
The intervention in Venezuela shows what the United States government really has in mind with its Donroe Doctrine. As far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned – including not only Latin America and the Caribbean but even Greenland now – the USA is pursuing an imperialist agenda of domination and unchallenged preeminence, with the goal of exploitation. Limitations previously imposed by human rights and international law, democratic standards, or even the basic principles governing inter-state cooperation no longer play a role.
What is less clear at this point is how China, in particular, will respond to Washington’s imperial policy. Likewise, we’ll have to wait and see whether European countries can offer any alternative to the ambitions of the great powers. While the controversial Mercosur Treaty was signed at the beginning of 2026, the tentative reactions of European nations to U.S. policy toward Latin America seem to point in the wrong direction. The same holds true for cutbacks in their pledges of development aid to the region. The successful cooperation of European nations with Latin American civil society and grass-roots organizations, joint deliberation on scientific issues, and work on future policymaking in the areas of human rights, sustainability, social justice, and equal rights have come under severe pressure. These are precisely the matters that it should be in Europe’s self-interest to expand in close cooperation with its Latin American partners.