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In 1970 political scientist Fritz Scharpf published a book entitled Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung (Democratic Theory from Utopia to Adaptation) that set the tone for the down-to-earth analysis of political processes. In that work Scharpf succeeded in making the distinction between input and output, rooted as it was in functionalist systems theory, more plausible to a broader specialist public. He suggested that we should distinguish between two different kinds of political legitimacy: »rule by the people« and »rule for the people.« Do political systems manage to make decisions in line with popular preferences by encouraging the participation and stakeholding of as many citizens as possible (input)? Or do democratic decisions seem convincing because they solve collective problems, are well thought-out, and can be implemented practically at lower levels (output)?

That Scharpf accords normative priority to the output dimension should not surprise anybody who has heard of his analyses of the »political interdependence trap,« a concept that he coined in 2009 in an essay for the Max Planck Institute for Social Research. It was intended to describe the »increasingly negative repercussions of the specific structures of German federalism upon the political sphere’s ability to solve problems.« In both federally organized states and supranational bodies such as the European Union, several levels of government and a plethora of actors frequently are involved in reaching decisions. This entanglement results from the very division of powers and responsibilities that were desired in the first place and leads to mutual dependencies and coordination loops in the political process. In short: goals have to be agreed upon, decisions coordinated, and compromises found. And none of that leads inexorably to the best outcome in each case, and certainly not to political payoffs with unequivocal accountability.

The point of this essay is to present an outline of the problem rather than to attempt an exegesis of Scharpf’s work. For decades democratic politics have been accompanied by background music: chiefly, the lament that it is hardly possible to implement »ambitious« policies within the existing structures of federal, parliamentary democracy. At one time, such critiques emanated from a reactionary-antiliberal milieu, embodied by such figures such as Carl Schmitt who excoriated the institutional incapacity of democratic political systems to act decisively. But other critics, above all those in the Seventies, argued that the modern state had overextended itself and even was becoming »ungovernable. Having assumed sweeping responsibility for the well-being of its citizens, it seemed to have been weighed down by its own excessive aspirations. 

How much leeway does politics have? A brief survey 

Later, globalization served as the entering wedge for a different line of attack that would press the state to whittle down its ambitions in favor of an alleged »politics with no alternative« beholden to neo-liberal financial market capitalism. In many instances, crisis diagnoses and »forward« defenses of democracy feature a survey of the leeway or room for maneuver left to politics or even of what British political scientists simply call political feasibility.

For that reason, academic studies inquire: what matters can be decided and implemented through political means and how? What are the pros and cons of specific political and electoral systems (first-past-the-post or proportional representation). Also, what are the advantages and disadvantages inherent in a given constellation of political forces? Which formal and informal veto-wielders are there, and what kinds of path dependencies limit the political system’s capacities? As far as political scientists are concerned, what ultimately needs explaining is not so much incrementalism as such – the petty details of democratic politics – but rather radical policy change.

»Politics is less than efficient yet institutionally stable.«.

Politics in this country relies on wide-ranging, constantly renewed processes of coordination; consequently, the German system has been rightly depicted as a more or less resilient, robust negotiated democracy. But that characterization is remarkably at odds with its image in public debates which focus on – and denounce – its clumsiness and intrigues. So, it appears that we are dealing with a kind of politics in Germany that, though less than efficient, remains institutionally stable. For example, there is a tendency to ignore the large number of political projects in which the state governments are involved by way of the upper house, the Bundesrat. And because opposition parties often run state governments, they too have a say in those projects.  

Furthermore, blame games and game frames are widespread. On talk shows for example, people are constantly trying to figure out who has been »winning« in political Berlin and who has been »losing,« or who has gotten something accomplished and who should take the blame for another political roadblock. There is nothing wrong with all this, yet it is worth pondering the fact that parliamentary democracy can be carried on only with majorities and not against them. A government is politically legitimate and empowered only as long as it enjoys the support of a majority in parliament, despite all the doomsaying and strategically-motivated calls for new elections. 

What democracy means

Democracy depends on the relevant actors‹ ability to compromise, i.e. on their enlightened self-interest in cooperation and bargaining. In the last analysis, democratic politics means obtaining a majority for political projects that eventually become collectively binding decisions, thereby obligating even the losing minorities (here we mean political rather than ethnic, religious, socio-cultural, etc. minorities!). Democracies always face the challenge of keeping outvoted forces loyal. That already implies an enormous ambition on the part of this institutional order, since it counts on the idea – or at least the assertion – of a general will rather than on a logic of authoritarian imposition.

However, many critics complain that the coalition now in office – the SPD, the Greens/Alliance 90, and the FDP – hasn’t even managed to keep its own voter base loyal, let alone present a shared idea of the »general will.« The divergences are too wide for that, and the notions about the relationship between state and society too disparate. Losses in the European elections and state elections as well as the shifts in voters‹ affiliations evident in both debacles make it clear that, in the eyes of the electorate, the problem-solving capacity of this coalition looks quite limited. 

»Politics operates like a malign zero-sum game«.

In 2024 the German government has been stuck not only in the aforementioned political interdependence trap, but also in a bogged-down-coalition trap. Here, politics operates like a malign zero-sum game in which actors quarrel publicly about which political schemes should be granted priority and especially about how those should be financed. Unlike the situation during the chancellorship of Angela Merkel, it has not been so much poll-watching and fear of placid, easygoing voters that have diminished the democratic will to shape policies. Instead, it has been the permanent tussle over the framework conditions of such policies, especially about how to craft a budget that conforms to constitutional law and how to adhere to the debt ceiling in times that, for many actors and observers, cry out for investment and policy change. One doesn’t have to advocate indiscipline in matters of fiscal policy to realize that prudent and in many respects sustainable budgetary policy is needed and that budgetary issues will decide the fate of political ambitions.

A certain narrative about our current situation has gained credence with the public lately. At the beginning of the legislative term, the story goes, the traffic-light government declared itself to be a »progressive« coalition. In the early stages there was a honeymoon, a time for proclaiming ambitious goals. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed not only the proverbial but even the concrete conditions for doing the business of German politics and of this governing coalition as well. Aware of the historical uniqueness of our present age, the Federal Chancellor, Olaf Scholtz, solemnly proclaimed a »historical turning-point.«.

»Once they are proclaimed, ›turning points‹ demand political change.«

»Turning points« demand change – and thus political transformation; otherwise, they would not be turning points at all. To issue such a proclamation is certainly ambitious and makes it seem politically appropriate to follow up on the implied promise of change. But what the sequel should be isn’t quite clear yet. The special fund for the German armed forces is the most obvious consequence, but what else will the turning point in history bring? In addition to bolstering military combat readiness, how can we go further in strengthening the resilience of this democracy in the midst of geopolitical upheavals and great power conflicts?

In the midst of a historical turn, it remains an open question whether it still makes sense to continue relying on traditional approaches: treating politics as a zero-sum game and clinging to the results of previous agenda-setting on budgetary and fiscal matters. At bottom, those ought to be political rather than academic decisions. Yet Chancellor Scholz has sent mixed messages on all this. After declaring a historic turning-point, he later issued a governmental policy statement in November of 2023, indicating that not much would change after all, especially for individual citizens. That amounts to a retreat from the very ambitions that the government had proclaimed initially and fosters the impression that, where its programs are concerned, this government has lost its way. Democratic politics requires majorities and those have to be pieced together through politics. That, in turn, requires politicians and parties that meet and arbitrate overblown expectations. To do so, they must entertain more than one modest ambition: that of their own political survival.