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Since Trump’s visit to Beijing, people and the media in Taiwan—as well as in the West—have been wondering whether Chinese President Xi Jinping will follow Putin’s example with his invasion of Ukraine and attempt to annex Taiwan in a surprise move; in Germany, for example, a best-selling book asks whether »China will attack.« The German foreign minister Johann Wadephul, like his predecessor, Annalena Baerbock, has stated that a move like this would violate international law, although the People’s Republic of China immediately disputed that claim. In legal matters, however, what one decides after often-elaborate deliberations is sometimes less important than how obvious the outcome is. Even a novice in international law can easily recognize that, for example, the U.S. and Israel, with their attacks on Iran, or Russia, with its attack on Ukraine, have launched unlawful wars of aggression in violation of the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2, Paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.
However, it is more difficult to say whether Taiwan would be entitled to invoke the same prohibition on the use of force against China, since China does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Because the island belonged to the Chinese Empire from 1683 to 1895, before coming under Japanese colonial rule for 50 years, China claims it as part of its territory. Nevertheless, the provision of the UN Charter cited above applies—according to its wording—only to »international relations,« not to the use of force within a single state. In other words: It does not intend to restrict the right of states to assert its sovereignty and defend its territory by force when a part of a country attempts to secede (e.g., the Confederate States of America in 1861) or when two parties within the same state are fighting for power in a civil war (as in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39); according to Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, these are »internal affairs.«
Taiwan’s current situation is basically the last vestige of a civil war over power in China that took place 77 years ago, when the defeated Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek fled to the island to escape the triumphant Communists led by Mao Zedong. Beijing emphasizes that this is a matter of »internal affairs«: it is therefore entitled to use force to resolve the situation in accordance with its own interests. Viewed in this light, Taiwan would not enjoy protection under the prohibition on the use of force under international law vis-à-vis China.
This conclusion is unsatisfactory, at least upon closer inspection. Above all, it cannot be ignored that since 1949, a fully functional society has been established in Taiwan—one that is significantly better-functioning than many other states. Initially a dictatorship, it has become a model of self-democratization. From the most modest beginnings, it has built a thriving economy with a per capita income several times higher than China’s. Despite all the Chinese pressures to which the island is currently exposed, the Taiwanese state is clearly on solid foundations—even without China’s recognition.
Despite its lack of diplomatic recognition, Taiwan has achieved a de facto level of internal and external stability equivalent to that enjoyed by recognized states.
Taiwan undeniably meets the criteria established under international law as prerequisites for statehood: a territory under the state’s control, a citizen body, and effective sovereign power. The resulting situation is by no means rare. To this day Serbia still refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Following the division of Korea in 1947, the communist North resorted to military means in 1950 to bring about the forcible reunification of the peninsula. A move which the UN Security Council classified as a violation of the prohibition on the use of force. Similarly, in the 1973 Basic Treaty with the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany recognized the GDR only »under domestic constitutional law,« but not »under international law.« If China were correct in its position on Taiwan, such pairings would likewise have to be placed outside the scope of the prohibition on the use of force. But can it ever be legitimate to deny recognition to a state in defiance of objective reality? And for an indefinite period of time?
In the case of Taiwan, 77 years have passed since it established its own statehood. The conclusion is inescapable: at some point, the denial of a state’s very existence through refusal to grant it diplomatic recognition constitutes a flagrant violation of objective reality. For this reason, international law here invokes the category of a »de facto regime,« which refers to political entities that, despite a lack of recognition, have in fact achieved a degree of internal and external stability equivalent to that of recognized states. Such entities should therefore be treated as states.
This outcome alone is also consistent with the imperative of peace that guides the UN Charter. Moreover, it is often overlooked that if Taiwan were unable to invoke the prohibition on the use of force under international law against China, the same would naturally apply in reverse: Taiwan, for its part, would also be entitled to use any form of force against China. The dangers arising from this might seem acceptable given the stark asymmetry between the two sides; but of course, the prohibition on the use of force is not merely about total conquest; rather, it also prohibits covert actions of all kinds, cyberattacks, or sabotage.
This conclusion does not violate the One-China policy advocated by Germany and the European Union. That policy merely prohibits recognizing any state other than the »People’s Republic of China« as a »sovereign state in China.« It is the reason why Germany does not maintain diplomatic relations with the island. Thus, this position is also consistent with the UN General Assembly resolution of October 25, 1971, according to which the seat in the UN General Assembly—as well as one on the Security Council—previously held by Taiwan on behalf of »China« was transferred to the »People’s Republic of China.« However, China claims that this resolution also implicitly acknowledges that Taiwan belongs to China. In fact, the resolution makes no mention of this point; its brief text is limited solely to a decision regarding the »China« seat. Two recent resolutions of the European Parliament (dated January 29, 2025, and January 21, 2026) have rightly rejected China’s interpretation, which goes beyond this provision. Ultimately, under the legal interpretation presented here, China remains free to continue pursuing the goal of the island’s reunification with China—but only by peaceful means.
Now one might wonder whether such subtle considerations serve any practical purpose. We are all too familiar with the temptation to describe this or that as desirable in order to avoid burdening the moral high ground thus attained with the question of what applications of power would be required to bring about the desired state of affairs. And if even America apparently no longer wishes to be guided by the fundamental rules of the international legal framework, why should an emerging China, determined to catch up with the U.S. in every respect, act any differently? Such considerations—especially in light of recent Russian and American military actions—form the backdrop for widespread speculation in Taiwan and the U.S. as to whether domestic or party-political developments in China might prompt a power-conscious Party General Secretary to put his political standing on a new and firm footing through »reunification« with Taiwan.
In a conversation with Donald Trump, Xi emphasized that a »declaration of independence« by Taiwan would cross a »red line,« which China would not allow. In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on May 16 that Taiwan is »a sovereign and independent democratic nation« that is »not subordinate« to the People’s Republic of China. Could this virtually indisputable fact now trigger armed Chinese action?
»Given the importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, the consequences of a war over Taiwan could be massive.«
It is not easy to predict how military actions will turn out. The invasion of Ukraine and Trump’s adventure in Iran serve as clear warnings of their unpredictability. China recognizes this as well. Incidentally, China asserts territorial claims not only against Taiwan but also in the South and East China Seas, against Vietnam, the Philippines, and others. If it were to seize Taiwan by force, the result would be a widespread arms buildup on the part of all the states mentioned—from Japan to India—a combination that even China would have to fear. And the global economic repercussions of a war over Taiwan could be massive, given the importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry—and would affect China itself.
Ultimately, behind all such considerations lies the same idea that has always inspired the prohibition of war under international law: that war is the ultimate evil; that, in the words of Bismarck, whoever sets the »iron dice« rolling enters entirely uncharted territory; and that at all events it is better to rely on peaceful means. Whether China ultimately allows its rise to the rank of a superpower—a rise that has been acknowledged by all—to culminate in a strategy of war, or whether it advances its interests through peaceful competition with strategic patience and confidence in its own strengths, will be determined by the Taiwan issue. The decisive factor here will be the self-image and world order to which China feels committed.